SCENESETTER FOR CODEL REED

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000031

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

KABUL FOR COS USFOR-A
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS
STATE FOR H PASS TO CODEL REED
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CG CJTF-101, POLAD, JICCENT

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TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR OREP AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL REED

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1. (SBU) Embassy Kabul warmly welcomes your visit.


2. (SBU) The coming year will take its identity from the
Afghan presidential elections, and from increased US military
deployments. We continue to face tough challenges in
Afghanistan, particularly on the security and governance
front. But conditions here are more nuanced than the
negative drumbeat coming from the media. Advances in
security do not grab headlines the way a spectacular suicide
attack does. Progress in development continues. National
and international will is holding. But poor governance,
corruption, and a growing gap between President Karzai and
the international presence, including the United States, are
problems.

Elections
--------------


3. (SBU) Presidential elections already influence nearly
everything political here. Karzai's popularity has fallen -
dramatically in some areas and among some constituencies.
But overall the Asia Foundation poll found that 66 percent of
the population still thought the national government was
doing a "very good" or "somewhat good" job (compared to 80
percent in 2007). In our view, especially in the absence of
a credible opponent, it is Karzai's election to lose.
Personal insecurity and corruption are Karzai's greatest
vulnerabilities. Karzai installed a new Interior Minister to
turn up the heat on both problems. Minister Atmar is working
hard, but time is probably too short for dramatic improvement
before elections.


4. (SBU) Political jockeying between Parliament and the
Independent Election Commission (IEC) over the election date
is causing a stir. The northern opposition, led by the
Speaker of the Lower Chamber, Qanooni, is calling for
elections no later than May, ostensibly to conform to the
constitution (although they found this position more than six
months after the Elections Commission had announced an autumn
time frame). We believe that this is posturing for political
purposes and, in the end, the Election Commission's
preference for a September vote will carry the day based on
security and logistical imperatives.


5. (SBU) More problematic is the insecurity in the south and
east, which is prompting some - including Karzai, other
Pashtuns and some RC-South partners - to raise the specter of
Pashtun disenfranchisement and the possible illegitimacy of
the vote. It is too early to judge the prospects of failure.
Although there may be some disruption of voting registration
in the south, we are confident that voting itself will be
able to take place, not least because of the arrival of
additional U.S. combat brigades and the growth of the Afghan
army at more than 2500 troops per month. We expect some
violence, however.

Security
--------------


6. (SBU) Seventy percent of the violence continues to occur
in about 10 percent of the 363 districts. The Coalition and
Afghan security forces have increased our area of control.
The Taliban response has been a forced shift in tactics from
insurgency to terrorism, to challenge the will of Afghans and
the international community. Ordinary Afghans feel less safe
as a result of this switch, and as result of rising
criminality, especially kidnappings.


7. (SBU) Afghanistan will remain short of security personnel
for the foreseeable future. Presently there are about 75,000
Afghan army, 82,000 Afghan police, and about 37,000
international military personnel to maintain security. The
army is growing at more than 2500 per month and should reach
134,000 in 2011. The international forces are expected to
top 50,000 in 2010. We are working with Minister of Interior
Atmar to accelerate reform and training of the police,
develop more intelligence-based policing, take action against
corruption, and create vetted, specialized police units.


8. (SBU) We and the US military are cooperating with
President Karzai's initiative to energize renewed community
responsibility for security in their locality, without
re-creating local militias. The pilot will be in Wardak
Province. District councils and local shuras will hire
local, but tribally integrated, community guards with elected

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councils and work with Afghan security forces to vet
potential leaders. US Special Forces will train and mentor
the guards for local defense within the boundaries of the
community.

Governance
--------------


9. (SBU) Karzai struggles to balance between institutional
and traditional informal governance, in an environment of
poverty, social exhaustion, illicit power centers arising
from decades of political breakdown, governmental incapacity,
criminality, and insurgency. Electoral dynamics are further
complicating the problem, leading Karzai to make expedient
decisions on one hand, but also to appoint top-flight leaders
like Atmar to deliver police services on the other. There
are no easy answers, and neither Karzai nor the international
community can fight all battles all the time. But we can do
better.


10. (SBU) In Kabul, the focus is on capacity building,
creation of a merit-based, professional bureaucracy, and
delivery of services to the public. Strong ministries
include Foreign Affairs, Defense, Public Health, Education,
Finance, Communications, Rural Development, and
Counter-Narcotics. The Central Bank is well-led. Interior
and Agriculture have new, better leadership. We work closely
with those entities. We also work effectively with the other
ministries, but mixed agendas or a legacy of weakness slow
progress. For instance, the Supreme Court and the Ministry
of Justice suffer from the acute lack of qualified
professionals, a history of law enforcement that combines
elements of Sharia, tribal, and now Western law, and a lack
of national consensus on the way forward.


11. (SBU) Outside Kabul, U.S. civilian and military efforts
are aimed at strengthening local government at all levels.
We work equally with traditional leadership structures, as
well as those who gained power through force or wealth during
the days of conflict, but have proven themselves ready to
cooperate with constitutional government and rule of law.
Lack of local consensus, traditionally weak connections
between the capital and localities, long-standing rivalries
and distrust among communities, and the presence of
illegitimate insurgent or criminal spoilers complicate the
task. The goal is responsive, reliable leadership in local
communities, which binds them to the capital in a reciprocal
way.

Taliban reconciliation
--------------


12. (SBU) Reconciliation with Taliban or other insurgent
leaders is controversial here. Many welcome the possibility
of reduced violence and instability via a possible
reconciliation with the Taliban, while others (mainly
non-Pashtuns, women, and certain civil society groups) fear a
Pashtun deal that could come at the expense of their
interests. So far, all reconciliation efforts have been
premised on respect for the constitution, which has allowed
us to support these initiatives. Although the recent Saudi
attempt to begin talks about talks generated much interest,
there has been little concrete progress in that or any other
initiative.

Narcotics: Positive Trends, Challenge in the South
-------------- --------------


13. (SBU) Poppy cultivation dropped by 19 percent in 2008,
the first reduction since 2005. Just as notable, poppy-free
provinces grew from 13 to 18, or more than half of all
provinces. Poppy cultivation has died away in the north and
east of the country, including in traditionally big poppy
cultivating provinces of Badakhshan, Balkh, and Nangarhar.
But the narcotics challenge continues in the south, where
seven provinces now account for 98 percent of the country's
opium, and trafficking is bound to the insurgency. Helmand
Governor Mangal is trying to change the game. Together with
the UK, we are backing Mangal's initiative to eliminate
narcotics cultivation in a 100-square mile area of Helmand
through an intensive information campaign, agricultural
assistance, and Afghan army-protected eradication.

International Community and Afghanistan
--------------

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14. (SBU) Relations between the government and the
international community are uneven. International support is
holding, as demonstrated by the promise of increased
deployments at the April NATO Summit in Budapest, increased
contributions at the June Donors' Conference in Paris, and
support for a larger Afghan army at the September JCMB
meeting in Kabul. There is a real improvement in bilateral
relations with the Zardari government of Pakistan, although
there is some doubt in the Afghan mind that Zardari can get
control of all elements of the military and intelligence
apparatus there. The UN presence is strong, but SRSG Kai
Eide has not yet been able to play the key coordination role
hoped for, not least because of insufficient budgetary and
personnel commitment from New York.


15. (SBU) There are often disagreements between the
internationals and the Afghan Government regarding issues of
corruption, governance, rule of law, freedom of the press,
and other areas. Internationals bridle, for example, when
Karzai attributes the bulk of corruption in Afghanistan to
international aid donations. The most important gap between
the government and the coalition is over the issue of
civilian casualties: both sides agree it is a problem that
needs to be fixed, but there is not yet agreement on the
balance between necessary security operations and necessary
protections for civilians. General McKiernan, aiming to
minimize civilian casualties, has directed substantial
changes to coalition tactics, techniques and procedures.

WOOD