PAKTYA PROVINCE SIX-MONTH ASSESSMENT: JULY-DECEMBER 2008

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000315

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR WILKES
CG CJTF-101 POLAD

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID PINR KDEM AF

SUBJECT: PAKTYA PROVINCE SIX-MONTH ASSESSMENT: JULY-DECEMBER 2008

SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) Paktya's security situation remained stable in the second
half of 2008, with Zormat and the Zadran Arc the main focuses of
coalition security efforts. Increased insurgent infiltration in the
northern half of the province may require additional Afghan or
Coalition Forces (CF) in 2009, particularly in the remote Jani Khel
district bordering Khost province and along the Pakistan border.
Governor Hamdard remains a relatively effective administrator, but
the real challenges lie at the district level. The lack of official
status for three of the provinces' 14 districts particularly
hindered governance in these areas. The groundbreaking for the
long-awaited Gardez-Khost road project through the Zadran Arc took
place in August, with 15 kilometers completed prior to the winter
construction halt. Combined with the impending launch of both the
Gardez-Ghazni road and approval won for the provincial "spine road"
from Gardez to the Pakistan border, the province will have all of
its major routes paved for the first time in its history.

TRIBES DECISIVE FOR SECURITY
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2. (SBU) The security situation in Paktya was largely stable
throughout the second half of 2008. Two areas in particular
remained problematic: the southern district of Zormat, which has a
relatively weaker tribal structure than the rest of the province,
and the Zadran Arc, which in Paktya comprises the districts of
Shwak, Waze Zadran, and Gerda Serai. Zormat, at the northern edge
of an area of relative instability that extends to Paktika and
Ghazni provinces, has long been susceptible to Taliban and Haqqani
influence. The Zadran Arc also includes districts in Khost and
Paktika provinces and has historically been relatively isolated from
the rest of the country. These two areas were the principal focus
of coalition operations in Paktya during late 2008. In Zormat, CF
established a new Joint Combat Outpost (JCOP) near the village of
Sahak along the route from Gardez to Ghazni, and have plans to
establish at least one more, further along the route toward the
Paktika border. Long-delayed plans to transfer authority for
security from the coalition to a steadily improving Afghan National
Army (ANA) may be realized in the first half of 2009. In the Zadran
Arc, the coalition established a second Combat Outpost (COP) along
the Gardez-Khost road route in late 2008.


3. (SBU) Isolated areas in the northern part of Paktya have also
seen insurgent influence, principally directed by Hizb-e Islami
Gulbuddin (HIG) and also by incursions of various forces across the
border between Paktya's Jani Khel district and Sabari district in
Khost. There are currently limited coalition or Afghan forces in
this isolated area, though the first half of 2009 may see an
increase to coincide with renewed development and outreach to tribal
leaders in Jani Khel. The lessening of Sunni-Shia conflict in
Pakistan's Kurram Agency in fall 2008 also impacted the security
situation in the north, especially in the Pakistan border districts
of Jaji Aryoub and Dande Patan, by making cross-border freedom of
movement easier for insurgents -- as well as for the tribes that
straddle the border and for commerce. Coalition training of and
partnership with the Afghan National Border Police (ANBP) began in
earnest only in late 2008.


4. (SBU) Paktya's government officials and tribal leaders almost
universally extol the efficacy that traditional tribal forces (known
as arbakai) would have in opposing insurgent organizations that are
not tribally rooted, which none of the insurgent groups are.
Although Paktya enjoys a relatively better security situation than
its neighboring provinces, Paktya's leaders are not satisfied, and
view "Loya Paktya" (which comprises Paktya, Paktika, Khost, and
parts of Ghazni and Logar) as uniquely suited among all of
Afghanistan's regions for a significant tribal role in ensuring
security. In fact, during Paktya's voter registration campaign in
November-December, Afghan security forces and civilian officials
alike appealed to tribal elders to provide protection. Voter
registration proceeded largely without incident -- with the
exception of Zormat, where insurgents were actively intimidating
citizens from registering. Paktya province has strong and cohesive
tribes -- notably the Mangal in the northeast, the Ahmadzai and Tuta
Khel in the center, and the Zadran in the south -- whose ultimate
commitment to the Afghan government is dependent upon stability and
progress. The government will have to devise an effective means for
enlisting their continuous support to ensure security.

GOVERNANCE GAPS IN UNOFFICIAL DISTRICTS
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5. (SBU) Juma Khan Hamdard's last six months as Paktya governor have

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been reasonably successful, though the province has suffered from
his frequent absences from the province. The Governor is a veteran
Pashtun leader, albeit originally from Balkh, and broadly
acknowledged as skilled at bringing tribal leaders together.
However, he complains that he does not have sufficient funding from
Kabul to convene tribal shuras on a regular basis, and continues to
use his own funding for that purpose. (Note: The Embassy provided
the Governor a small grant that enabled him to convene two large
shuras in late 2008.) In the last months of 2008, the PRT took a
more active role in connecting Governor Hamdard with districts and
officials in the province. The PRT facilitated the first-ever visit
of the Governor to the northern district of Chamkani, provided
transport for a visit to Jaji Aryoub, and plans to move him more
regularly around the province.


6. (SBU) USAID's Local Governance and Community Development program
(LGCD) started a series of district administrator conferences and
trainings to bring them collectively to Kabul in January 2009.
District administrators have few resources with which to establish
authority in their districts, a deficiency LGCD is addressing.
Several new district centers were constructed and/or existing
facilities rehabilitated in the province in recent years. Sayed
Karam and Ahmad Abad are nearing completion, Jani Khel somewhat
further behind, and the PRT is set to start new such projects in
Zormat, and possibly in Chamkani, Dande Patan, and Mirzaka. There
have been several changes in the line-up of district administrators
in the latter half of 2008, with those from Zormat and Dande Patan
switching places; a new district administrator also came to Jani
Khel, the most inaccessible district in the province; and a new
district administrator was brought to Gerda Serai after an
ineffective stint in Jani Khel and three other districts before
that. The prior Gerda Serai district administrator quit in protest
of his lack of pay in the fall and provincial officials told the PRT
that it is difficult to find qualified personnel to serve there.


7. (SBU) Lack of funds, personnel, and facilities for Gerda Serai
and Paktya's two other unofficial districts hindered governance in a
variety of ways. The lack of status was less consequential,
however, for Mirzaka and Lija Mangal, as these two unofficial
districts have more unified tribal structures anchored by the
predominantly pro-government Mangal tribe. But Gerda Serai is the
home district of Jalaludin Haqqani, a significant base of support
for the Haqqani network, and contains much of the most difficult
terrain in the province. In all districts, district administrators
rely on the active support and cooperation of district tribal
shuras, convened on a regular basis and generally representing the
most legitimate authority in the districts.

A SURGE IN DEVELOPMENT
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8. (SBU) Governor Hamdard has been fortunate in that his tenure has
coincided with a sharp increase in development funding for the
province, led by U.S. military funding and the launch of a major
USAID project. The total figure in Commander's Emergency Response
Funds (CERP) funding for FY 2008 was approximately $37 million, more
than four times the amount from FY 2007. Provincial leaders are
well aware that the number for FY 2009 is likely to be significantly
higher. Most of Paktya's leaders and elders have long complained
about the disparity in funding between Paktya and surrounding
provinces. Because the increase roughly coincided with Hamdard's
assumption of the governorship, he has been able to take credit for
the increase and thus increase his own support; at the same time, he
has taken an active role in lobbying Kabul and international donors
for more support.


9. (SBU) The centerpiece of development efforts in Paktya was the
groundbreaking of the Gardez-Khost road, a $98 million USAID-funded
project eagerly awaited for years. The PRT has been coordinating
complementary projects along the road's route, such as bazaar
turnouts in the three Zadran Arc districts the road traverses and
schools in Gerda Serai. The PRT has also won approval for other
significant road projects in the province, including a key piece of
the "spine road" from Gardez which runs through most of the
province's districts to Ahmad Khel, where both forks lead to the
Pakistan border, in Jaji and Dande Patan districts. The PRT
portion, awarded to a contractor in December, runs from Gardez to
Alamgay in Sayed Karam district. The Army Corps of Engineers
portion is Alamgay to Dande Patan and the portion from Ahmad Khel to
Jaji will likely be a combined effort of IRD and the PRT. The
Gardez-Khost road, due to be complete in late 2009, and the spine
road, which will see significant progress in 2009, will both be
vital trade and transport links, connecting Paktya to Pakistan in
two directions, and to the one already-paved road in the province,
from Gardez to Kabul through the Tera Pass. When the long-planned

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USAID-funded Gardez-Ghazni road breaks ground in the first half of
2009, the last vital link the province requires -- to Highway One --
will have gotten underway. CF will be augmented in March 2009 by an
Agribusiness Development Team to help the people of Paktya develop
their predominant economic activity and prepare for the commercial
opportunities these roads will provide.


10. (SBU) The Provincial Development Council (PDC) meets monthly and
made strides prioritizing development projects that it approves
throughout the province and ensuring donors are attuned to those
priorities. Line directorates at the provincial level, however,
remain weak and ill-funded, and translating community needs into
provincial priorities remains problematic. Generally donors,
including the PRT, must engage communities directly to learn their
needs, despite the existence throughout the province of Community
Development Councils (CDCs). Some donors made efforts in late 2008
to engage with CDCs directly -- including UNAMA and GTZ in the
Zadran Arc, USAID/LGCD in Zormat, and CARE International in Sayed
Karam -- but these efforts remain ad hoc. In general, district and
village leaders still have little confidence in the Afghan
government addressing their development needs and seek to engage
with international donors, the PRT and CF in particular, as a more
reliable source of development.

WOOD