Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL3045
2009-09-30 09:54:00
SECRET
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

IS KANDAHAR CITY UNDER SIEGE?

Tags:  PGOV MOPS PREL AF 
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VZCZCXRO7802
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3045/01 2730954
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 300954Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1764
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003045 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PREL AF
SUBJECT: IS KANDAHAR CITY UNDER SIEGE?

REF: A. KABUL2292

B. KABUL2335

Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y
ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003045

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PREL AF
SUBJECT: IS KANDAHAR CITY UNDER SIEGE?

REF: A. KABUL2292

B. KABUL2335

Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y
ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) SUMMARY. Is Kandahar City under siege? The short
answer is no. The Taliban does not intend to seize
Afghanistan's second largest city, but it has increased its
power in significant portions of the city and surrounding
districts through infiltration, intimidation, and terrorist
attacks that undermine GIRoA and create a public perception
of insecurity. The new American security presence has begun
to reverse this trend. U.S. Military Police (MPs) have
established themselves in the city under Canadian command,
and the Stryker Brigade is clearing neighboring Arghandab
District, which had been under Taliban occupation for two
years. Initial stabilization activities, including a
civilian contribution, will begin soon, even though fighting
will continue there for some time to come. END SUMMARY.

Taliban Intimidation Tactics
--------------


2. (S) Afghanistan's second largest city (pop. 800,000) at
the strategic heart of the insurgency is not isolated nor is
it currently in danger of falling to the Taliban. The
ongoing introduction of U.S. forces is welcomed by the Afghan
Government (GIRoA) and the Canadians, and will be key to
reversing the trend that has seen violence increase by 100
percent during the past year. In any case, the Taliban's
objective is not to seize Kandahar City, but rather to
contest control of the population through counter-governance
that undermines and discredits GIRoA while provoking a
perception of uncertainty and insecurity among the public.
In this, they have effectively intimidated, encircled and
infiltrated significant portions of the city and surrounding
districts, despite increased security measures.


3. (S) Terrorism has brought the Taliban message home most
spectacularly. This was particularly true of the massive
August 25 SVBIED that killed approximately 45 Afghans,
wounded another 75 and leveled an entire city block. VBIED
and suicide bomber threats targeting GIRoA, ANSF and ISAF are

a constant, as is fear that there will be a repeat of last
year's highly successful attack that freed hundreds of
Taliban and other prisoners from Sarpoza Prison. However, it
is the invisible Taliban presence that has the greatest
effect. Security forces congratulated themselves for mounting
successful operations that allowed elections to proceed in
Kandahar City with few incidents other than scattered rocket
attacks and bombings in the morning hours. This tactical
assessment is accurate, but masks the impact of a successful
intimidation campaign that contributed to an exceptionally
low turnout -- probably well under 25 percent in an urban
area presumably disposed to support the government and
opposed to seeing the Taliban return to power.


4. (S) If there is relative freedom of movement during the
day, the situation becomes more ominous after dark, when
night letters are posted on mosque doors and Taliban check
points appear on the streets. Uncounted assassinations and
kidnappings, that for the most part target police officers
and government figures, are another deep source of
insecurity. In a prominent recent example, President
Karzai's campaign manager in the province and several
associates were kidnapped in early September and are being
held for ransom. There are also reports of the Taliban
shadow government's reach into the city, for example,
summoning residents before sharia courts in the countryside
to settle land cases.

GIRoA and Coalition Security Response
--------------


5. (S) In response to this deterioration, GIRoA and the ANSF
have no option but to press ahead, relying on increased
American and Canadian support to make up for their lack of
wherewithal. In May, President Karzai ordered the ANA to
take charge of security for Kandahar City. Under a newly
revised plan, escalated measures are to include 100 percent
vehicle checks at the "Five Gates" to Kandahar City, plus an
additional 27 checkpoints within the city and its environs,
expanded cordon and search operations by sector, and
reinforced joint ANSF-ISAF patrols. Even if the city is not
under siege, the cumulative impact may well make the public
feel that way if the measures are ever fully implemented.
Provincial Security meetings over the past three weeks have
grown somber at times, with the Afghans pointing fingers and
revealing their lack of agreement on what is to be done.

KABUL 00003045 002 OF 002




6. (S) There is no indication, however, that cooperation
among the ANA, ANP and NDS has broken down. Usually supine
Gov. Weesa has demanded answers and solutions from his ANSF
commanders with growing assertiveness. He is reflecting
increased pressure from Kabul that has taken the form of
frequent phone calls from President Karzai, visits from MOI
Atmar, VTCs with Kabul leadership and an unprecedented
appearance by Kandahar kingpin and the President's
half-brother Ahmed Wali Karzai at the September 2 Provincial
Security Meeting (where he used the opportunity to propose
that the Canadians give him $2 million so he could carry out
his responsibility as consequence manager for the August 25
bombing.)


7. (S) Canadian-led Task Force Kandahar has primary
international responsibility for security in Kandahar City.
They usually prefer to paint a rosy picture, but the tone was
different at the September 16 Provincial Security Meeting.
The session followed immediately after the broadcast of a
pessimistic Canadian TV news special about Afghanistan, and
was preceded a few days earlier by a major IED attack that
killed two of its soldiers in Dand District to the south,
where the Canadians have until now been touting a kinder and
gentler approach to stabilization. A complaint by UNAMA that
the 30 police they have been subsidizing to guard their
Kandahar City compound were not doing their jobs led Task
Force Kandahar (TFK) Commander BG Vance to rail against
persistent ANSF complacency and exhort them to greater
vigilance.


8. (S) The U.S. contribution to the increased security
effort is significant. The 97th Military Police Battalion
has just deployed its headquarters to Kandahar City where it
will carry out joint patrolling and much-needed police
mentoring with the ANP. Elements of the 4th Brigade of the
82nd Airborne will reinforce the assistance mission to the
ANSF in outlying districts. The 1-12 Battalion, detached
from TF Anzio in RC(E),serves as part of the Canadian battle
group deployed to Zhari District, where insurgents infiltrate
the city from the west. In the main effort, 5/2 Stryker
Brigade is in the advanced stage of a clearing operation in
Arghandab District immediately to the north of the city,
which had been under effective Taliban occupation for at
least two years.

Comment
--------------


9. (S) There is general consensus that Stryker and the ANSF
must hold and, with civilian partnership, eventually
stabilize the Arghandab River Valley in order to loosen the
belt that the Taliban have tightened progressively around
Kandahar City. Most immediately, it will be important to
lock in GIRoA and ANSF commitment to restoring and building
its presence in the Arghandab.


10. (S) In addition to the two reftels, also see: DIA
Kandahar Province Overview (S-30, 155-09/AFPK TF, 21 Jul
2009); CIA Field Memo: Security in Kandahar City (CIA DI MFAC
0219-09, 28 May 2009),and ISAF RC(S) KIFC Kandahar City
Assessment (31 Aug 2008.)


11. (SBU) This cable has been reviewed by the Stryker
Commander.
EIKENBERRY