Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL3388
2009-10-22 04:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

MOMENTUM IN HELMAND? YES, BUT...

Tags:  KDEM MOPS PINS PGOV PREL AF UK 
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VZCZCXRO6597
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3388/01 2950444
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 220444Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2414
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003388 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2019
TAGS: KDEM MOPS PINS PGOV PREL AF UK
SUBJECT: MOMENTUM IN HELMAND? YES, BUT...

REF: A) KABUL 2143 B) KABUL 3286

Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y
ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003388

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2019
TAGS: KDEM MOPS PINS PGOV PREL AF UK
SUBJECT: MOMENTUM IN HELMAND? YES, BUT...

REF: A) KABUL 2143 B) KABUL 3286

Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y
ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Focused security, governance and
reconstruction efforts in Helmand Province have led to
hard-won progress of the U.S. area of operations. Garmsir
and Nawa Districts -- where U.S. Marines have solidified
recent security gains in important, relatively densely
populated centers -- stand out for their improvements. Close
partnering among military, Afghan and coalition civilians has
helped sustain momentum. Where Marine units face greater
resource constraints, including persistent gaps in Afghan
capacity, our ability to affect stabilization is limited.
Deepening our efforts in Nawa and Garmsir will remain a
primary focus, even as targeted Marine and Special Forces
interdiction operations continue in less-populated.


2. (C) SUMMARY CONT'D: The MEB Commanding General and
State/USAID Reps in Helmand, in coordination with the UK-led
PRT, are beginning a district-by-district assessment in light
of current resource levels (U.S., UK, and Afghan). U.S.
Marine positions encompass about 40 percent of the Helmand
population; UK forces cover the other 60 percent, including
many of the most densely populated areas such as Lashkar Gah,
Helmand's capital. Regardless of the final U.S./UK troop
numbers dedicated to Helmand, we have necessarily begun to
prioritize our civilian-military efforts within the vast
province. This process could result in decisions to withdraw
from less-strategic areas outside of Helmand's more populated
areas in order to more sustainably reinforce populated and
intrinsically important districts. A major planned operation
(Marjah) is currently on hold pending the ongoing interagency
deliberations on future troop levels and uncertainty over the
availability of sufficient U.S. and Afghan forces. END
SUMMARY.

STRATEGIC DISTRICTS THAT MATTER

--------------


3. (C) Operation Khanjar, which commenced July 2 and included
the insertion of approximately 4,500 Marines into the central
Helmand River Valley, has enabled COIN traction in key
districts -- principally Nawa and Garmsir. Pre-district
Support Teams (pre-DSTs, or partially staffed DSTs) are fully
functioning in these areas and local governance (despite few
line ministry representatives on-site) is active. Officials
in these districts, in consultation with pre-DST personnel
and Marine civil affairs units, have identified priority
projects to be funded using CERP, PRT and USAID resources.
In both locations, real COIN practice is evident. Advance
civil-military planning and coordination for initial
stabilization and reconstruction in the districts has been an
essential element of the success of these efforts thus far.


4. (C) In Nawa, for example, once akin to a UK "Fort Apache"
and under frequent attack, a local community council has just
been elected through the Afghan Social Outreach Program
(ASOP). In Garmsir, regular sessions between elders and
local government leaders reflect a deep level of engagement
-- the best example in Helmand of post-kinetic local
participation. Recent VIP visitors (USG, coalition military
and CODELs) have left both locations impressed by visible
signs of progress. (NOTE: Recently, central ministry
representatives visited Nawa, part of the new District
Delivery Working Group (DDWG) (Reftel B),which is working to
deliver essential services at the district level, initially
in six priority districts. Nad Ali is the second priority
district in Helmand currently identified for focused
attention by the DDWG. END NOTE.)


5. (C) Helmand's Marjah area (part of Nad Ali District)
represents a still unaddressed security challenge. It is the
only no-go zone for Marine units in the Area of Operation
(AO). Joint planning between the PRT and the MEB is underway
to begin operations in Marjah -- intended to help showcase a
significant ANSF role -- but additional U.S. forces will be
required; ANSF have yet to be identified as well. The PRT
and U.S. civilians are playing an active role in shaping
local governance, tribal engagement and reconstruction
planning if/when the Marjah operation is approved and
resourced. (NOTE: Marjah is home to tracts of canals funded
in the 1950s by the U.S. government, geography that would
greatly add to the complexity of militarily clearing
operations. Leading, and controversial, Marjah power brokers
-- including a former provincial chief of police and
narco-trafficker -- also share close ties to President

KABUL 00003388 002 OF 003


Karzai, adding a political dimension to any operation and
post-clearance phase. END NOTE)

NEW NEIGHBORHOODS, OLD CHALLENGES
--------------


6. (C) Elsewhere in Helmand and the Marine AO (which includes
a corner of Nimruz and Farah Provinces),persistent
challenges remain. Gaps in ANSF coverage and local
governance capacity have limited our COIN traction (Bakwa,
Golestan, and Now Zad fall into this category). In some of
these locations, small platoon-sized Marine elements face
complex terrain (physical, tribal, political) that has lacked
government or coalition attention for most of the war -- and
well before. Engagement with local leaders remains basic,
often led by the lead Civil Affairs Sergeant only, and with
some populations signaling a preference for Marine departures
(in Bakwa, for example),where Afghans say that we have
disrupted historic community equilibrium. In these more
remote areas, local populations cite low expectations
regarding coalition and government endurance; elders,
unsurprisingly, see us as temporary neighbors.


7. (C) The highly symbolic and still abandoned city of Now
Zad (Reftel A) represents perhaps the greatest long-term
rebuilding and repopulating challenge -- a city that arguably
does not warrant our greatest attention given other (and more
realistically attainable) COIN objectives. Successful Marine
operations have cleared key areas in and adjacent to the city
center. Its mined and IED'd streets and fields, however,
will first need to be cleared prior to any return of
residents. Such an effort will likely be time and resource
intensive -- and increasingly an Afghan government-led and
resourced priority. Even with a successful de-mining effort,
it remains unclear whether Now Zad's former residents, most
having now built lives in Lashkar Gah, would return at all,
especially non-landowners.

TARGETING AFGHAN CAPACITY
--------------


8. (C) Afghan central ministries recently demonstrated
important albeit preliminary outreach in Nawa (Reftel B). A
group of Kabul-based officials, including from Afghan
government and U.S. Embassy Kabul, representing the DDWG,
visited the district (with Marine assets) on October 11 and
met with area elders. The DDWG's work will be followed by a
higher-level visit (MRRD, Education, among others are
anticipated) and donor coordination in Kabul to ensure
funding streams and other mechanisms of support are in place.


PROGRESS, BUT FRAGILE
--------------


9. (C) Our presence in Helmand's strategic districts has been
brief. This factor poses perhaps our greatest challenge, as
we are just beginning to understand these key neighborhoods
and the various dynamics at play within them, including the
tribal dimension and affiliated narco-trafficking networks.
While Helmandis seek reassurance from us regarding our
endurance, they also voice stubborn skepticism toward their
government. Recent outreach through the Afghan
government-led DDWG visits (Nawa as the first) could help
close this gap if appropriately followed up. The steady
arrival of more U.S. and UK civilians stationed alongside
Marine infantry units in districts also has helped sustain
governance engagement. The fact that Nawa has progressed so
quickly bodes well.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) Current momentum in Helmand needs to be assessed with
the Afghan dimension foremost in mind; Marine operational
pace is fast, that of Afghans (government, ANSF) remains much
slower and will likely be the case for some time.
Solidifying gains in population centers like Nawa and Garmsir
(the DDWG has designated Garmsir as a "phase two" priority
district) should enable these strategic anchors to move
toward greater self-sustainment, even if parts of Helmand's
hinterlands continue to be home to Taliban elements. Less
important districts in Helmand that currently host Marine
units constitute legitimate targets for military operations
(and associated interagency civilian elements). However,
given such districts' geographic isolation and small
populations, they realistically represent multi-year
commitments well beyond our current resource capacities and

KABUL 00003388 003 OF 003


probable coalition patience and potentially detract from our
population-centric strategy. Moreover, the return on force
and resource down payments in these remote districts remains
questionable.


11. (U) This cable has been reviewed by 2MEB Commander BGen
Nicholson.
EIKENBERRY