Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL3291
2009-10-16 15:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

BALKH GOVERNOR ATTA ON POSSIBLE KARZAI-ABDULLAH

Tags:  PGOV PREL EAID AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3291/01 2891500
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161500Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2198
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003291 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID AF
SUBJECT: BALKH GOVERNOR ATTA ON POSSIBLE KARZAI-ABDULLAH
POWER-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS

REF: A. A. KABUL 3167

B. B. KABUL 3391

Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y
ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003291

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID AF
SUBJECT: BALKH GOVERNOR ATTA ON POSSIBLE KARZAI-ABDULLAH
POWER-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS

REF: A. A. KABUL 3167

B. B. KABUL 3391

Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y
ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The Governor of Afghanistan's northern
province of Balkh, Mohammed Atta Noor, enumerated
preconditions for any power-sharing arrangement between the
forces of President Karzai and his main challenger, Abdullah
Abdullah, in the event that there is no/no runoff election.
The preconditions include an elaborate scheme for allocating
central and provincial government leadership positions, and
reserving for Abdullah any &Number 28 executive position in
the government. If election authorities should declare a
runoff election in the coming days, Atta believes that Karzai
government should yield to an interim administration to
ensure stability. Atta reiterated his long-standing
criticism of &paltry8 international assistance efforts in
Afghanistan's north; acknowledged that his security officials
are confronted by increased efforts by unnamed opponents to
de-stabilize the province; and claimed the central government
is withholding funds for completion of infrastructure
projects in Balkh. End summary

CONDITIONS FOR POWER-SHARING WITH KARZAI
--------------


2. (C) During Senior Civilian Representative-North,s October
11 introduction of the new State Officer for the Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Mazar-e-Sharif, Governor Atta
Mohammed Noor, a supporter of presidential challenger
Abdullah Abdullah, acknowledged significant on-going
back-channel communications between the Abdullah and Karzai
camps. He outlined specific terms that he said the Abdullah
camp had communicated it would require should it accept
persistent entreaties by the Karzai administration )
including appeals through Atta himself ) to participate in a
power-sharing arrangement. The requirements included the
following:

-- a stipulation that, in the event of any decision to
implement a power-sharing arrangement that would provide for
an additional strong executive position (with Karzai

continuing to serve as President),Abdullah be the person to
fill that position. (Note: Atta did not use the term &prime
minister.8 End Note)

-- an elaborate division of the appointed leadership of
ministries and other governmental and non-governmental
organizations. Specifically, he emphasized that the Abdullah
camp would need to have leadership of at least one of the
following pairs of ministries and organizations: Interior or
Defense, Finance or Foreign Affairs, Independent Directorate
of Local Governance or the Administrative Affairs Office of
the President, Office of the Attorney General or the Supreme
Court, and the Afghan Central Bank or the Afghan Red Crescent
Society. (Note: Like ministers and the Attorney General,
Supreme Court members are appointed by the President and
approved by the Wolesi Jirga. End Note) In the case of the
Interior and Defense Ministries, he specified that the
Minister and First Deputy Minister positions should be
divided between Karzai and Abdullah supporters. (For
example, if Karzai forces were to name the Defense Minister,
Abdullah forces would name the First Deputy Minister of
Defense.)

-- allocation of provincial leadership positions on the basis
of votes received for the respective candidates in each
particular province. Accordingly, the party whose candidate
received the most votes in the presidential election within a
particular province would have the right to select the
governor of that province; the second-place finisher would
appoint the Deputy Governor; the third-place finisher would
appoint the third highest official, etc.
-- that Karzai sign a document accepting these conditions and
share this document with the international community.


3. (C) Atta said he preferred the description
&power-sharing8 to &coalition8 government. He believes a
&coalition8 arrangement would imply a government organized
along ethnic lines. He suggested that &power-sharing8 is
more accurate in describing cooperation between two leading
candidates, one that does not imply a coalition of different
ethnic interests. Atta disavowed any interest in serving as
a minister himself, but said he would welcome the opportunity
to continue serving as a governor. Regardless, he made clear

KABUL 00003291 002 OF 003


that he intended to continue to play an influential political
role in the development of the Afghan nation.

IF THERE IS A PRESIDENTIAL RUNOFF
--------------


4. (C) If election authorities declare a runoff election in
the coming days, Atta believes that the Karzai government
should yield to an interim administration to ensure
stability, pending full resolution of the presidential
elections. In addition, he said, the membership of the
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) should change.
(Comment: The President has the right to appoint IEC
members, so presumably Atta would envision an interim
administration, rather than Karzai, selecting a new IEC. End
comment) According to Atta, these steps would guard against
a repeat of the voting fraud that characterized the first
round of the elections, which Atta said was abetted by the
Karzai administration's control over the IEC.

TIME FOR CHANGE
--------------


5. (C) Regardless of the outcome of the presidential
elections, Atta called for a drastic change in the central
government's approach to building a cohesive Afghan nation.
Specifically, he said that the new government would have to
address high-level corruption in some meaningful and
transparent way; and start assisting, rather than
undermining, provincial governments.

POLITICAL REPRISALS AGAINST BALKH?
--------------


6. (C) PRT Officer solicited Atta,s comments on claims in a
recent local press article that Atta,s open support for
Abdullah,s candidacy had prompted the central government to
slow or block implementation of centrally-funded
infrastructure projects in Balkh. Atta said the claims were
accurate and cited three examples of the Karzai government's
&revenge8 against him: suspension of its central
government budget allocations to the Governor's office, a
mid-stream cutoff of funding for a number of Mazar-e-Sharif
municipal road-paving projects, and withholding of &USD 8 or
10 million8 needed to complete construction of a Balkh
University agricultural faculty building at a new campus site
on the outskirts of Mazar-e-Sharif.

SECURITY SITUATION IN BALKH PROVINCE
--------------


7. (C) On the question of security in Balkh province, Atta
walked a fine line. He said security was still good, but
acknowledged that his security officials have to address
increased efforts to de-stabilize the province. He again
alleged (ref A) that unnamed political &opponents8 are
financing the arming of local civilians &to create problems
for Governor Atta.8 He charged that these opponents not
only are arming civilians, but are promising them political
positions as an eventual reward for their service in
challenging him. Despite these efforts to undermine
stability, Atta claimed that Balkh is still managing to
maintain security in the province.


8. (C) Addressing the possibility of violence in the event
Karzai is declared the first-round winner of the presidential
election, Atta repeated allegations that the central
government has directly armed civilians with the goal of
creating instability in Balkh and other areas in the north.
He said such actions, coupled with Karzai,s subversion of
the democratic process, suggest that the Karzai camp's
intention is to do whatever it takes to win a second term.
If that is their intention and they succeed in achieving
their goal by anti-democratic means, he warned that Abdullah
supporters &would not sit without any reaction.8


9. (C) Atta challenged the U.S. and the international
community to work against electoral fraud and corruption,
which undermine the democratic process. Senior Civilian Rep
reinforced U.S. support and respect for a fair and
transparent election process managed by the IEC and Electoral
Complaints Commission.

MORE ASSISTANCE FOR THE NORTH
--------------


10. (C) Atta graciously welcomed the new PRT Officer and

KABUL 00003291 003 OF 003


wished him success. But he took the opportunity to reiterate
his dissatisfaction with the PRT and the international
community. He decried the allocation of the lion's share of
assistance to unstable (and often narcotics-producing)
provinces in southern and eastern Afghanistan. He urged
greater assistance to northern provinces like Balkh, which
had done a good job in maintaining security and in reducing
poppy cultivation. Failure to reward good performance
ultimately would strengthen the hand of those seeking to sow
instability in the region. Atta also urged that
international assistance support infrastructure projects,
rather than &protocol-type seminars and conferences.8
(Note: USAID will soon begin an assessment of the many
requests for infrastructure projects in the north. End Note)
He conceded the utility of international assistance to
long-term training/capacity-building projects as well.


11. (C) Comment: It is unclear to what extent Atta,s
elaborate terms for a power-sharing arrangement with the
Karzai administration represent Abdullah,s thinking on the
issue. Atta,s senior political advisor, Zalmai Yonusi, had
earlier mentioned to PRT officers that Atta personally had
given more thought to a coalition government structure than
some Abdullah camp purists. It is clear that Atta, as an
appointed governor who broke with the Karzai camp in
endorsing Abdullah, has much to lose if a Karzai victory is
declared in the first round.
EIKENBERRY