ABDULLAH'S CONCERNS: FRAUD, SECURITY, AND HIS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003157

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: ABDULLAH'S CONCERNS: FRAUD, SECURITY, AND HIS
FUTURE

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Classified By: Ambassador Francis Ricciardone, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary: Presidential challenger Dr. Abdullah
Abdullah recently told Ambassador Eikenberry that he objected
to being lumped with President Karzai's wholesale fraud. He
would contest losing legitimate votes in the IEC/ECC auditing
process, but generally agrees with the auditing mechanisms.
After a sharp public message and private anxiety, he sent his
observers to the first and second days of auditing. On a
separate issue, he expressed concern that government-led
programs to arm local groups are out of control, and has sent
us a video of alleged government payoffs to the Taliban.
Abdullah's political room to maneuver is tightening, but he
appears unwilling to make a final arrangement that would end
his candidacy. End Summary.

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Assessment of Fraud: Questions
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2. (S) On September 30 a preoccupied Abdullah reviewed with
us his current situation in light of the departure of D/SRSG
Galbraith, recent media reports that the Foreign Ministers
attending the "Friends of Afghanistan" meeting in New York
had expressed confidence in a Karzai victory, and the delays
in getting the ECC audit underway. Abdullah said that rumors
about Galbraith had been confusing and "debated" and said
that "I need to call him." (Comment: we have unconfirmed
reports that Ambassador Galbraith has been in telephone
contact with Abdullah, end comment.)


3. (S) The ECC audit and sampling methodology seem sound, the
Ambassador told Abdullah, and it was a good decision to add
the extra boxes which were omitted in the first sample (note:
due to an error in the English translation of whether all
votes or only valid votes were being counted, end note.) He
pointed out that training candidates in the auditing added
transparency in the process. He told Abdullah that the
documenting of fraud would be "your legacy." Abdullah
confirmed he has sent agents to be trained, and agreed that
the methodology seemed fine "once they explained it." The
problem was when the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)
gets involved -- "they are not trustworthy." For example,
they transport ballot boxes without allowing observers to
take part.


4. (S) Abdullah expressed uneasiness at that point that all
boxes in a category, or "universe" should be disqualified for
gross fraud on the part of one candidate and not the other
(i.e., himself.) He said that he wants it "known" afterwards
which boxes belonged to which candidate and what they did -
so he would not be linked to "historical" fraud. When the
Ambassador pressed him to get a fuller explanation of the
process or allow the U.S. to facilitate greater
communication, Abdullah said that he has good access to the
ECC and the international experts directing the audit.

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Anger at Eide
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5. (S) Abdullah told us that he was very angry at the recent
UNSC report by SRSG Eide because Eide refers to "everyone"
committing fraud. "Does he have proof?" Abdullah asked,
noting that fraud committed by his followers was so
insignificant that in his strongholds, Baghdis and Panjshir,
there was a healthy mix of candidates who got votes,
including Karzai. There was no institutional framework to
support his fraud, Abdullah said. "We've digested so much on
behalf of the country," he said, that being accused of
Karzai's gross fraud is too much. He mentioned that he'd had
a 'difficult conversation' with Eide on September 24, before
Eide's trip to New York. Eide asked if Abdullah were
questioning his integrity and Abdullah said he'd replied "no,
I'm not, but I will if I have to."


6. (S) The Ambassador expressed our continued support for the
process but also noted the need for a balance between
credibility and timeliness. Abdullah said he has been asked
by many others if the reported U.S. position that Karzai
would likely win in the first or second round "constitutes a
shift" in our policy; we replied that no, it does not. We
reiterated our continued concern that delays could force a
second round, if required, into the spring. Abdullah asked
if the Minister of Interior would be able to claim that a
second round was impossible to secure; Eikenberry responded
that Atmar could not do so, and we continue to believe that
security can be provided.


7. (S) Abdullah again claimed that his followers, especially
government employees such as teachers, have been intimidated
or targeted for retribution. He "blames himself" for

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exposing them, he said, although he has not responded to our
repeated requests for specific information on teacher firings
or other such acts. He did report that one of his campaign
organizers in Kunduz was assassinated on September 25.

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Shaky Support for the Process
--------------


8. (S) On October 3, Abdullah held an hour-long press
conference which drew from the Galbraith letter. He accused
SRSG Eide of "support" for President Karzai and suppression
of a report on voter turnout that would have proved that the
real level of participation was far below the number of votes
cast in key provinces. He expressed confidence in the audit
process, but said that the international community would be
responsible for the political crisis that would ensue if the
final results were "unjust." After more ECC rule
refinements, Abdullah's campaign manager threatened the ECC
and IEC by email on October 4 that if Abdullah did not get
another briefing on the process early the next morning he
would not send his observers to the audit that started that
day. The experts went to his house early October 5 and
explained the process, and he agreed to allow his observers
to participate. Abdullah advisor Farid Zekria told us later
October 5 that the team went and was "happy enough" with the
complex process, now that they had their questions answered,
but it was going slowly with only 35 out of 350 boxes
examined on the first day.

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Concern over Informal Security Arrangements
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9. (S) Abdullah raised the arming of local security groups.
He gave the Ambassador a blurry mid-September video
reportedly from Bahglan, from mid-September, which allegedly
shows police turning over vehicles and weapons to the Taliban
(note: it is not evident from the video what is the
affiliation of the non-uniformed men, and there is only
footage of the police talking to them with weapons - it is
unclear whose - in evidence. End note.) He also raised some
of the community defense initiative (CDI) and other local
security programs, including one under Karzai campaign
leader, brother-in-law and "Director for the Independent
Directorate of Highways" Arif Noorzai. Abdullah alleged that
some old linkages among drug traffickers and former warlords
were being reactivated under this program, naming a few such
figures in the Takhar area.


10. (S) Ambassador Eikenberry reviewed some of the programs
that are underway in the area of local defense forces,
including the CDI and the AP3 in Wardak. He said that some
of these were good efforts that had positive results, but
other results remain uncertain. We are concerned, he said,
that this not occur without oversight and without being fully
developed with communities, governors and the ANSF. Such
initiatives should be centrally controlled, transparent and
accountable. Abdullah added, "and not politicized."
Eikenberry concurred, noting that sometimes we are not aware
of all the local influences at play. He agreed with Abdullah
that we could get drawn into local rivalries through our
programs.

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Where Does Abdullah Go From Here?
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11. (S) Abdullah told us that the IEC needs to resign, and
that Parliament should get involved in reforming this
corrupted system. Parliamentary elections with these
institutions won't work, he said, stating that Provincial
Council elections (where fraud is even more consequential
since victory margins are narrow) have resulted in many
reformists losing to corrupt candidates. He accused Karzai's
supporters of not respecting the institutions and having
created a "cracked foundation" for democracy.


12. (S) Outreach by Karzai's camp continues, he said, with
continued appeals both to him and to his colleagues,
including Rabbani (whom Karzai visited over the September
20-23 Eid holiday.) Abdullah said that Karzai is using
governors to protest a second round, but those demonstrations
are getting out of hand - compared to his own meeting on
September 27, which had been peaceful. At his press
conference October 3, he reiterated his previously-stated
position that he is not going to be "part of a coalition
government that is the outcome of an unjust election."


13. (S) Lower House (Wolesi Jirga) Speaker Yunus Qanooni,s
brother and closest advisor told us October 1 that Qanooni,
one of Abdullah's key backers, has offered his services

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to both Dr. Abdullah and President Karzai, and would serve
his country in any capacity they deemed appropriate.
However, he remains steadfast behind Dr. Abdullah, and was
present at the peaceful September 27 Abdullah gathering in
Kabul that drew over 5,000 supporters. He said there would
be no coalition government, but perhaps a &National
Participation government, likely hinting at roles for
Qanooni and perhaps the son and son-in-law of
Abdullah-supporter Burhanuddin Rabbani.
EIKENBERRY