Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL2918
2009-09-20 06:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

BAMYAN GOVERNOR SAROBI PERCEIVES GROWING IRANIAN

Tags:  PGOV PREL SNAR AF IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9953
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #2918/01 2630644
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 200644Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1616
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002918 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR AF IR
SUBJECT: BAMYAN GOVERNOR SAROBI PERCEIVES GROWING IRANIAN
INFLUENCE IN THE PROVINCE

Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y
ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002918

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR AF IR
SUBJECT: BAMYAN GOVERNOR SAROBI PERCEIVES GROWING IRANIAN
INFLUENCE IN THE PROVINCE

Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y
ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) SUMMARY: Bamyan Governor Habiba Sarobi revealed data
to PRT DoS rep and PRT Commander showing that Karzai and
Bashardost each captured approximately 49,000 votes in
Bamyan. She stressed that rifts between Mohaqiq and Kalili
and between MP Akbari and Deputy Governor Fahimi hurt Karzai,
stating that Hazaran voters "were fed-up with these guys and
Karzai." In Waras district alone, she stated that Bashardost
received over 21,000 votes. Sarobi believes that, for the
same reasons, upwards of 80 percent of voters in Day Kundi
supported Bashardost. She is confident that neither former
governor Aliyar nor Ahlaw Rahmatee, a member of Kalili's
staff, will be selected as the next governor (both names had
been suggested to us by well-connected UNAMA staff),but
admits that Kalili has strong interest in controlling the
governorship or chief of police positions to facilitate his
personal interest in antiquities trade and opium smuggling.
Finally, Governor Sarobi warned of continued Iranian
influence in the province, but her concern may be affected by
her hyper-sensitivity to personal criticism. The PRT will
continue monitoring the situation and seeks close
coordination with Task Force Cyclone in this endeavor. END
SUMMARY

Why the Hazarijat Preferred Bashardost
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


2. (C) According to the latest figures available to
Governor Sarobi, approximately 120,835 or roughly 50 percent
of Bamyan's 240,000 registered voters cast their ballots on
August 20. She reported that Karzai received 49,496 votes,
Bashardost 49,342 votes, and Abdullah 21,997 votes. (NOTE:
Recently, we reported figures provided to the NZ police by
the ANP that indicated 130,000 of 200,000 registered voters
went to the polls, casting 39,500 votes for Karzai, 29,400
for Bashardost, and 25,000 for Abdullah. END NOTE)
Governor Sarobi frankly declared that the "conflict" between
Mohaqiq and Kalili cost Karzai votes in both Bamyan and Day

Kundi because the people have grown weary of the in-fighting
and lack of development progress, thus confirming earlier PRT
reporting on the source of Karzai's sagging popularity in
region. (COMMENT: Interestingly, Sarobi quipped that much of
the support Karzai received in Bamyan center was, in fact, a
reflection of the popularity of the provincial government.
END COMMENT)


3. (C) By way of further example, Governor Sarobi added that
in Waras district alone, Bashardost received 21,489 votes -
nearly half the votes cast for Bashardost province-wide. She
credited Bashardost's strong showing in Waras to another
chink in Karzai's armor, the rift between MP Akbari and
Deputy Governor Fahimi. She remarked that voters there "were
fed-up with these guys and Karzai." In Day Kundi, she
reported that upwards of 80 percent of voters supported
Bashardost and in some areas, such as Jawgaree, Bashardost
captured 90 percent of the presidential vote.

Thoughts on Who will NOT be the Next Governor
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


4. (C) When PRT DoS officer brought up the names of Bamyan's
former governor and Ahlaw Rahmatee, a member of Kalili's
staff from Yakawlang district, as possible replacements as
Governor (both names were offered as possible replacements by
well-connected UNAMA officials in a previous meeting),Sarobi
immediately dismissed both men. She argued that Karzai
would not re-appoint Aliyor because he "does not fit well in
Bamyan" and could further weaken Karzai's popularity among
the Hazara. As for Rahmatee, Governor Sarobi expressed her
strong personal dislike for him, stating that he "has caused
me many problems" and "accused me of many things that are not
true." She cited several examples including Rahmatee's
relatives at Bamyan University organizing anti-Sarobi
demonstrations, propaganda and accusations published in the
magazine "Bahar" accusing Sarobi of stealing antiquities,
lecturing in the mosque on Eid, taking funds from aid
projects, and of being a bad manager. (NOTE: Sarobi
complained that she had filed an official complaint against
Rahmatee for making false accusations against her, but that
no action was taken because of Rahmatee's close association
with Kalili. END NOTE)

"Kalili Has Always Wanted Bamyan"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


5. (S) While Sarobi was convinced that Rahamtee would not be
appointed governor, she warned that Kalili has always coveted

KABUL 00002918 002 OF 002


Bamyan and has attempted on several occasions to influence
the appointment of both the governor and chief of police
positions to enhance his personal control over the levers of
official power. She bluntly stated that Kalili seeks to gain
control of the province in order to exploit antiquities
related to the ancient Buddha statues and to control and grow
opium smuggling.
She pointed out that when she took over as governor, opium
smuggling from Samangan, through Yakawlang and Day Kundi to
Helmand was big business and that she and the police had put
a stop to it. Thus, it is her strong belief that Kalili
wants, again, to control one or both of these positions.

"I Hate What the Iranians do to the Hazara"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


6. (S) Unprompted, Sarobi raised the issue of continued
Iranian influence in Bamyan, promising to provide "lots of
documents" about Iranian activities to the DoS officer.
Although she spoke mostly in general terms, she did zero in
on the Iranian-funded madressa located just behind the PRT,
emphasizing that she had fought the appointment of the
center's director, whom Sarobi characterized as a
"fundamentalist" Tajik Sunni from Eshpushte (in the
northeastern corner of Bamyan). She said the director
preaches against the governor and the Shia community. Sarobi
lamented that the Ministry of Education appointed him despite
her vigorous objections, and she asked that the US Embassy
pressure the Ministry to have him replaced. She further
alleged that none of the students are local shia children,
but rather Pashtun and Tajik Sunni from the northeast and
other provinces; she worried that these kids were being
radicalized in her own backyard. Despite the apparent
contradiction of Iranian support to a radical Tajik Sunni
mullah, Governor Sarobi insisted that Iran was using the
Hazaran people for its own political ends, and she sought
Embassy support in countering this influence.

Comment
- - - -


7. (C) There is a long history of Iranian influence in
Bamyan that has waxed and waned over time given the Shia
connection between Iran and the Hazara. Many credit Governor
Sarobi with stemming and even reducing Iranian influence over
the past several years. However, Sarobi is clearly not
objective in her assessment of the Iranian-run madressa,
whose mullah has criticized her on several occasions. She is
hyper-sensitive to criticism and reacts strongly. This would
not be the first time Sarobi has sought either GIRoA or USG
support to remove a source of criticism.


8. (C) That said, she has proven to have excellent instincts
and the PRT recently began surveillance of an Iranian-funded
madressa in the Faladi Valley -- just a few miles from the
PRT -- that is rumored to be trying to influence the
traditional law practiced by local Shura leaders. At this
point, there is not enough information to draw any
conclusions. The PRT will continue its surveillance
activities and seeks close coordination and information
sharing with Task Force Cyclone.
EIKENBERRY