SUBJECT: BUILDING A STRATEGY ON AFGHANISTAN'S

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 004024

C O R R E C T E D COPY (CLASSIFICATION)

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MOPS ELTN CAN PK AF
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: BUILDING A STRATEGY ON AFGHANISTAN'S
SOUTHERN BORDER AT SPIN BOLDAK

REF: A. REF: (A) KABUL 3161

B. (B) KABUL 3480

C. (C) KABUL 3814

KABUL 00004024 001.5 OF 002


Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Director Hoyt Yee
for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary. Cross-border issues have a fundamental impact
on U.S. objectives in southern Afghanistan, and improved
control of the southern border -- at the Spin Boldak crossing
in particular -- is a critical path to international
coalition and GIRoA success. This message assesses the key
challenges and outlines local action proposals for
civil-military consideration by Embassy Kabul's Border Issues
Working Group (BIWG) in four issue areas: border crossing by
the Taliban, cross-border consultation, military control of
the border, and reform of the border regime. Ultimately,
however, a determined strategic approach that unifies
diplomatic, military, and commercial dimensions requires
national level attention. End Summary.

Visit of Embassy-ISAF Border Issues Working Group
--------------


2. (S) On November 27, members of the Embassy-ISAF Border
Issues Working Group (BIWG) visited Kandahar Air Field for an
extended briefing and discussion with Regional Command )
South (RC-S) and Regional Platform ) South (RP-S),including
the RC-S Commander and the RC-S Senior Civilian
Representative (SCR). This report reflects issues raised
during that session. The group focused on the cross-border
issues and the fundamental impact on U.S. objectives in
southern Afghanistan. Improved control of the southern
border -- at the Spin Boldak crossing in particular -- is a
critical path to international coalition and GIRoA success.
While it will be possible to attack some of the border
challenges through local and regional programs, ultimate
success in dealing with this highly complex issue will
require national level attention. The central challenge is
broader than both the near-term objective of achieving
population-focused COIN effects in RC-South and the long-term
objective of increasing central government revenues as part
of an ISAF exit strategy. As long as conflicted
Afghan-Pakistani interests and a host of sub-national actors,
including narco-traffickers and insurgents, preempt
sovereignty, the southern border will remain an enduring
source of instability.

TRADE AND MAJOR PLAYERS IN SPIN
--------------


4. (S) The quasi-legitimate trade regime and relative
stability prevailing today at Spin Boldak (the actual
crossing is Weesh-Chaman) provides short-term benefits to all
involved in cross-border interchange. Obstructing freedom of
movement is not in the interest of any of these parties. The
participants include a complex array of interrelated
political clans that extend to commercial trucking mafias,
businessmen, local power brokers, members of the Karzai
regime, narcotics traffickers, traditional Noorzai racketeers
and Achekzai smugglers, private security protection rackets,
and the Afghan Border Police (ABP). All have Pakistani
counterparts, the majority of whom are fellow Pashtuns, among
whom common ethnicity is more important than nationality.
Other beneficiaries include ISAF, through safe passage of
NATO supplies, and the Taliban, who likewise use Weesh-Chaman
as a virtually unimpeded transit route. The incentives for
maintaining the status quo are powerful and to a large degree
countervail COIN objectives, assertion of central government
authority, and the broader project of modern state-building.


5. (S) Low-grade hostility and lack of trust characterize
relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, even though
objectively their mutual interests in stability and trade
should outweigh zero sum calculation. For example,
Afghanistan requires Pakistan for access to the sea, and
Pakistan requires Afghanistan for access to Central Asia;
Spin Boldak is the most geographically logical crossing point
for both, even though the volume of traffic at Torkham Gate
in the East is currently greater. Instead, insecurity in
Afghanistan keeps Pakistan's trade with Central Asia
negligible, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
estimates that illicit and semi-licit trade is four times
greater than legitimate commerce on the southern border.


6. (S) In addition to narcotics flowing south, smuggling
travels in both directions, and Afghanistan is the source of
substantial "unauthorized-trade" in vehicles, consumer

KABUL 00004024 002.4 OF 002


electronics, and other goods that enter Afghanistan duty-free
under the 1965 Trade and Transit Agreement, and then return
for resale in Pakistan. The losses to tariff revenues from
this gray market trade as well as smuggling of licit goods
are enormous. Most financial and political benefits accrue
to political clans in Kandahar and in Baluchistan Province,
Pakistan, which is semi-autonomous and often at odds with
Islamabad.

Three Areas for a Strategic Approach
--------------


7. (S) Border Crossing by the Taliban: There is broad
recognition that no matter how effective population-centered
COIN is in southern Afghanistan and how many troops are
present there, it will be possible for the conflict to
continue at a slow burn as long as the Quetta Shura Taliban
enjoy undisrupted sanctuary along with access to recruits and
material support in Pakistan. Short of decisive measures
against the Afghan Taliban leadership, securing Pakistani
cooperation to halt cross-border movement of Taliban
insurgents will be far more effective than interdiction from
the Afghan side alone across the hundreds of kilometers of
open country on the southern border. Recognizing that these
talks would need to be initiated at the national level
between the neighboring countries but could be ultimately
coordinated at the local levels, one starting point would be
getting Pakistan and Afghanistan to cooperate, with RC-South
assistance, in halting positively identified Taliban from
crossing at Weesh-Chaman.


8. (S) Border Coordination and Control: The Border
Coordination Center (BCC) will benefit from clarification of
its mission and repositioning. Posting a U.S. civilian
agency border enforcement liaison with the current military
Liaison Officers (LNOs) at the BCC would be a useful
addition, as would the near-term stationing of mentors at the
border crossing. The BCC's current location on Forward
Operating Base Spin Boldak eight kilometers from the actual
border reduces its potential even for low level
military-military communications. One solution would be to
move it on an interim basis to the site of the proposed
border crossing facility once the project, led by the
Embassy's Border Management Task Force, gets underway.


9. (S) Military Control of the Border: Positioning U.S.
military forces with the mission of establishing control at
the Weesh-Chaman border crossing, as directed by the guidance
issued by RC-S Commander, is sensitive and requires explicit
definition. An existing presence in Regional Command ) East
(RC-East) helps channel traffic to Torkham Gate, but there
are differences in conditions, and it is not clear, for
example, exactly how the military presence may help ensure
uninterrupted flow of NATO supplies or legitimate collection
of revenues. This deployment would best be carried out in
close coordination with the BIWG or the civilian entities at
the BCC. An informal local agreement with the ABP that keeps
U.S. forces out of Spin Boldak proper and allows direct
access to the border only by exception will need to be
modified, possibly by referring to Kabul for confirmation.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (S) A variety of issues should be addressed and steps
taken to better control the porous southern border. However,
it is important to view Spin Boldak and the southern border
as a whole in order to grasp the degree to which the
situation there has multiple and critical implications for
RC-South operations, as well as for broader international
coalition objectives in southern Afghanistan. There are
incremental and programmatic measures that can be taken on
the ground, such as stationing mentors with customs agents
and border police to reduce corruption as a result of their
day-to-day presence with the law enforcement officials.
Ultimately, however, a determined strategic approach, formed
at the national level with regional buy-ins and applications
and unified diplomatic, military, and commercial dimensions
is essential. U.S. civilians in RC-South will continue to
support GIRoA efforts to develop and implement such an
approach.


11. (U) This message was drafted by the State Department
Representative at the Stryker Brigade headquarters in
Kandahar.
EIKENBERRY