Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL3409
2009-10-26 04:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

NURISTAN,S GOVERNOR JAMALUDDIN: PORTRAIT OF AN

Tags:  KBIO PGOV PREL AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9570
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3409/01 2990428
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 260428Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2447
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003409 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE, SCA/FO, SCA/A
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
UFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2019
TAGS: KBIO PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: NURISTAN,S GOVERNOR JAMALUDDIN: PORTRAIT OF AN
ELITIST

REF: KABUL 3396

Classified By: Deputy IPA Coordinator Hoyt B. Yee, Reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003409

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE, SCA/FO, SCA/A
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
UFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2019
TAGS: KBIO PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: NURISTAN,S GOVERNOR JAMALUDDIN: PORTRAIT OF AN
ELITIST

REF: KABUL 3396

Classified By: Deputy IPA Coordinator Hoyt B. Yee, Reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)


1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: Habitually attired in blindingly white
baggy trousers and tunic, Governor Jamaluddin Badr is the
very picture of the present Afghan bourgeoisie: proud of his
conservative religious credentials, fascinated with modern
luxuries, and focused on narrow concerns. His weaknesses as
Nuristan,s governor overshadow his strengths, and his flaws
mean he is a frustrating and limited partner
for us. Jamaluddin is indifferent to popular concerns and
unable or unwilling to confront the recent increase in
insurgent activity. He is, however, educated, articulate,
and free of the taint of warlord politics. The son of a
traditional leader (malik),he knows Nuristan,s intricate
web of tribal relationships and has the respect of religious
leaders. If, as promised, Jamaluddin soon shifts
more of his work time out of the isolation of the capital
Parun to Nurgram district center, his proximity to the PRT
will better position us to make use of his talents. And even
if the 2009 presidential election results in a shuffle of
governors, we know of no alternative contenders for this
difficult post (reftel). END SUMMARY.


2. (C/NF) Jamaluddin is not yet 35 years old. By this
accident of age he lacks the customary symbol of legitimacy
for an Afghan leader: he is not a mujahid, and he never
fought the Soviets. Instead, like many younger middle-class
Afghans, he was educated in exile in Pakistan, at the
Jam-i-Asadya religious school. Some Nuristanis say
Jamaluddin earned his scholarship to university in Saudi
Arabia through cooperation with ISI, Pakistan,s intelligence
service. In any case, Jamaluddin is a Salafi, part of a
movement within Sunni Islam that seeks to purge presumed
corrupting cultural influences supposed to have
accumulated in the faith after the death of the Prophet
Mohammed. Jamaluddin strongly supports sharia law. At
times, the governor seems to regard the Salafi purifying
mandate as an alternative source of political legitimacy.


3. (C/NF) Neither Jamaluddin,s faith nor his public
responsibilities interfere with his liking for luxury,
however he might obtain it. German journalists recently
caught the governor lounging in a foyer snacking on grapes
while local leaders met inside to work on election security.
The governor is fond of fancy trucks and full
air-conditioning, and complains when his work in this
desperately poor province deprives him of these conveniences.
Local contractors tell us the governor authorizes his
political allies to collect "commissions" of three to five
percent from internationally-funded development projects.
Still, many acknowledge Jamaluddin is less corrupt than
former governor Tamim Nuristani, who
stole government and aid monies allocated to the province.


4. (C/NF) Nuristan faces fresh insurgent incursions and a
longstanding development deficit, but Jamaluddin appears to
give priority to provincial political alliances and
rivalries. Taliban forces, for example, succeeded this year
(unlike last year) in driving into the district center of
Nuristan,s Barg-e-Metal district, which borders on Pakistan.
(Afghan and Coalition forces have since regained the town.)
Barg-e-Metal district governor Ishmael, an old classmate and
present crony of Jamaluddin,
fled to Kabul two days before the Taliban attack - because,
the governor,s critics say, Ishmael had sold for his own
profit the government weapons allocated for self-defense.
The same sources say Jamaluddin paid 12,000 USD bail to free
Ishmael when the central government placed him in detention
after his arrival in Kabul.


5. (C/NF) The governor,s parochial political jockeying
sometimes spills over into other kinds of violence. As
reported septel, Jamaluddin almost certainly fomented an
August 14 demonstration at election headquarters in Parun
that resulted in two deaths. The Provincial Electoral
Officer says Jamaluddin was frustrated that he was unable to
dictate his choices for poll workers, likely a bid to
inflate the vote for incumbent President Karzai. His
family,s longstanding support for the Kushtozi tribe against
the Kam tribe leaves him unable to affect the fighting in
Kamdesh district. Meanwhile, the governor,s rivals - mostly
allies of former governor Tamim now disaffected with their
exclusion from
political spoils - are rumored to have distributed weapons

KABUL 00003409 002 OF 002


in volatile Wama district, to paint Jamaluddin as weak.


6. (C/NF) Both born into the local elite and educated to
disdain the ordinary faith of rural Afghans, Jamaluddin
particularly dislikes the inherently democratizing effect of
international development projects. In discussing the
governor, Nuristanis who work in development almost always
mention their conviction that Jamaluddin worked to expel the
British NGO Afghan Aid from Barg-e-Metal in 2000.
Members of the political movement Ummat-e-Muslima, to which
Jamlauddin belongs, destroyed Afghan Aid,s offices and
attacked demonstration farms seen as a corrupting Western
influence. When working with the PRT and USAID, the governor
appears focused on opportunities for his benefit, comfort,
and prestige as much as, or more than, on the needs and
concerns of his communities. He also dislikes the
responsibility of saying no - a skill we are working now to
add to his repertoire.


7. (C/NF) Comment: Given the difficulty the Independent
Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) had in finding a
college-educated Nuristani to nominate as governor,
Jamaluddin appears to stand a reasonable chance of remaining
in place in any second Karzai administration. For this
reason, the PRT is redoubling its ongoing efforts to bring
Jamaluddin around to more constructive behavior. End Comment.

EIKENBERRY