Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL2834
2009-09-19 07:54:00
SECRET
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

ABDULLAH: EAGER FOR RUN-OFF CHALLENGE AND

Tags:  KDEM PGOV PREL AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #2834/01 2620754
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 190754Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1530
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002834 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2019
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: ABDULLAH: EAGER FOR RUN-OFF CHALLENGE AND
POST-ELECTION FUTURE

REF: KABUL 2768

Classified By: D/Ambassador Francis Ricciardone for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)


S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002834

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2019
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: ABDULLAH: EAGER FOR RUN-OFF CHALLENGE AND
POST-ELECTION FUTURE

REF: KABUL 2768

Classified By: D/Ambassador Francis Ricciardone for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)



1. (S) Summary: Presidential candidate Abdullah Abudullah
is adamant that he will not be part of a new Karzai
government. He believes that if Afghanistan's electoral
bodies are "thorough," a second round will be necessary, and
he is confident he can prevail against Karzai because the
incumbent's true intentions have been revealed through
massive, systemic fraud. In the event Abdullah loses on the
first or second round, he intends to build a "New Wave" party
whose base will be Afghan youth who seek a new direction for
their country. He fears, however, that if Karzai is
re-elected, state institutions will be weakened and
overshadowed by parallel, criminal elements, and Karzai will
mastermind a Constitutional amendment allowing him to run for
a third term, or indefinitely. End Summary.


2. (S) Karzai political rival Abdullah dined at the
Ambassador's residence on September 16. He had not heard the
Independent Election Commission's (IEC) announcement of the
final preliminary results, which showed Karzai leading with
54.6 percent followed by Abdullah with 27.7 percent. He
jokingly quipped that he was out of the elections circuit.
Attired in an Afghan-Western melange, a white Kemis and black
suede blazer and loafers, Abdullah at first appeared subdued,
possibly resigned, but as the evening progressed, he regained
some of his customary energy and determination.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Why Abdullah Broke with Karzai
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


3. (S) Dr. Abdullah first launched on a lengthy explanation
of his parting of ways with Karzai. As early as 2004, he had
started to realize that Karzai's priorities were his personal
ambitions rather than the good of the country. However,
Abdullah continued for some time at the helm of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and implemented much-needed reforms,
including recruiting and grooming a new generation of
diplomats. He suspected, however, that as Foreign Minister,
he had gained a level of international renown that Karzai
resented. In March, 2006 while he was on an official mission
to the United States, Karzai called him to offer him a new

cabinet position: either the Minster of Commerce, or the
leadership of a "super" Economic Ministry. Abdullah
declined. While in Washington, the news broke that he was no
longer Minister. Secretary Rice, who had seen him earlier,
asked to see him again. He warned her that Karzai would lead
Afghanistan along the wrong path.

- - - - - - - - - - -
IEC Reform Essential
- - - - - - - - - - -


4. (S) Abdullah next directed his attention to the
Independent Elections Commission (IEC). Irrespective of the
outcome of this election, the IEC leadership, among them,
Secretariat Chief Najafi and President Lodin, must be
replaced with truly independent, professional individuals, he
said. The current leadership had cast its fate with Karzai;
their relatives served in the Palace and in other parts of
the current government. He believed that if the IEC were
"reformed," parliamentary elections, scheduled for April-May
2010 could probably be held on time, or a few months later,
as had been the case with the presidential and provincial
council elections.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
If the IEC/ECC Are Thorough, There Will Be a Run-off
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


5. (S) Abdullah asserted that if the Independent Elections
Commission (IEC) and the Electoral Complaints Commission
(ECC) do a responsible and thorough job, a second round will
be necessary. He said that the fraud was massive, citing
examples of polling stations where two to four times the
registered voters had cast ballots and claiming that the
number of voter cards more than doubled the population in
many pro-Karzai areas. To the Ambassador's observation that
Abdullah's chances of winning a second round could be remote
because the winner of a "silver medal" is not considered the
victor, Abdullah replied he was confident he could prevail
against Karzai in a run-off. Now that incumbent's true
intentions were revealed through deliberate and systemic
fraud, he argued, more people would cast their lot with
Abdullah. He asserted that a second round would store

KABUL 00002834 002 OF 002


people's faith and they would vote despite poor security
conditions. Further, Afghan youth were energized
increasingly backing him; the youth vote would help him win a
second round.


6. (S) Abdullah also commented that when he started the
presidential campaign he was untested. Since then, he had
learned from his campaign mistakes and the dirty tricks of
Karzai, and was now more prepared to tackle a run-off.
Abdullah cited a Karzai set-up into which he had fallen when
he was campaigning in Daikundi Province: someone had slipped
him a piece of paper with names of supposed local heroes for
him to praise; it turned out the list included the name of a
convicted assassin of the region's martyr, whose grave lay
just a few feet away. His citation of the assassin among the
local heroes cost him the confidence and votes of the
audience.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Seeking a Win-Win Scenario
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -


7. (S) Abdullah agreed with the Ambassador that he could be
seen as a victor even if he lost the first round because he
had offered a genuine alternative to the Afghan people. If
he were to lose, Abdullah would establish a "New Wave" party
whose base will be Afghan youth seeking a new direction for
their country, not the Northern Alliance. He was certain
that after years of occupation, Taliban oppression,
terrorism, and now fraud, Afghans yearn for a change.
Abdullah was confident that if the IEC is reformed, "and if I
live," he and his party would be well poised to succeed in
the 2010 Parliamentary elections. He would also advance his
initiative to establish a parliamentary system in Afghanistan.


8. (S) Returning to the subject of a possible second round,
Abdullah conceded that people could construe his insistence
on competing as putting his personal interests above the
nation's, given that a second round would be contentious and
people would have to risk their lives to return to the polls.
However, the alternative, Karzai was worse. Even many
Pashtuns no longer support Karzai because the fraud made a
mockery out of their genuine votes, argued Abdullah.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
I Will Not Join a Karzai Government
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


9. (S) Abdullah was adamant that he would not join a future
Karzai government. He said that Lower House Speaker Yunis
Qanooni, who was his primary intermediary with Karzai, was
currently on the lesser pilgrimage. Abdullah had recently
seen Karzai running-mate Marshall Fahim at the anniversary of
Massoud's martyrdom in Panjshir, but they had discussed
banalities, not politics. He would likely see him again in
Panjshir during the upcoming Eid holiday, but did not expect
anything to come of it. Abdullah speculated that if he has
the chance to talk to Fahim alone he will tell him, "You have
made your last mistake."

- - - - - - - - - - - -
The Worst-Case Scenario
- - - - - - - - - - - -


10. (S) Abdullah predicted that if re-elected, Karzai would
allow state institutions to be overrun by parallel, criminal
elements. He alleged that criminal elements were already the
underpinnings of Karzai's current administration; this
Narco-Taliban-criminal nexus was bizarre and dangerous.
Karzai would first try to control intelligence, then the
informal security militias (he claimed some were already
working for Karzai's political interests),and eventually,
the police and possibly military. He claimed that Karzai was
already engaging the Hizb-i- Islami to check the Taliban
insurgency. Abdullah feared that Karzai would also seek to
control Parliament; he was already maneuvering to place
loyalists in the legislature. Karzai would likely mastermind
a Constitutional amendment allowing him to run for a third
term, or indefinitely, warned Abdullah.
EIKENBERRY