REGIONAL COMMAND EAST CIVILIAN UPLIFT: THE NEW, INTEGRATED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003888

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PREL PROP AF
SUBJECT: REGIONAL COMMAND EAST CIVILIAN UPLIFT: THE NEW, INTEGRATED
CIVILIAN-MILITARY PLATFORM

Classified by: CDDEA Ambassador E. Anthony Wayne; reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)


1. (C) Summary: This is the first of a series of messages that will
outline important innovations in our operational paradigm in Regional
Command East (RC/E),one of the more volatile areas along
Afghanistan's Pakistan border, to improve stability and demonstrate
near and medium term progress. A key component of this new platform
for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations is the deployment now
underway in RC(E) of significant numbers of civilian subject matter
specialists from a range of USG agencies to work closely with
military colleagues. We are seeking to build a population-centric
COIN effort that conducts all operations by, with, and through Afghan
institutions, both formal and informal. End Summary.

Unity of Effort
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2. (C) The first element of this effort deeply integrates military
and interagency civilian personnel with senior leaders to execute a
joint campaign plan -- on a division scale -- throughout the 14
provinces of RC(E). Authority and responsibility for executing this
civilian-military plan, for "operationalizing" it, begins at the
headquarters of Combined Joint Task Force-82 (CJTF-82) and is shared
equally by the Commanding General and Senior Civilian Representative
(SCR). This co-equal leadership structure focused on the defeat of
the insurgency is replicated at the brigade and all lower unit levels
wherever an interagency civilian team operates alongside its military
counterparts.


3. (C) Jointly signed by the SCR and Commander of RC(E),the
operational order for this campaign plan also focuses civ-mil
operations into the district level. Interagency District Support
Teams (DST) will operate from remote Combat Operating Posts (COP)
throughout each province, extending the reach of established
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) focused more on population
centers. Manning these new interagency positions will be
approximately 175 subject matter specialists as part of the civilian
uplift supported by the extraordinary efforts of Washington and
Embassy staffs.

Visitors welcome Innovations
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4. (C) During a recent visit to CJTF-82, CENTCOM Commander General
Petraeus observed this paradigm at Baraki Barak, one of the focus
districts selected under the joint campaign plan, commenting that
this approach to counterinsurgency was particularly innovative. We
have also described it recently to CODEL Burr (who also visited
Torkham Gate and Jalalabad),the NATO Military Committee and NATO
General Ramms (both of whom visited Panjshir),CODEL Bordallo (Task
Force Cyclone),and State's Office of the Inspector General
(travelling to Task Force Cyclone and Bagram-based PRTs). We are
also familiarizing the 101st Division with this new counterinsurgency
approach as it prepares to assume command of the regional battlespace
from the 82nd Airborne Division.

Protect and Support the Populace and build Afghan Capacity
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5. (C) The intent of this integrated civ-mil command, shared equally
by the Commanding General CJTF-82 and the SCR, is to protect and
support the populace by building the competence, capacity, and
credibility of Afghan government (GIRoA) and the Afghan National
Security Forces through integrated operations at every level. The
plan seeks to address the root causes of instability, enhance
security and governance, and help set conditions for long term
economic development. Nangarhar Province and the Kunar River Valley,
including Laghman Province, known collectively as "NKL," are
conflicted areas of concentrated insurgent activity, yet have the
greatest potential for enduring stability and economic development.
Thus, they are the focus for the main effort of the joint campaign
plan being implemented by five regional interagency task forces, 14
PRTs, and nine DSTs. The principal USG agencies charged with this
mandate include State, USAID, Agriculture, and DEA. Other agencies
and their civilian personnel are playing important roles as well,
including Defense, Justice, Treasury, and agricultural specialists
from the National Guard Bureaus of several states.

Four Critical Operational Foci
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6. (C) In addition to an agreed focus on NKL, the GIRoA has also
agreed to combined civ-mil operations across all lines of
counterinsurgency operations -- information, governance, security,
and development -- focused on the following three concepts:

-- District Delivery Pilot Districts. Four have been selected by the
GIRoA-led District Delivery Working Group in RC(E): Sarkani,
Khogyani, Baraki Barak, and Sayadabad. (The two others are in RC(S).

-- Stabilization Areas. In those unstable areas of RC(E),the
immediate goal remains to clear them of the enemy and malign
influence, and to hold the areas. Setting the conditions to build
going forward will require the combined effort of our interagency
teams and GIRoA.

-- Transfer of Lead Security Responsibility (TLSR). RC(E) is
considering Bamyan, Panjshir, and Parwan Provinces, due to their
relative stability, for the next phase of development effort whereby
lead responsibility for each would transfer to GIROA.

An Abbreviated Case Study: Laghman Province
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7. (C) Laghman Province is illustrative because the interagency PRT
and National Guard agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs) are fully
integrated today. The challenges, as throughout the east and
differing only by degree in many instances, remain: ineffective
government, corruption, low literacy, high unemployment, no land
dispute resolution mechanisms, and a virulent, complex insurgency.
Over time, a "welfare state" mentality has evolved and now citizens
and local officials rely on Coalition Forces, not the Afghan
Government, for basic services and security. A nascent Provincial
Development Council and proactive Governor in Laghman, however, are
responding positively to a number of programs addressing these
issues. Key is to engage the local populace by, with, and through
GIRoA civil and security officials; to empower community-based
decision-making processes; and to link emerging Afghan leadership to
relevant GIRoA institutions in Kabul.


8. (U) An important albeit largely informal role in Afghan society,
shuras are a means to draw in tribal elders, mullahs, maleks, key
stakeholders, and even insurgent fence-sitters to mediate communal
disputes, discuss and generate support for elections, address the
concerns of the poor and women, and petition government. PRTs and
DSTs have been using these gatherings to offer incentives for
communities to join with sub-national authorities in security,
governance and development compacts running the gamut of the many
programs offered by the Afghan Government, international community,
and the USG. Together with district-wide information campaigns, our
immediate objective is to provide time and space -- stability -- to
allow these relationships and programs to take hold and to set the
conditions for more effective governance and economic development.


9. (C) Comment: Over the next several weeks, reporting from RC(E)
will describe the rationale for selecting NKL and the operational
foci described above in greater detail, as they will influence
governmental legitimacy at the sub-national level where the
insurgency is most active and the presence of effective civil service
and Afghan institutions are so important. End Comment.


10. (U) This message was drafted by Regional Command - East.

MUSSOMELI