HELMAND VIEWS ON U.S. TROOP LEVELS IN AFGHANISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003733

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MOPS UK AF CAN
SUBJECT: HELMAND VIEWS ON U.S. TROOP LEVELS IN AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: Charge D'Affairs Joseph A. Mussomeli for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Over a three-week period in October, PRT
Helmand obtained a wide range of Afghans views (more than 75
in all) on the issue of U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan. A
majority thought that, under any scenario, the country,s
security problems will not be solved soon, with many
referencing a decades-long timeframe. While the opinions
below reflect the perspectives of only one province, they
collectively represent a cross-section of Helmandi public
opinion that Washington readers may find of interest. END
SUMMARY.

HELMAND GOVERNOR AND DEPUTY
--------------


2. (C) In detailed discussions with PRT reps over a
three-week period in October, a wide range of Afghans
(numbering more than 75 in total) mostly from southern
Afghanistan offered views about U.S. troop levels. State
Representative to the Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade
(2MEB) spoke to Helmand's governor, deputy governor, several
day laborers, displaced Now Zad residents, approximately
three dozen Afghan Army officers, non-commissioned officers
and enlisted soldiers stationed adjacent to Camp Leatherneck.
Farah's governor also commented on the subject, as did
shopkeepers and elders in the city of Delaram (the part of
Nimruz Province within the 2MEB Area of Operation (AO)).


3. (C) Governor Mangal told State, UK FCO, and PRT reps, and
2d MEB Commanding General, BGen Lawrence Nicholson, in
mid-October that U.S. troops would be needed in Helmand and
Afghanistan for some time. He said it was important also for
Helmand residents to see more of their own ANSF on the
streets, adding sarcastically, "Of course, 40,000 more U.S.
troops will solve terrorism in Afghanistan!" NOTE: Governor
Mangal has been a strong proponent of U.S. Marine operations
in Helmand, recently telling CENTCOM Commander Petraeus that
successes in Nawa and Garmsir Districts would also be
possible in Marjah, an operation on hold pending approval of
more U.S. troop and associated ANSF commitments. He said
Helmandis were asking him "When can Marjah become like Nawa?"
END NOTE Helmand's Deputy Governor Sattar stressed the
urgency of Afghans seeing less corruption among officials, in
addition to a stronger ANSF. In a lengthy discussion over
tea at the governor's residence, he said that the coalition
needed to focus its primary efforts on ANSF training. He
likened simply adding thousands of more troops as continuing
a "project" that so far had not worked.

FARAH GOVERNOR (AND HIS GUARDS)
--------------


4. (C) Farah's Governor Amin told State Rep, PRT officer, and
2d MEB CG that more troops could help improve security in
outlying areas. He urged the continued presence of Marine
units in one of the most remote region of his province
(Bakwa),and said he did not know the population there (which
is minimal),claiming that the area served as a Taliban
transit route. Governor Amin voiced blunt criticism of the
central government and its lackluster efforts to beat back
corruption; some parts of the government, he said pointedly,
"supported the Taliban" (he did not specify further).


5. (U) Two of Governor Amin's guards (natives of Kunduz and
Kunar Provinces) offered contrasting views while seated under
ripe pomegranate trees. One said his family and friends did
not want more U.S. troops to arrive because of the increased
number of IEDs targeting them, which inevitably left
civilians hurt. The other said, "I am sure more troops will
come, but it is more important to win support from the people
and to build our army." Both said Americans needed to talk
more publicly about strengthening the Afghan army in
particular. The Kunar native said that the arrival of U.S.
troops there had led to more fighting in his home province,
not less. Each considered the level of troop commitment to
be less important than the duration of the coalition
presence; the guard (an ex-ANA soldier) from Kunduz said he
"could not imagine" how long a U.S.-Afghanistan security
partnership was needed, but estimated "more than 30 years"
was necessary.

DAY LABORERS
--------------


6. (U) A group of day laborers based at Camp Leatherneck told
the State Rep that more troops might help in the short-term;
however, over the long term, the situation could become a

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trap. One worker (a Kabul native) said that Afghans also
needed to hear from the U.S. that "eventually, you Americans
will leave -- not only that you will stay and help the
government and army become stronger." He said a majority of
his poor family members and neighbors in the capital did not
see the U.S. military as occupiers per se, but that more and
more were feeling uneasy about our intentions and the
unwanted but unavoidable effects of a larger foreign military
presence. The laborer said that unemployed, uneducated
Afghan youth ("some are my friends") were especially
susceptible to anti-coalition rhetoric.

DISPLACED NOW ZAD RESIDENTS
--------------


7. (U) About a dozen displaced residents from Now Zad
currently living in Kwaja Jamal (KJ) on the outskirts of the
abandoned city described being caught in the middle of U.S.
Marines and still active Taliban elements in the area. One
elder referred to a Pashtun declaring "today, we are caught
between a tiger and a lion -- your side and the Taliban on
the other side." Two children gathered nearby said that they
only felt safe when they saw ANA around their mud compounds.


8. (U) One teenager loudly argued that more U.S. troops would
create "more war" and that many in the area would rather be
left alone. NOTE: A Marine company is stationed in Now Zad,
which remains abandoned because of its IED and mine-infested
streets; the day before the foot patrol, a Marine was killed
by an IED (double amputation) and several others were
wounded. As 2d MEB CG, USAID Rep, and State Rep walked to
the KJ area, a group of locals gathering fire wood nearby
detonated two more IEDs, killing one and
wounding seven. Now Zad's district governor has agreed to be
based full-time in the area once he is formally approved in
that position by Kabul officials; work on renovating the
downtown bazaar is also set to begin. END NOTE.

DELARAM SHOPKEEPERS
--------------


9. (U) While drinking green tea outside several shops in
downtown Delaram (situated along a busy transit corridor in
Nimruz Province),eight shopkeepers offered their views about
U.S. troop levels. The oldest asked, "What benefit have we
seen so far? Will more troops bring more of the same?" He
added that funds being spent on U.S. troops should instead be
directed toward the ANA. Another argued that "even one
million more troops" would not be enough to solve
Afghanistan's problems. Their most immediate concerns
centered on access to a local mosque (near a joint
ANSF-Marine base) and electricity projects. Several said
Marines had helped improve security in the immediate area,
but that Taliban retained free movement farther away.

AFGHAN ARMY OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS
--------------


10. (U) In a two-hour exchange at an ANA base located
adjacent to Camp Leatherneck, approximately three dozen
Afghan army officers and soldiers (NCOs and enlisted among
them) commented on possible increases in U.S. troop levels.
Most had spent years fighting in Helmand and southern
Afghanistan, many alongside coalition forces. In one notable
exchange, the unit's most senior member (a grizzled 36-year
veteran of the ANA and native of mountainous eastern
Afghanistan) offered the following assessment (comments
verbatim):

-"I have served 36 years in the army. Wars always destroy
nations. Our war in Afghanistan continues to be brought to
us by other countries, especially those near to us."

-"The whole world knows that the U.S. is a superpower. But
most people want you to send assets to Afghanistan that bring
peace, not more assets that bring war. More war equipment is
what the enemy wants here, the enemies of the U.S. people and
the Afghan people."

-"Afghanistan's ground yells for water projects, wheat
fields; it is not yelling for more war equipment. Afghans do
not want more Americans killed and wounded on our land. War
equipment does not talk to us."

NOTE: After his lengthy remarks, the room erupted in loud
applause. One lieutenant emphasized the pride ANA took in
their mission to bring security to Afghanistan, while
acknowledging direct U.S. support would be needed for several
more years. While those gathered represented a limited

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sample of ANA officers and soldiers, their near universal
response to the senior ANA soldier,s comments stood out;
only one officer, at the outset of the session, argued openly
in favor of a large U.S. combat troop increase.


11. (C) Other gathered ANA officers and soldiers stressed
that Afghans knew how to fight, and many did not understand
why the U.S. wanted to spend large amounts of money bringing
in more U.S. forces. The funds would be better spent on
higher ANA and ANP salaries and expanded recruitment and
training. The people trusted the ANA. Afghans would
cooperate with them, they argued.


12. (C) The ANA brigade's chief artillery officer also noted
that due to political paralysis in Kabul, "no new major
operations were underway, only simple patrols; we are waiting
for new orders." He added that ANA units in Kabul had been
placed on high alert for several weeks (and seemed to imply
that the potential for civil unrest, not just
election-related Taliban attacks, was the main reason).

COMMENT
--------------

13. (C) This diverse sample of Afghans voiced a common theme
(apart from a few exceptions): security in
Afghanistan needed to come primarily from more (and better)
Afghan forces -- not through additional American troops.
Even Helmand Governor Mangal, a vocal advocate of the
improved security the Marine forces have been able to bring
to Helmand since their arrival, stepped back from a private
endorsement of any large combat troop increase beyond those
forces necessary for a clearing operation in Marjah. His
counterpart in Farah, Governor Amin, more closely (and more
predictably) tracks with what we hear from official-type
interactions with government leaders on the question of more
troops: the more the better.


14. (C) In contrast, the overall sense from many
man-on-the-street type interactions more accurately conveys
the current public mood in Helmand. This sentiment boils
down to a theme of a) don't leave, b) keep partnering, but
also c) don't think sending in new U.S. military forces is
the best option. Most apparent in these conversations --
whether in a room filled with animated ANA officers and
soldiers or conversing with elders in front of mud compounds
and rundown bazaar shops -- was an implied question: just
how long will the coalition stay in Afghanistan? The size of
our ongoing troop commitment seemed to matter less in their
minds than U.S.-led coalition stamina, the extent to which
our side of the partnership will endure. One Helmand elder
remarked that Afghanistan's challenges were not only military
or political in nature but generational.


15. (U) This cable was drafted by the State Representative to
the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, and its Commanding
General, Brigadier General Lawrence Nicholson, has reviewed
this cable.
Mussomeli