LAGHMAN GOVERNOR FACES SIGNIFICANT LOSS OF POPULAR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000330

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR WILKES
CG CJTF-101 POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2019
TAGS: MOPS PREL PGOV AF
SUBJECT: LAGHMAN GOVERNOR FACES SIGNIFICANT LOSS OF POPULAR
SUPPORT FOLLOWING SPECIAL OPS

REF: KABUL 131

Classified By: DCM Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
--------------

1. (C/NF) Two Special Operations Forces operations conducted
in the Alishang district of Laghman Province on January 6 and
Galuch Valley on January 23 resulted in the deaths or capture
of several suspected insurgents, but also in allegations of
civilian casualties. The events provoked anti-Coalition
protests and Coalition-friendly Governor Mashal told us the
operations undermined his political authority. Mashal,
until now a strong and effective ally, has publicly distanced
himself from his Coalition partners. On February 1, PRT and
Maneuver Task Force officers provided a total of USD 77,000
in condolence payments to relatives of the dead. End summary.

Background
--------------

2. (S/NF) On January 6, U.S. Special Operations Forces
(SOF) conducted a night-time raid on the homes of identified
insurgents Bahadar Shah and Gul Pacha in the village of
Masamute a Bala in Alishang district of Laghman province.
Armed villagers engaged SOF soldiers, and in the ensuing
firefight, several residents of the village were killed, in
addition to the two confirmed insurgent fighters who were
leaders of an IED cell operating in Laghman province.
Initial media reports were positive, although casualty
figures varied widely. SOF reports following the operation
claimed 32 insurgents killed, including a woman combatant.
SOF reported two arms caches destroyed, two High Value
Targets (HVTs) killed, and one detainee. Coalition media
operations were quick and effective, portraying the dead as
enemy combatants who had engaged CF. However, President
Karzai quickly called Coalition claims into question, and
dispatched a Presidential fact-finding delegation to
investigate. The delegation concluded that 19 innocent
civilians were killed, in addition to the two insurgents. One
person was detained, according to the investigation.


3. (S/NF) On January 23, a similar incident occurred in
Galuch valley of Mehtarlam District, in which 15 people were
killed in a firefight with armed village residents who
engaged the SOF. According to a NATO/ISAF report, the
targets of the 23 January operation included Qader Khan, a
known Al Qaida collaborator. Following the operation, a
joint ISAF-Afghan Government mitigation team met with shura
elders and Laghman Governor Lutfullah Mashal on January 25.
In conjunction with the PRT and the Maneuver Task Force,
Mashal approved a plan to provide &solatia8 payments.
Thirty-five thousand dollars were paid to relatives of the
Galuch dead, and forty-two thousand dollars to relatives of
those killed in Masamute. In a departure from previous
practice, the payments were given wide press coverage.


Questioning Methods
--------------


4. (C/NF) In an animated meeting with the Brigade Regional
Advisor following the first incident, Mashal expressed his
concern that unilateral U.S. operations undermined his
authority and brought into question the legitimacy of the
Coalition presence in Afghanistan in the minds of the
populace. While Mashal said he favored the raid and the
target, he was adamant that the methods employed had the
effect of separating the population from the government.

Taliban &Guardians?8
--------------

5. (C/NF) Following the first operation, Mashal said that he
came under pressure from local Members of Parliament, and was
summoned to give testimony to the Military Commission of the
Senate. President Karzai instructed the governor to publicly
criticize the Coalition. Governor Mashal persuaded President
Karzai that public attacks on the Coalition were not in
GIRoA,s interest, although he did later &scold8 Coalition
Forces for their mistake. Tribal elders told the governor
that Taliban elements had approached them and offered to
exact revenge for the deaths if the villagers would agree to
host an insurgent base of operations. While some elders
appeared to believe that they had found a &guardian8 in the
Taliban, Governor Mashal believed the village would reject
the proposal to allow the village to be used as a base of

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operations.

Hearts and Minds
--------------


6. (C/NF) Mashal argued that as governor he needs to engage
the &hearts and minds8 of the people of Laghman. Mashal
estimated that he had secured the support of ninety percent
of the population, and that the deaths in Alishang cost him
thirty percent of that support. Following the second
incident on January 23, there were protests that included
some rock-throwing. Two U.S. soldiers were hit by rocks, but
not seriously injured. U.S. officers estimated the size of
the carefully orchestrated protest at no more than three
hundred (though some media reports erroneously claimed
&thousands8 took part).

Involving the Afghans
--------------

7. (C/NF) Mashal, who was a cultural advisor for
then-Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, and later the spokesman for
the Ministry of the Interior, insists that the solution lies
in involving Afghans and conducting operations of this nature
&the Afghan way.8 The governor said he clearly understood
the need for operational security for these sensitive
operations. He strongly argued for the inclusion of Afghan
security forces in any of these operations. By engaging the
Tribal elders and involving Afghans, the likelihood of local
resistance would be greately reduced.


8. (C/NF) Governor Mashal emphasized that he found no fault
with the conduct of the soldiers, who responded to hostile
intent from armed villagers. Rather, it is the planners and
cultural advisors to the SOF who need to reconsider the
methods employed in these raids. The Arbakai tradition of
village self-defense is designed to respond to unknown armed
intruders, and every Afghan male has a weapon. By involving
Afghans, and adapting tactics, this operation could have
produced a major success. The Afghan government and security
forces would be shown to be acting against insurgent
elements, and the close cooperation between ANSF and
Coalition Forces would have strengthened the view within the
population that the Coalition is here to support the
government, rather than acting unilaterally.



9. (U) The Task Force Commander has reviewed this message.
WOOD