Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL809
2009-04-01 14:11:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY LEW

Tags:  PREL AMGT ABLD APER CVIS AF 
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VZCZCXRO6434
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #0809/01 0911411
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 011411Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8075
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000809 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL AMGT ABLD APER CVIS AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY LEW

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000809

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL AMGT ABLD APER CVIS AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY LEW


1. (SBU) Embassy Kabul warmly welcomes your visit.


2. (SBU) The coming year will take its identity from the
Afghan presidential election, and from increased US military
deployments. Implementing the new strategy will require
significant resources to enhance our current diplomatic
support platform. We continue to face tough challenges in
Afghanistan, particularly on the security and governance
front. The President's Strategic Review for Afghanistan and
Pakistan has delineated the way forward in Afghanistan.
Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Holbrooke
is leading the effort to take a more integrated, regional
approach here. Conditions remain more nuanced than the
negative drumbeat often coming from the media. Advances in
security do not grab headlines the way a spectacular suicide
attack does. Progress in development continues. National
and international will is holding, but poor governance and
corruption are corrosive problems. The Afghan response to
President Obama's strategy for Afghanistan has been
overwhelmingly positive, including a strong public
endorsement from Karzai. This suggests that he too is
looking to turn the page on the period of disagreement and
growing tensions in our relationship.

Resource Issues
--------------


3. (SBU) Upgrading Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif -- Planning is
underway to stand up these two locations by June 1. Funding
sources and specific requirements are being determined, to
support projected seven-person State with other agency
personnel at each site.


4. (SBU) Housing and desks in Kabul -- Frequently-amended
staffing projections have complicated planning, but we expect
30-50 new USDH on compound by July, and 100 by the end of the
year. 20 trailers (40 beds) will be ready for occupancy by
early May, with another 40 trailers (80 beds) ready by
end-August. We currently have 60 spare desks (unclassified
areas) and plan to increase to 100 by rearranging and "dense
packing" work areas. Our classified office space is at
maximum capacity, so new requirements would displace current
occupants.


5. (SBU) Airwing -- State received 08 supplemental ($19m)
and 09 bridge supp ($36m) funds for added air assets. INL

Airwing (Patrick AFB and Kabul),at SCA's request, conducted
a study to determine best type of aircraft and acquisition
method (purchase or lease) to meet projected needs. The
study indicates purchase, with 2-3 aircraft arriving December
2009 at the earliest.


6. (SBU) Added air transport requirements as we open Herat
and Mazar, and in the runup for elections, will not be met
with current plans. Leasing via an existing USAID Air
contract appears a reasonable alternative, getting aircraft
here as early as July. A third possibility would be
chartered hours from existing in-country air service
providers. Commercial carriers KamAir and Safi Airways might
also be options.


7. (SBU) New apartment and office construction -- OBO
intends to award contracts for a 200-unit apartment building
and 530-desk unclassified office annex on the existing
embassy compounds in Kabul. Construction should begin by
early 2010 and be completed in late 2011. Existing housing
and services trailers (the Afghan "Brothers" cafeteria) will
be displaced to other locations on-compound.


8. (SBU) Acquiring additional land -- for staff growth and
relocating the LGF guard camp (Camp Sullivan),prospects are
good for getting 25-30 acres of MoD-controlled parcels from
the GIRoA, but we will need to continue to raise this at high
levels (MoD, MFA, Karzai) until resolved. Murky land titling
and competing ownership claims may delay or complicate
acquiring the land. To make the 25-30 acres usable, we need
to acquire the "TAYL panhandle," a 1-acre strip separating
our compound from the 25-30 acres noted above. The panhandle
is attached to the main TAYL property, 6-acres slated for
Marriott hotel construction starting April 2009, also
adjacent to our CAFE compound and bordering Massoud Circle.
OPIC has loaned TAYL funds for the project. A US investor
owns 25% of TAYL. We also want to acquire a 3.5 acre
Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) property adjacent to the
north end of our embassy-side compound. However, in
exchange, MoPH would like a new ministry building ($19m),
disproportional to the $4-5m appraised value of the current
MoPH site.


9. (SBU) SIVs - Special Immigrant Visas -- The 2009 Omnibus
Appropriations Act included 1500 SIVs per year for the next
five years for USG and USG-contractor employees with one year
of service who face a threat related to their employment.

KABUL 00000809 002 OF 004


This has the potential to significantly increase LES/FSN
turnover, if large numbers of LES pursue this SIV, as we
expect they will.

Elections
--------------


10. (SBU) The August 20 presidential election continues to
color every aspect of political life here. Karzai's
popularity has fallen - dramatically in some areas and among
some constituencies. But overall the Asia Foundation poll
found that 66 percent of the population still thought the
national government was doing a "very good" or "somewhat
good" job (compared to 80 percent in 2007). In our view, it
is Karzai's election to lose so long as political opposition
leaders continue to quarrel among themselves and fail to
unite behind a credible opposition candidate. Opposition
coalition United Front has signaled Dr. Abdullah Abdullah
will be its candidate, but has not yet made an official
announcement - reportedly due to ongoing internal discussions
aimed at securing broader UF support for an Abdullah
candidacy. Insecurity and corruption are the President's
greatest vulnerabilities. Karzai installed Interior Minister
Atmar in October 2008 to turn up the heat on both problems.
Atmar is working hard, but timeis too short for dramatic
improvement before elections.


11. (SBU) An expected rise in insecurity in the south during
elections is prompting some - including Karzai, other
Pashtuns and some RC-South partners - to raise the specter of
Pashtun disenfranchisement and possible illegitimacy of the
vote. Predicted disruptions of voter registration, however,
did not take place, even in the south and we are confident
that voting itself will go forward, not least because of the
arrival of additional U.S. combat brigades and the growth of
the Afghan army at more than 2500 troops per month. We
expect some election violence, however.

Debate Over Transitional Authority
--------------


12. (SBU) The earlier election date debate has been resolved.
The opposition now has shifted its focus to challenging the
legitimacy of Karzai remaining in office beyond May 22, the
date on which his term expires under the Afghan constitution.
The issue is executive authority following May 22 and
through August 20 to the inauguration of the next president.
Opposition leaders' claims that they are motivated by
constitutional concerns ring hollow given their alternatives
are equally extra-constitutional. However, there is genuine
concern among some Afghans and the international community
that Karzai will use his office inappropriately to leverage
support for his re-election. We recognize this concern, but
believe it is important for Afghanistan to maintain
continuity of leadership throughout this period, especially
during the summer fighting season and in the lead-up to
elections. We have therefore encouraged the opposition to
focus its efforts on successful elections rather than on
political posturing. At the same time, we have asked Karzai
to publicly support the principles of a level-playing field
for all candidates.


13. (SBU) The Supreme Court weighed into the debate March 29
issuing a statement saying the President and his two Vice
Presidents should continue in office based on the principles
of the Afghan constitution and sharia law, as well as the
same logistical concerns that led to political consensus
supporting a later election date than is prescribed in the
constitution. The opposition objected to the Supreme Court
statement, accusing Karzai of engineering it. The Court's
comment is not binding, but does add political weight to
Karzai staying in place until elections. The Department of
State issued a public statement March 30 strongly supporting
and welcoming the Court's statement, adding the U.S. believes
continuity of government is critical during this period and
contributes to creating stability. We expect the
transitional authority issue to be resolved eventually
through some political consensus in which Karzai remains in
office until the election.

Security
--------------


14. (SBU) Seventy percent of the violence continues to occur
in about 10 percent of the 365 districts. Coalition and
Afghan security forces have increased our area of control.
The Taliban response has been a forced shift in tactics from
insurgency to terrorism designed to challenge the will of
Afghans and the international community. Ordinary Afghans
feel less safe because of this switch, and as result of
rising criminality, especially kidnappings.


15. (SBU) President Obama's decision to deploy 17,000 U.S.

KABUL 00000809 003 OF 004


troops is concrete support of the U.S. commitment to improve
Afghan security. A number of coalition partners are also
increasing their troop contributions, but it's clear the U.S.
will continue to provide the lion's share of international
security support to Afghanistan. Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) will be undermanned for the foreseeable future.
The recently-released Strategic Review contained U.S.
acknowledgment that the ANSF must be expanded but it was not
specific on the questions of "how much" and "how fast."
Presently there are about 82,000 Afghan National Army (ANA)
soldiers, 81,000 Afghan National Police, and about 59,000
international military personnel to maintain security. The
ANA is growing at more than 2,500 per month and is projected
to reach its currently authorized strength of 134,000 in

2011. The current ANP authorized strength is 82,000.
International forces are expected to top 80,000 by late 2009.
We and the international community are working closely with
MOI Atmar to accelerate police reform and training, develop
more intelligence-based policing, significantly reduce
corruption, and create vetted, specialized police units.


16. (SBU) We and the U.S. military are also cooperating with
President Karzai's initiative to energize renewed community
responsibility for security in their locality, without
re-creating local militias. The Afghan Public Protection
Force (APPF) is still in development stage, and will be an
official ANSF organization under the Minister of Interior.
In the pilot phase, district councils and local shuras
nominated over 200 local - but tribally integrated -
community guards per district. These candidates were vetted
by the Minister of Interior and National Directorate of
Security. CSTC-A and U.S. Special Forces trained the
trainers and ODA SOF will provide the guards with mentoring
oversight for local defense within the boundaries of the
community. The first members of the Afghan Public Protection
Force just graduated from training March 26. The pilot
program is underway in Wardak Province.

Governance
--------------


17. (SBU) Karzai struggles to maintain a balance between
institutional and traditional informal governance, in an
environment of poverty, social exhaustion, illicit power
centers arising from decades of political breakdown,
governmental incapacity, criminality, and insurgency.
Electoral dynamics are further complicating the problem,
leading Karzai to make expedient decisions on one hand, but
also to appoint top-flight leaders like Atmar who seem
capable of delivering police services on the other. There
are no easy answers, and neither Karzai nor the international
community can fight all battles all the time. That said, we
will look for improved Afghan performance on the governance
front with increased U.S. civilian presence and capacity
building assistance from both the U.S. and other donors.


18. (SBU) In Kabul, the focus is on capacity building,
creation of a merit-based, professional bureaucracy, and
delivery of services to the public. Strong ministries
include Foreign Affairs, Defense, Public Health, Education,
Finance, Rural Development, and Counter-Narcotics. The
Central Bank is well-led. Interior and Agriculture have new,
better leadership. We work closely with those entities. We
also work effectively with the other ministries, but mixed
agendas or a legacy of weakness slow progress. For instance,
the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice suffer from the
acute lack of qualified professionals, a history of judicial
decision-making that combines elements of Sharia, tribal, and
now Western law, and a lack of national consensus on the way
forward.


19. (SBU) Outside Kabul, U.S. civilian and military efforts
are aimed at strengthening both the Afghan central
government's role and that of local government. We work
equally with traditional leadership structures, as well as
those who gained power through force or wealth during the
days of conflict, but have proven themselves ready to
cooperate with constitutional government and rule of law.
Lack of local consensus, traditionally weak connections
between the capital and localities, long-standing rivalries
and distrust among communities, and the presence of
illegitimate insurgent or criminal spoilers complicate the
task. The goal is responsive, reliable leadership in local
communities, which binds them to the capital in a reciprocal
way. The Embassy working with U.S. Forces Afghanistan
(USFOR-A) created an Integrated Civil Military Action Group
(ICMAG) as a means to enhance unity of effort across all
military and civilian agencies, with initial focus on
Regional Command-East (RC-E). This group is now expanding
its effort to RC-South as the U.S. presence increases in that
region in the coming months. The ICMAG's mandate includes
joint civilian-military planning assessments and operations
from the national to the local level.

KABUL 00000809 004 OF 004



Taliban Reconciliation
--------------


20. (SBU) Reconciliation with Taliban or other insurgent
leaders is controversial here. Many welcome the possibility
of reduced violence and instability via a possible
reconciliation with the Taliban, while others (mainly
non-Pashtuns, women, and certain civil society groups) fear a
Pashtun deal that could come at the expense of their
interests. So far, all reconciliation efforts have been
premised on respect for the constitution, and no ties to
Al-Qaeda, which has allowed us to support these initiatives.
Although last year's Saudi attempt to begin talks about talks
generated much interest, there has since been little concrete
progress in that or any other initiative.

Narcotics: Serious Challenges Remain; Some Positive Trends
-------------- --------------


21. (SBU) Poppy cultivation remains a difficult challenge,
particularly addressing the nexus between narcotics
traffickers and insurgents; a challenge further complicated
by widespread public corruption. However, there is some good
news; poppy cultivation dropped 19 percent in 2008, the first
reduction since 2005. Poppy-free provinces grew from 13 to
18, or to more than half of all provinces. Three formerly
major poppy cultivating provinces - Badakhshan, Balkh, and
Nangarhar - have succeeded in eliminating or nearly
eliminating poppy cultivation. However, the narcotics
challenge continues in the south, where seven provinces now
account for 98 percent of the country's opium, and
trafficking is bound to the insurgency. Together with the
UK, we are backing Helmand Governor Mangal's initiative to
eliminate narcotics cultivation in a 100-square mile area of
Helmand through an intensive information campaign,
agricultural assistance, and Afghan army-protected
eradication. The Afghan Police's Poppy Eradication
Force (PEF) with security support from the Afghan Army's
Counter Narcotics Infantry Kandak (CINK) is currently
conducting eradication in Helmand province in
narcotics-growing areas where there is heavy presence of
anti-government forces.

International Community and Afghanistan
--------------


22. (SBU) Relations between the government and the
international community are uneven. International support is
holding, as demonstrated by broad international support for
the Administration's comprehensive policy and increased,
closer policy consultation with key partners. There has been
real improvement in bilateral relations with the Zardari
government of Pakistan, although there is strong skepticism
here that Zardari can ever extend control over Pakistan's
military and intelligence apparatus. The UN presence is
strong, but SRSG Kai Eide has not yet been able to play the
key coordination role hoped for, not least because of
insufficient budgetary and personnel commitment from New York.


23. (SBU) There are often disagreements between the
internationals and the Afghan government regarding issues of
corruption, governance, rule of law, freedom of the press,
and other areas. Internationals bridle, for example, when
Karzai attributes the bulk of corruption in Afghanistan to
international aid donations. The most important gap between
the government and the coalition is over the issue of
civilian casualties: there are efforts moving towards
agreement on the balance between necessary security
operations and necessary protections for civilians, including
an agreement signed by General McKiernan and Afghan Minister
of Defense Wardak, aiming to minimize civilian casualties
through increased coordination between ANSF and coalition
forces.


24. (SBU) Karzai's enthusiastic public response to the
release of the President's Strategic Review marked a dramatic
shift from his relentless criticism of the U.S. (and the
international community) earlier this year. Karzai said he
was in full agreement with the new U.S. strategy, that it was
exactly what Afghans were hoping for and had Afghanistan full
support. This change in tone suggests Karzai is ready to
turn the page in U.S.-Afghan relations and move past the
recent period of disagreement and increased tension sparked
by civilian casualties and fanned by Karzai's concerns
regarding the level of support he could expect from a new
U.S. administration.
WOOD