Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL321
2009-02-12 11:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PRT ZABUL: IT'S HOT IN QALAT

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM AF 
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VZCZCXRO9993
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #0321/01 0431114
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121114Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7342
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000321 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR WILKES
CG CJTF-101 POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM AF
SUBJECT: PRT ZABUL: IT'S HOT IN QALAT

REF: KABUL 131

Classified By: DCM Christopher Dell for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000321

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR WILKES
CG CJTF-101 POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM AF
SUBJECT: PRT ZABUL: IT'S HOT IN QALAT

REF: KABUL 131

Classified By: DCM Christopher Dell for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) The situation in Zabul province grows increasingly
tense, following a February 6 Special Forces operation near
Shar-e-safa that killed six, captured three, and garnered
national and international media attention. Tribal elders,
religious leaders and Provincial Councils members issued
polite but determined ultimatums about coalition operations:
change the way special operations are conducted at night and
cooperate with Afghan security forces, or we will fight you
the way we fought the Soviets. Zabul's provincial police,
army and intelligence chiefs admitted the mood at an
800-person rally February 8 at the Qalat mosque "frightened"
them. Governor Arman asked the PRT for advice in how to
diffuse the situation, but noted that President Karzai's
anti-coalition rhetoric makes it hard for him, Karzai's
appointee, to counter Taliban propaganda in the media. End
summary.

Special Ops in Zabul
--------------


2. (SBU) The February 6 operation in Torri Kalay,
Shar-e-safa is only the latest in a series of coalition
attacks against insurgents that resulted in casualties and
public outrage (reftel). According to CENTCOM, when the
force arrived at the targeted compound, it conducted a
call-out and all women and children exited the buildings to
safety. Coalition forces pursued suspected militants to a
nearby cave; the ensuing engagement killed six militants and
captured three.


3. (SBU) The following day (February 7),the PRT shared with
Deputy Governor Gulab Shah Alikhel releasable intelligence.
National and international media outlets picked up Provincial
Council Chief Haji Mohammed Hashim's statements calling the
victims innocent civilians. More than 300 Shar-e-safa
residents took to the streets in protest, and threatened to
bring the bodies to Kandahar (where Hashim and Shar-e-Safa
district chief Shodi Khan, a close associate of the Karzai
family, were conferring with Ahmed Wali Karzai),rather than
bury them according to Islamic custom, to show their outrage.

Gulab Shah dispatched additional police from Qalat, who
diffused the situation and convinced the residents to bury
their dead.

Public demonstrations
--------------


4. (C) Gulab Shah denied protesters permission to
demonstrate in the streets February 8, but told them they
could gather in the mosque, provided it remained peaceful.
Prior to the meeting, he warned the PRT that he might not be
able to control a spontaneous demonstration, if the
protesters decided to block Highway 1. The Afghan police
estimated that 800 people attended the rally. Several Afghan
security leaders told PRT staff at a private dinner at the
governor's residence February 9 that the atmosphere at the
mosque was unsettling. "It was frightening," said Zabul's
Army chief and commander of the 2d Brigade of the 205 Corps
MG Jamaluddin. "It was scary," said the NDS deputy, who said
that although the protesters had promised to remain peaceful,
"foreigners" (meaning Pakistanis) heated up the rhetoric.
The ANSF agreed that the tension had not passed, and that
future gatherings would need to be closely monitored.

A clear message delivered . . .
--------------


5. (SBU) Over the last weeks and in the past days, PRT
Afghan contacts ranging from mullahs, elected Provincial
Council members, the local UNAMA head, members of the ANSF to
tribal elders delivered the same recommendations:

-- Cooperate with the Afghan national security forces on
operations so they have an Afghan component for public
credibility.

-- Stop the night raids which terrify women and children;
conduct arrests during the day, when most of the recent
victims are easy to find in their shops and fields.


KABUL 00000321 002 OF 003


-- Respect Afghan culture and Islamic values, protect our
civilians.


6. (C) Provincial Council Chief Mohammed Haji Hashim and
Provincial Council Member Abdul Salam asked the PRT February
8 to meet with the Shar-e-safa elders "to give them comfort"
after many district families had abandoned their homes and
livestock. They said the residents did not want humanitarian
assistance or development projects, only security in their
homes. They alleged that when the villages hear the sound of
helicopters at night, the men flee into caves out of fear,
not guilt. Hashim suggested that the Afghan army, police,
and possibly the deputy governor participate in the shura,
along with the PRT, ISAF and Provincial Council.


7. (SBU) They also requested that CF coordinate their
operations with the Afghan security forces. PRT informed
them that we had an outstanding request with Governor Arman
and NDS to assign trusted agents to work with special forces,
but had yet to receive names, despite repeated reminders.
Haji Hashim said he would bring this up at the next
provincial security meeting.

A second time, louder, more forcefully . . .
--------------


8. (SBU) A six-person delegation of two tribal elders, two
Provincial Council members, and two religious leaders brought
a similar, but more severely worded message, to the PRT
February 9: stop the special operations at night that kill
civilians and terrify our women and children. If you don't,
you will lose our support. We will close our shops, block the
streets, move to the mountains and fight you the way we
fought the Soviets. We want to help you fight the Taliban
who terrorize us during the day, but the special operations
are doing more harm than good.


9. (SBU) Using provocative, sometimes aggressive language,
they questioned the legality of the operations under the
Afghan constitution. (Note: Article 38 of the Constitution
stipulates, "No one, including the state, shall have the
right to enter a personal residence or search it without the
owners permission or by order of an authoritative court,
except in situations and methods delineated by law.") They
emphasized that they do not object to special operations that
capture insurgents, but they wanted them conducted according
to Afghan cultural values. They noted that the current
operations benefited the enemy. "The Taliban call and laugh
at us every time civilians die." They also agreed to meet
with coalition forces and Afghan government representatives
in a shura.

And a third time
--------------


10. (SBU) Governor Arman, recently returned from Kabul,
asked PRT to address a group of 45 Shar-e-safa elders
February 10, again to "offer to console the people." Several
elders spoke out against the operations which forced their
families to seek refuge in Kandahar, and questioned why the
United States couldn't catch the enemy, but instead killed
the innocent. "You came to bring peace and security, but we
don't want it, if it comes at the cost of our culture and
religion."


11. (SBU) Echoing previous comments by Provincial Council
members, mullahs, and tribal elders, the Shar-e-safa
residents expressed the firm conviction that special
operations were violating Afghan culture and against Islamic
principles. They shook their heads in disbelief when PRT
explained that special operation forces took special
precautions to protect women and children. They suggested
that if CF were not more respectful, they would be perceived
the same as the Soviets. &We stood against the Soviets for
nine years, when they attacked our religion and culture.
Don't force us to do the same to you.8 (Note: PRT is
hearing comparisons to the Soviets more and more frequently.
End note.)

Help us help you
--------------


12. (SBU) PRT made the point in all three meetings that the
operations were intended to break up a cell that was planting
bombs on Highway One, killing civilians as well as CF, ANA
and ANP, and destroying the infrastructure by blowing bridges
and culverts. Coalition forces needed community involvement

KABUL 00000321 003 OF 003


and the support of the elders in identifying IEDs and the
people who placed them. The PRT also pointed out to the
elders that the U.S. also stood against the Soviets, and
since SOF operations were conducted no bridges or culverts
were destroyed. The PRT also promised to attend a shura in
Sara-e-Safa next week as part of Task Force Zabul's "First
Step" operations. Governor Arman will also attend. In
addition, the PRT promised to convey their concerns to ISAF
and U.S. Embassy.


13. (C) In a private meeting February 9, Governor Arman
turned to the PRT for advice. PRT recommended that he or his
deputy help counter Taliban propaganda by publicly reassuring
the Zabul residents about coalition operations, and asking
for their support. He noted ruefully that he would have to be
"a little careful" about getting ahead of President Karzai,
who criticized the Zabul operations. Arman said he needed to
speak with the Shar-e-safa elders and mullahs and other
provincial authorities before deciding a course of action for
provincial shuras or other gatherings.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) Another special operation with casualties could tip
the balance in Zabul towards anti-coalition forces. If
Coalition Forces (CF) disregard the clear warnings and
specific requests for cooperation, they risk endangering all
of their stabilization and reconstruction efforts, and
creating a more hostile environment as the U.S. plans on
increasing troops in the province. Equally important, CF are
losing the public relations campaign in Zabul -* no matter
how Special Operation Forces (SOF) operations are actually
conducted, the firm public conviction that CF are killing
civilians and treating women badly works against them. The
Taliban has the upper-hand in media relations, by declaring
all casualties &civilians.8 PRT is working with Zabul
local media to set the record straight, but will need robust
support from ISAF. End Comment.


15. (U) This cable has been reviewed by the PRT Commander.
WOOD