STOPPING THE PROLIFERATION OF FERTILIZER-BASED

S E C R E T KABUL 003505
SENSITIVE

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, T, ISN, S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PLEASE PASS TO DIRECTOR, FBI, AND USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019
TAGS: PTER ETTC EAGR KDEM MOPS PGOV AF WA PK

SUBJECT: STOPPING THE PROLIFERATION OF FERTILIZER-BASED
HOMEMADE EXPLOSIVES


1. (SBU) Summary: Embassy Kabul is implementing an action
plan in conjunction with the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA),the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) and partner embassies to halt the
proliferation of fertilizer-based homemade explosives (HME).
Insurgents are using HME, particularly explosives derived
from Ammonium Nitrate (AN),with increasing frequency and
lethality in IED attacks on Afghan civilians, Afghan National
Security Forces and ISAF troops. ISAF forces in Regional
Command South (RC-South) have begun seizing AN fertilizer,
which has been banned since 2005, although the ban has
neither been enforced by GIRoA entities nor widely known or
understood among Afghans. Because AN has some legitimate
uses for which alternatives are not readily available, we see
regulation as preferable to a blanket ban. We are pressing
GIRoA to establish, with international support, a coordinated
inter-ministerial enforcement regime and public awareness
campaign to interdict imports of AN fertilizer and to
exchange current AN stockpiles for less dangerous
alternatives. Regardless of how effectively GIRoA may
attempt to control AN, however, Pakistani cooperation will be
critical to success, as Pakistan is the largest supplier of
AN-based substances to Afghanistan. We defer to Embassy
Islamabad,s judgment on how best to influence the GoP, and
suggest adding AN to the agenda for the upcoming Security
Trilateral. End Summary.

The Threat
--------------


2. (S/REL ISAF) According to ISAF,s Counter-IED Task Force,
IEDs made from ammonium nitrate-based fertilizer are by far
the greatest killer in Afghanistan. Since 2008, casualties
from IEDs or VBIEDs containing AN have doubled. Coalition
deaths due to AN-based explosives have risen from 130 in 2008
to 229 through September 2009, while Coalition wounded have
risen from 575 to 1302. The majority of attacks and the
greatest percentage increase are in RC-South: from 64 to 159
killed and from 317 to 811 wounded. Afghan National Security
Forces and civilians continue to represent the greatest
losses, with 751 killed by AN-based IEDs in 2008, and 1090
through September 2009.


3. (S/REL ISAF) HQ ISAF Counter-IED Branch has confirmed
that AN-based homemade explosives have been used in the
deadliest attacks on civilians and Coalition Forces, and the
bombs are growing in size. On October 8, insurgents used a
suicide VBIED containing roughly 500 pounds of homemade
explosives to attack the Indian Embassy in Kabul, resulting
in 12 deaths and at least 80 civilians wounded. On October
15 a U.S. military Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)
vehicle was ripped in half by 1500 pounds of AN-based
homemade explosives. With a street value of $550 per metric
ton of AN, a bomb of this size cost about $350 to make, but
it took four U.S. lives and destroyed a $570,000 vehicle.
The incident is only the second catastrophic attack on an
MRAP in Afghanistan, but it represents a disturbing
development.


4. (S/REL ISAF) Ammonium nitrate fertilizer yields a
powerful, inexpensive and easily-made explosive. Adding a
small amount of a simple carbon source, such as diesel fuel,
is all that is necessary to turn AN into ammonium nitrate
fuel oil (ANFO),a popular commercial blasting agent, which
then requires only a high-explosive detonator to initiate.
While other popular fertilizers, such as urea, can also be
made into explosives, they require significant additional
chemical processing and specific precursor chemicals such as
nitric acid or sulfuric acid to become effective.
Additionally, processing batches of urea large enough to be
used for IEDs creates a large exothermic reaction and thus a
significant heat signature, which can be detected by
Coalition airborne intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) assets.

Action Plan
--------------


5. (SBU) In Afghanistan, AN makes up only about five per
cent of all fertilizer. Cheaper, more effective
alternatives, such as a combined use of diammonium phosphate
(DAP) and urea, are readily available and is the fertilizer
combination USAID, USDA and other donor nations are promoting
for Afghanistan. In the U.S., farmers still widely use AN
because of certain desirable properties (e.g., it provides a
faster release of nitrogen to boost vegetable quality prior
to harvest),but the U.S. closely regulates its production
and distribution. We have concluded that regulation is a
more appropriate course of action for Afghanistan than a
blanket ban, since AN does have some specific uses where
alternatives are not readily available here. For example, AN
used in industrial blasting cannot be as easily replaced.
For mines, quarries and construction sites, it may be
necessary to allow use of AN, in which case it should be
regulated and tracked.


6. (SBU) The Embassy has mobilized a working group including
GIRoA, ISAF, and partner embassies(thus far the UK, Canada,
The Netherlands, Australia, Denmark) to stop the
proliferation of AN-based IEDs throughout Afghanistan, and to
mitigate the threat. The group is working to:

-- halt imports of AN-based fertilizers;

-- support GIRoA efforts, assisted by ISAF,
particularly in the South, to seize AN-based fertilizers and,
for a limited time, compensate legitimate farmers and/or
traders who were unaware of the ban;

-- develop a targeted public diplomacy campaign to:
educate the Afghan public on the dangers of AN-based
fertilizers; inform them that the long-standing ban will be
enforced and that compensation will be offered for a limited
time; and mitigate any resentment caused by fertilizer
seizures;

-- better equip and train border police and customs
officials to detect AN-based fertilizer, precursor chemicals
and other explosives/devices;

-- establish a licensing or other regulatory scheme to
control importation and use of ANFO in Afghanistan,s
critical mining, quarrying and construction industries;

-- include AN-related issues on the Canadian)led Dubai
Process agenda which deals with Af-Pak border issues; and

-- flag this issue via Washington for inclusion on the agenda
of international bodies focused on the control of dangerous
materials.


7. (C/REL ISAF) On September 23, Minister of Agriculture,
Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) Mohammad Asif Rahimi formally
confirmed in a letter to the Ministers of Defense and
Interior, the National Security Director and COMISAF, that
since 2005 &ammonium nitrate fertilizers are already illegal
and are wholly banned in Afghanistan8 and that GIRoA


authorities are authorized to confiscate such supplies.
Consequently, on October 14 MG de Kruif issued RC-South FRAGO
(Fragmentary Order) 005-233, directing ISAF forces in
RC-South to seize AN fertilizer stockpiles and, if intended
for legitimate use, to pay farmers sufficient amounts to buy
alternative products. The FRAGO describes current ISAF
actions as the initial phase, from which &we will transition
to the GIRoA-led counter AN campaign ensuring that our
efforts are fully nested and complimentary with their
programs.8


8. (C/REL ISAF) The Ambassador, Deputy Ambassador, and
Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs
have pressed a number of ministers individually to coordinate
on this issue, and GIRoA working level staff have met several
times with Embassy and ISAF action officers. Defense
Minister Wardak promised Ambassador Eikenberry he would host
an inter-ministerial meeting to collectively discuss the way
ahead. Preoccupation with the run-off election delayed the
event, but Wardak finally convened such a meeting, with
highly publicized announcement of the AN ban, on October 31,
attended by Ambassador Eikenberry.

THE PAKISTANI DIMENSION
--------------


9. (C/REL ISAF) Both smuggling and legal importation of
AN-substances - primarily from Pakistan - present challenging
problems. Most of the AN used in Afghanistan comes from
Pakistan through the Weesh-Chamin and Towr Kham border
crossings. Pakistan has two major AN production facilities
and is opening a third, which we understand is heavily
subsidized for domestic use, even though much of the
production is in fact exported. Official figures show $135
million of AN fertilizer was imported into Afghanistan from
Pakistan last year, which, due to the subsidies, may
represent a substantial financial loss for the Government of
Pakistan. Diplomatic coordination with Pakistan will be
essential as Afghanistan works to stop the proliferation of
AN-based explosives. Despite potential financial and
jobs-related domestic issues, interdiction may well be in
Islamabad,s interest, since up to 50% of bombs in Pakistan
are also made from fertilizer-based HME. Embassy Kabul has
begun consultations with Embassy Islamabad on a coordinated
Af-Pak strategy on AN and HME, deferring to Embassy
Islamabad,s judgment on how best to collaborate with the
GoP. We invite Embassy Islamabad,s views as to adding
cooperation on AN to the agenda for the upcoming Security
Trilateral.

EIKENBERRY