Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL3376
2009-10-20 12:36:00
SECRET
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

UNDERSTANDING AND ROLLING BACK THE INSURGENCY IN

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS EAID AF 
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VZCZCXRO4589
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3376/01 2931236
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 201236Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2395
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003376 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS EAID AF
SUBJECT: UNDERSTANDING AND ROLLING BACK THE INSURGENCY IN
KAPISA PROVINCE

Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y
ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003376

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS EAID AF
SUBJECT: UNDERSTANDING AND ROLLING BACK THE INSURGENCY IN
KAPISA PROVINCE

Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y
ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (SBU) Summary: State Department Representative to the
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the eastern Afghan
province of Kapisa held separate conversations covering the
insurgency in the province with a shura leader, radio network
director/community leader and police chief in recent weeks.
Each painted a similar picture of a non-ideological
insurgency whose fighting force consists largely of
unemployed young "drug addicts" with local roots. None
believes there is broad-based support for the insurgent
cause. This information dovetails with the emerging PRT
Kapisa strategy of coordinating with local shuras (especially
in TaGab District) to enhance economic opportunity and
employment, and increase support for GIRoA. Although the
security situation in Kapisa has deteriorated steadily over
the last several months, we believe it is possible to make
significant progress against the Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami
Gulbuddin (HIG),and criminal elements operating in the
province in the near to medium term. Careful coordination
with French Task Force Lafayette -- which becomes the battle
space owner starting November 1 -- will be key for the
success of the U.S. PRT's counter-insurgency strategy. End
Summary.


2. (SBU) Following an early September shura (community
meeting) at the TaGab District Center at which a pomegranate
cooperative was formed, State Rep met privately with Haji
Ibrahimi, the aged leader of the most established shura in
the TaGab district and a respected elder among Pashtuns
throughout Kapisa. Even though there were no other Afghans
in the large meeting room, Ibrahimi pulled State Rep into a
corner opposite the entrance and shared his views on
insurgent elements in TaGab. He expressed his full support
for ISAF efforts in Kapisa ("You didn't come to destroy, but
to build"),but said our activities thus far have not been
well conceived. After applauding military operations against

the "criminals," he added that more needed to be done to
prevent them from re-establishing after they are chased off.
He said that there were no more than 200 Taliban in the area
and half were ordinary "thieves, murderers, and drug
addicts." He also shared his frustration about the lack of
effective development projects, saying that small bore
programs here and there "have no effect on security." On the
other hand, the elder stressed that programs that provide
major economic development and give sustained employment
would result in "every one of them putting down their
rifles."


3. (S) Task Force Cyclone Senior Civilian Representative and
PRT Kapisa State Rep met with Dr. Abdul Mutaleb, the director
of Radio Nijrab on September 9. The station covers a large
portion of Kapisa, including the districts of Mahmood Raqi,
Alisai, TaGab, and Nijrab (the most volatile areas in the
province). In addition to being well-known and
well-respected among his local Afghan audience, the station
director has a long-standing, constructive relationship with
ISAF. Dr. Mutaleb reported that he has received "night
letters" from the Taliban because he plays music not
authorized by the Taliban, encourages participation by women
in his programming, and broadcasts PRT messages. A
self-described communications and cultural leader in his
community, he was adamant that he would not be intimidated
and would continue doing what he considers to be the right
thing. He further stated that he believes "providing
education and jobs for young people is "the most effective
way to defeat the local insurgency," as most fighters are
adolescent ne,er-do-wells who receive payment for their
nefarious activities. (Note: According to other PRT sources,
many local "insurgents" are paid according to a fee schedule
by instigators based in Pakistan. End note.)


4. (SBU) State Rep returned to TaGab September 23 for a
meeting with the executive board of the newly formed
pomegranate cooperative. Chief of Police Zelwar, who has
been shot three times by the Taliban and has recently been
promoted to general, arranged security for the meeting.
State Rep asked him for his views on the insurgency. Zelwar
said the number of insurgents ebbs and flows, with 200-300
fighters currently operating in the area. He said about a
third are indigenous Taliban, a third are ex-mujahadin
(mostly HIG and a third are well-armed outlaws living in the
countryside who oppose anybody who tries to restrict them.
He also described most Taliban fighters as uneducated drug
addicts. He lamented that the lack of educational or economic
opportunity leads many young men to go to Pakistan and Iran

KABUL 00003376 002 OF 002


to work as day laborers, whereupon they become addicted to
opium and heroin. They are then prime candidates for
recruitment into the insurgency. Zelwar expressed his belief
that the local insurgents are "poorly organized and have
little power."


5. (SBU) At least three of the four leaders of the shuras in
TaGab have embraced PRT,s efforts to form a pomegranate
cooperative and link local farmers to buyers in Kabul, India
and Dubai who will pay significantly higher prices than have
traditionally been paid by their sole existing market in
Pakistan. This effort has created an opportunity for good
will among the hard-pressed farmers - many of whom have had
Taliban links. PRT Kapisa and the Kentucky Agriculture
Development Team are working closely with the local shuras to
ensure the success of the cooperative and build on the effort
through additional agricultural, employment and other
projects. The French are funding a much-needed cool storage
facility for fruit in TaGab. The Kapisa Director of
Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (DAIL) has been an
active participant in both pomegranate cooperative meetings
and is adamant that he will fully support local farmers. The
PRT plans an aggressive public diplomacy/information campaign
focused on these activities to build support for GIRoA.


6. (SBU) Comment: TaGab, Nijrab and Alisai have been
identified as "critical districts" by GIRoA. PRT Kapisa's
interagency command group shares this assessment. We further
believe that interagency counterinsurgency efforts combined
with the French Task Force Lafayette, which will be
responsible for the battle space starting November 1, should
focus on TaGab. The Kapisa agriculture director is an able
administrator whose work demonstrates GIRoA's commitment to
the people of TaGab. It is significant that he is Tajik and
TaGab is almost exclusively Pashto.


7. (SBU) Comment continued: Rising attacks against GIRoA and
ISAF (including an IED on September 22 that injured several
members of PRT Kapisa) are well known. However, given the
relatively small number of insurgents, their mostly
non-ideological nature, and their limited command and control
capacity, it is possible to make significant progress in our
counterinsurgency efforts in the near to medium term.
In addition to "clear and hold" operations by Task Force
Lafayette, more resources may be needed to solidify successes
and open opportunities for similar efforts in neighboring
critical districts. As we proceed with our COIN efforts in
TaGab, careful coordination between the U.S.-led PRT and the
French Task Force Lafayette will be key.
EIKENBERRY