THE DAY AFTER: MEETINGS WITH THE CANDIDATES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003387

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: THE DAY AFTER: MEETINGS WITH THE CANDIDATES

Classified By: Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary: The day after President Karzai accepted the
decision which will lead to a second round in Afghanistan's
presidential elections, Ambassador Eikenberry met separately
with Karzai and with Dr. Abdullah Abdullah to reaffirm full
U.S. support for a successful second round scheduled for
November 7. He emphasized that the U.S. and international
community would not engage in efforts to form a coalition
government; any such decision needs to be made by the
candidates. Karzai recommended that the Embassy continue to
engage Afghan media and when doing so, to commend Karzai's
decision to accept a second round as a step towards
strengthening the democratic process and emphasize the U.S.'s
long-term commitment to Afghanistan. He agreed that a
proposed U.S. troop increase would need to be seen as a joint
Afghan-U.S. decision, and the announcement of such an
increase must address concerns in Afghanistan, the region,
and NATO countries.


2. (S) Abdullah told Ambassador Eikenberry that his main
concern was that Afghanistan have a foundation for a real
election process. He recounted his recent conversation with
Karzai in which they discussed the importance of national
unity and agreed to get together for talks. We encouraged
him to work with reformers in Karzai's cabinet on a unified
platform of ideas for the good of the country. Abdullah
pledged to continue to call for calm and to encourage Afghans
to vote in the second round, but expressed concern that some
key Karzai relatives are willing to engage in "anything
necessary" to advance Karzai's fortunes. End Summary.

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KARZAI CONFIDENT, POSITIVE
--------------


3. (S) Ambassador Eikenberry met with President Karzai on
October 21 to clarify the U.S. position on a second round of
elections. National Security Advisor Zalmay Rassoul also
joined the 45-minute meeting. A tired yet confident Karzai
began by expressing his appreciation for President Obama's
call and the "extremely positive" conversation. Ambassador
Eikenberry then outlined four major points regarding the
second round: the U.S., NATO, and international community's
commitment to ensuring a successful election; U.S. neutrality
regarding discussions of a coalition government; the fact
that the only authoritative voice on U.S. policy in
Afghanistan comes from the U.S. Embassy; and an offer of
Embassy public support for any elements of the proposed
compact between the new government and the Afghan people that
has been discussed with Karzai and his team over the past
three months.


4. (S) Ambassador Eikenberry elaborated on the third point
and suggested that, while "private citizens" may try to help
in days to come, "the U.S. Embassy is the only official voice
of U.S. policy in Kabul." Karzai responded with his
trademark "I got it." Ambassador Eikenberry used French FM
Kouchner's recent paper on a proposed CEO-like position,
which implied Abdullah Abdullah as the preferred candidate,
as an example of an independent voice which is not conveying
the intentions of the whole international community. Karzai
said it was "good news" when Ambassador Eikenberry told him
Kouchner's idea was neither endorsed nor rejected by the
United States.


5. (S) Ambassador Eikenberry encouraged Karzai and his team
to discuss aspects of the "compact" publicly. Karzai took
note when Ambassador Eikenberry promised that the Embassy
would find ways to comment positively on Karzai's
presentation of dimensions of the compact.


6. (S) President Karzai noted Secretary of State Clinton's
upcoming trip to Pakistan, and suggested it might be helpful
for the Secretary to visit Afghanistan at that time.
Ambassador Eikenberry responded that a visit would only be
possible to consider if the second round process was moving
forward or if the candidates had made some other sort of
agreement by that point.


7. (S) President Karzai encouraged the Embassy to continue to
seek exposure to the Afghan media and outlined four messages
he would like the Embassy to convey: accepting a second round
was a good decision by the President of Afghanistan; this
decision strengthens the democratic process; the United
States will remain committed to Afghanistan; and Afghan
people have shown great courage in participating in the
election. Karzai also recommended we continue to convey our
support for a second round rather than for a coalition
government.


8. (S) When the conversation turned to the U.S. debate over
our military strategy in Afghanistan, Ambassador Eikenberry

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stressed that a decision to send more troops would need to be
seen as a collaborative decision. Ambassador Eikenberry
described the importance of three different audiences when
discussing a troop increase: the Afghan domestic audience,
the regional audience, and the U.S./NATO publics. Eikenberry
noted Karzai's message to his people should be that U.S.
troops are providing for their protection so that governance
and justice, and economic development can be advanced; his
message to the region should be that the troops are deploying
at the invitation of the Afghan people; and his message to
the U.S. should be that he is committed as Commander in Chief
to pushing his Army and Police so that they will rapidly
develop the capabilities necessary to relieve international
military forces of front-line combat duties. Karzai agreed
to this approach, noting that troops coming in without this
kind of political context would not be well received,
especially by his people or within the region.

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ABDULLAH POSITIVE BUT SKEPTICAL
--------------


9. (S) At their meeting October 21, Ambassador Eikenberry
thanked Dr. Abdullah for his measured approach to the entire
campaign and post-election process. He noted that Abdullah
had made a huge contribution to the future of Afghanistan and
the strengthening of its institutions as well as to his own
legacy. Ambassador Eikenberry told Abdullah that the U.S. is
fully committed to a second round, noting that if the Afghan
players decide it is in their mutual interests to come to
some agreement and not to proceed to a second round that is
up to them. The U.S. does not object, he said, but we plan
to deliver a second round unless both candidates reach an
understanding before November 7.


10. (S) As he had with Karzai, Ambassador Eikenberry reviewed
the challenges facing a second round: 1) the role of the
military and the provision of security; 2) logistics; 3)
improving the performance of the IEC and ECC. Ambassador
Eikenberry told Abdullah that there was a UNAMA meeting
earlier that day, at which the assembled Ambassadors had
given UNSRSG Kai Eide their full support. Ambassador
Eikenberry said that the number one imperative is to deliver
a transparent election. He also emphasized that the U.S.
will stay out of political negotiations until if and when its
assistance is sought. Ambassador Eikenberry assured Dr.
Abdullah that we are prepared to offer necessary support to
make the second round happen.


11. (S) Eikenberry said that ensuring IEC and ECC cooperation
and credibility may be our biggest challenge. He assured
Abdullah that we planned to work very closely with UNAMA on
this round. Ambassador Eikenberry described that an election
where the process emerged intact and the rules were not
broken would be a "win" for Afghanistan. Abdullah responded
that it was only the transparency of U.S. interactions with
him and our obvious commitment to the process that had
allowed him to convince his more cynical colleagues that we
had no hidden agenda. He said that his main concern too was
that Afghanistan have a foundation for a real election
process someday. Ambassador Eikenberry reminded Abdullah of
how much the United States has invested in Afghanistan in
defending the elections process and told him, "what you do
not want to do is attack the process. Work with the
international bodies and with the IEC." He warned Abdullah
that otherwise, he would be destroying the hard work of many
and condemning his own standing. Ambassador Eikenberry told
Abdullah he had heard his comments on the ECC and IEC earlier
in the day and found them "measured and responsible." (Note:
The Embassy called Abdullah before his conference upon
hearing his plans to harshly criticize the IEC. This
intervention likely contributed to Abdullah,s modified
tone.)


12. (S) Abdullah shared his impressions of President Karzai's
October 20 press conference and said that he believes Karzai
is fully prepared for a second round. He said he wished
Karzai well during their phone call following the press
conference and told him "this chapter is now behind us. We
have gone through some difficult exercises. Countries that
never go through exercises like these are not interesting.
Let us put this behind us and look to the interests of the
country." Karzai responded in kind regarding the importance
of national unity and they agreed to get together at some
point. Abdullah said that he was concerned that Karzai is
under intense pressure from his inner circle saying that
Karzai even sounded pressured while on the phone, as though
his inner circle was watching him closely as he spoke.
Abdullah said that it was this problem and the likelihood
that Karzai feels personally attacked by the political
contest he has endured that may keep him from letting bygones
be bygones and making any kind of deal.


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13. (S) Abdullah said that he does not plan any large
rallies before the run-off but that there may perhaps be some
rallies in the provinces. He intends to use the media and
local shuras to get his message out and to put team members
throughout the country for the next two weeks to keep him
informed and connected. He sees "new opportunities in the
South and the East" as people there now see change is
possible. He also said that his main focus will be on
monitoring and correcting mistakes in Kandahar, Kabul, and
Jalalabad. Abdullah also plans to reach out to other
Presidential candidates who lost to see if they will endorse
him and direct their voters his way.


14. (S) Ambassador Eikenberry told Abdullah, as he told
Karzai, that if he discussed dimensions of the "compact" as
part of his campaign platform, the Embassy would lend its
public support. Ambassador Eikenberry suggested the compact
could serve as a basis for discussion with Karzai,s team,
but also pointed out that the document was not complete.
Certain details such as devolution of power and
constitutional change need to be addressed by Afghans.
Abdullah agreed that the compact would form a good platform
for discussions with Karzai, and thanked Ambassador
Eikenberry for his offer of Embassy support for presenting
aspects of the compact to the public. Ambassador Eikenberry
stressed the importance of a this kind of roadmap for
protecting the interests of the Afghan nation.


15. (S) Ambassador Eikenberry told Abdullah that several
members of Karzai,s team had emerged as "big idea people"
over the last several weeks. He listed Minister of Finance
Zakhilwal, IDLG Director Popal, and National Security Advisor
Rassoul as influential "reformers" in Karzai,s inner circle
who appear much more willing than we realized to speak with
Karzai about political ideas. Abdullah advisor Farid Zikria,
who attended the meeting, noted that he was related to
Zakhilwal and offered to reach out to him. Abdullah thanked
Ambassador Eikenberry for his insights. He said he had not
been aware of these reformers, and asked his advisors to
reach out to Zalmay Rassoul as well.


16. (S) Abdullah said he would continue to call for calm and
for people to come out and vote. He expressed serious
concern about the influence of Karzai's brother Ahmed Wali
Karzai, head of the Kandahar Provincial Council, and Arif
Noorzai, another Karzai relative who works on community
security efforts. Both have well-known reputations as
narco-traffickers willing to engage in anything necessary to
advance Hamid Karzai's fortunes. Abdullah said he was
worried Noorzai would use his community security connections
to increase tribal divisions in advance of the elections.


17. (S) Comment: The Embassy will move forward with the
international community and NATO/ISAF to rigorously support
preparations for the second round. The Embassy will be
active in the Afghan media and work with key Afghan
interlocutors to convey our message of commitment to a second
round, and to say there will be no attempt by the
international community to broker a coalition government.
The Embassy will continue to emphasize the United States,
long-term commitment to Afghanistan, and publicly praise
Karzai,s decision. While it was a difficult decision, it is
a &win8 for the development of Afghan democracy. The
Embassy will praise the courage of Afghan voters in the first
round, and encourage Afghans to support, under what will be
difficult conditions, the second round. The Embassy will
also reinforce points made by candidates which are aligned
with the "compact."


18. (S) In the days ahead, the Embassy will work to maintain
discipline in its messaging and will be watchful for the
moment, should it arise, in which we might shift to a
proactive engagement with candidates to bring them both
together. It is our belief that in the immediate future it
is only through convincing efforts to deliver a second round
that the necessary political context will be created that
could, in turn, lead to serious dialogue between the Karzai
and Abdullah camps. End Comment.
EIKENBERRY