Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL3079
2009-10-04 05:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

COMISAF TALKS SECURITY, ELECTIONS, RECONCILIATION

Tags:  KDEM MOPS PGOV PREL AF 
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VZCZCXRO1035
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3079/01 2770509
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 040509Z OCT 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1811
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003079 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2019
TAGS: KDEM MOPS PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: COMISAF TALKS SECURITY, ELECTIONS, RECONCILIATION
WITH GHAZNI GOVERNOR, TRIBAL ELDERS

Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y
ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003079

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2019
TAGS: KDEM MOPS PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: COMISAF TALKS SECURITY, ELECTIONS, RECONCILIATION
WITH GHAZNI GOVERNOR, TRIBAL ELDERS

Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y
ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On September 15, COMISAF, Deputy Commander
US forces Afghanistan LTGEN Rodriguez and RC-East Commander
MG Scaparotti conducted a Battlefield Circulation (BFC) in
Ghazni. Aside from meeting with Task Force White Eagle
commanders, COMISAF held separate discussions with Ghazni
Provincial Governor Usman Usmani and a collection of Ghazni
tribal elders. Usmani, a strong Karzai partisan, expressed a
hardening of his position on opposition challenges to the
presidential election in Ghazni. While previously appearing
open to the Electoral Complaints Commission examining
allegations of vote irregularities in Ghazni, Usmani told
COMISAF that any further challenges to the integrity of the
vote in Ghazni would &upset the people.8 The tribal elders
endorsed the presence of coalition forces in Afghanistan, and
told COMISAF that the Afghan people did not view them as
occupiers. The tribal elders voiced their strong support for
engagement with reconcilable elements of the Taliban, and
urged COMISAF to separate Al Qaeda and its allies from those
who took up arms due to the lack of opportunity in Ghazni.
End Summary.

BETTER SECURITY COOPERATION REQUIRED
--------------

2. (C) On September 15, COMISAF met with Ghazni Governor
Usman Usmani in the governor's office. The governor told
COMISAF that the security situation remained problematic in
the province, and that increased NATO efforts were required
to bring the situation under control. Usmani said that the
Afghan National Army (ANA) remained understaffed in Ghazni,
filling only two battalions out of the assigned brigade, and
that the Afghan National Police (ANP) lacked adequate
training. Usmani also told COMISAF that he believed
coordination among the ANA, ANP, and coalition forces was
lacking. He cited an example from the previous evening, when
ANP elements allegedly fired on Polish coalition troops in

Ajiristan district. (Note: Task Force White Eagle
investigated the incident in question, but no coalition
forces were injured in any incident on September 14. End
Note.)
GOVERNANCE IMPEDED BY LACK OF TALENT
--------------

3. (C) Usmani also requested increased international
assistance for development. The governor said that in
particular Ghazni could use increased irrigation projects,
and any initiatives that would build factories to produce
&high quality goods.8 Regarding governance, Usmani told
COMISAF that the human capital was lacking to provide
effective leadership in the province. Usmani said it was hard
to find even district sub-governors with the requisite high
school education. When pressed by Deputy Commander US Forces
Afghanistan LTGEN Rodriguez, Usmani conceded that it was
difficult to recruit the top talent to come to Ghazni.
Usmani also complained that the Independent Directorate of
Local Governance (IDLG) technically appoints sub-governors, a
fact which limits the amount of oversight the Governor can
exert. Usmani cited the example of the sub-governor of
Malistan, who he claimed had not called the governor in eight
months.
OPPOSITION &UPSETS THE PEOPLE8
--------------

4. (C) Usmani offered a vigorous defense of the conduct of
the elections in Ghazni. Usmani said he was &proud8 that
the election was an Afghan-led process, but he worried that
&opposition8 attempts to cast doubt on the vote would only
&upset the people.8 Usmani told COMISAF that there was
little substance to the fraud allegations, and they stemmed
from the &losers,8 inability to accept the results.
Usmani also seemed to suggest that if he, sub-governors, and
tribal elders had really attempted to skew the electoral
results in favor of President Karzai, then the president
would have received twice as many votes in Ghazni. Usmani
also questioned how fraud could have occurred when &ISAF
transported all the ballots.8 (Comment: Usmani is a strong
Karzai partisan and his remarks are consistent with his
previous efforts to downplay the widely-acknowledged
electoral fraud allegations in Ghazni and deflect attention
to what he asserts are &opposition8 efforts to challenge a
legitimate election. End Comment.)
TRIBAL ELDERS: SEPARATE AL QAEDA ALLIES FROM SOME TALIBAN
-------------- --------------

5. (SBU) COMISAF also met with approximately 30 tribal
leaders representing Ghazni,s different districts. (Note:
Governor Usmani arranged the meeting at our request, and the
participants appeared to be largely supportive of the

KABUL 00003079 002 OF 002


governor. Local and Polish media representatives were
present for the duration of the meeting. End Note.) The
elders asked COMISAF to do more to address the deteriorating
security situation, and increase the capacity of the ANA and
ANP. In addition, the elders expressed strong support for
COMISAF,s suggestion to seek reconciliation with certain
elements of the Taliban. Several tribal leaders stressed the
importance of separating Al Qaeda and its supporters from
those whose motivation for joining the Taliban is joblessness
and lack of opportunity. Finally, two tribal leaders spoke
openly of Pakistani support for insurgent elements in
Afghanistan, and urged COMISAF to do everything possible to
block this support and control the Afghan-Pakistani border.
COMISAF pledged to do his best, and LTGEN Rodriguez urged the
tribal leaders to use their positions of influence to play
the key role in improving security.
COALITION NOT &OCCUPIERS8
--------------

6. (SBU) COMISAF, asking for &honest and direct8 answers,
asked the tribal elders if coalition forces were viewed as
&occupiers.8 Only one elder answered the question, saying
that the United States had &abandoned8 Afghanistan after
the conclusion of the Soviet occupation of the country and
allowed dangerous elements to take refuge in the country.
The elder told COMISAF that unfortunately the result of this
policy was the tragedy of September 11. Despite this
history, the elder assured COMISAF that most Afghans
understand that coalition forces are now in Afghanistan to
support the Afghan people. The session closed with the
elders telling COMISAF that every coalition soldier killed in
a combat was also a tragedy for the Afghan people, and asked
COMISAF relay their deep condolences to the families of the
fallen.

7. (C) Comment: COMISAF,s meeting with the tribal elders
proved to be a positive and honest exchange with influential
leaders in Ghazni. Several elders told us as they departed
the session that they were pleased with COMISAF,s initiative
to speak with them and felt that the session had been
beneficial to both sides. Despite the fact that the tribal
elders were hand-picked by the governor, they appeared
willing to openly express their views on the security
situation and the role of coalition forces in Ghazni. The
meeting also served to reinforce our efforts on the
Provincial Reconstruction Team to significantly extend
outreach to the informal government structures in the
province such as the elders and local shuras.

8. (C) On a less positive note, Governor Usmani,s comments
on the conduct of the presidential elections in Ghazni
reflect what appears to a hardening of his position. Aside
from being a strong Karzai partisan, Usmani has a deep
personal connection to the president, whom he has
affectionately referred to as his &father.8 Usmani seems
to have taken the line, at least in public, that challenges
to the integrity of the elections in Ghazni as a personal
affront and a challenge to the honor of the president.
However, his assertion that there was no malfeasance on the
part of Karzai supporters while pro-Abdullah forces have been
conspiring before and after the elections rings hollow. ECC
representatives confirmed our suspicions that some vote
totals, almost uniformly in support of President Karzai, from
Pashtun-areas of Ghazni are implausible. We also have
significant doubts about Usmani,s assertions that Abdullah
supporters, who appear limited in Ghazni, are planning daily
demonstrations against the government. We speak several
times a day with the governor, and have urged him to remain
above the fray and express his support for a non-partisan
adjudication of election challenges by the responsible
governmental institutions. His remark to COMISAF that
further challenges to Ghazni,s vote totals would &upset the
people8 indicates he may attempt to pursue a different path,
organizing popular pressure for the Karzai votes in the
province to be counted in the national tally. End Comment.
EIKENBERRY