PLUSES AND MINUSES OF TURKISH PRT IN AFGHANISTAN,S

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 002814

NOFORN
SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y ( PARA MARKINGS )

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2019
TAGS: EAID PINS PREL AF
SUBJECT: PLUSES AND MINUSES OF TURKISH PRT IN AFGHANISTAN,S
NORTH

REF: ANKARA 01217

Classified By: Classified By: IPA Coordinator Dawn Liberi for Reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C/NF) Summary: Turkey has taken exploratory steps toward
establishing a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in
northwestern Afghanistan,s Jowzjan Province, with its
coverage to extend through Sar-e-pul Province. Jowzjan and
Sar-e-pul stand to gain development projects and possibly
additional police training, judging by the performance of the
Turkish PRT in Wardak Province southwest of Kabul. The move
would also likely free up the Swedes, responsible for four
provinces in the north, to narrow the focus of their
development resources. The Swedes are worried, however, that
the Turks, &soft8 approach to security (security in Wardak
has deteriorated markedly) would bode ill for the worsening
insurgent and criminal challenges in Jowzjan and Sar-e-pul
and thus increase the risks to other northern provinces.
Nonetheless, the Swedes do not formally oppose expansion of
Turkish responsibilities, given Turkey,s status as a NATO
member. There may be advantages to Turkey taking on
additional responsibilities in the North, but the risk is
that security negatives may well outweigh the pluses. End
Summary.

The Turkish PRT in Wardak Province
--------------


2. (C/NF) The Turkish PRT in Wardak Province is civilian-led
and has been operating in Wardak Province since November of

2006. From its inception, PRT Wardak has followed a &soft8
approach, focused on sponsoring development projects and
conducting police training. It strictly avoids any direct,
hands-on security work. By minimizing its presence and
utilizing police rather than military forces to provide
security when traveling in the province, the PRT has sought
to foster the perception among the local populace that it is
primarily a development-centered organization. There are a
limited number of Turkish military at the PRT, but their sole
function is to secure the PRT facility itself. The Turks in
Wardak do not conduct patrols. In fact, after a visiting
U.S. patrol came under attack in 2007, the then-civilian head
of the PRT contacted the Embassy to suggest the U.S. military
stay away to avoid provoking anti-American sentiment. As
security has worsened, however, attitudes at the PRT have
changed markedly, with the Turks now welcoming the presence
of U.S. forces in the area. All the same, the Turks believe
their overall approach has allowed the PRT to make
significant strides in developing relationships within those
communities where the security situation has permitted them
to operate.


3. (C/NF) The Turks have had challenges in implementing their
program due to security concerns and difficulties with their
implementing agency, the Turkish International Cooperation
and Development Agency (TIKA). As security has deteriorated,
they have found it more and more difficult to implement
projects. Part of the problem is the limited number of
Turkish police available for movement security. Currently
about 25 Turkish police are dual-tasked to provide both
convoy security and police training, leaving the PRT
struggling to find a balance. Without adequate mobility,
TIKA has been forced to postpone or decline implementation of
projects in areas that are deemed to be too high-risk. This
has now effectively limited the PRT,s working area to Maydan
Shahr, the provincial capital, since reaching even other
fairly secure districts in the province requires traveling
through less permissive areas. Between November 2006 and
November 2008, the PRT undertook 43 projects of various
kinds. For 2009 a total of 56 projects were approved by
Ankara, but security concerns have allowed only seven to be
implemented.


4. (C/NF) Another factor hindering the PRT,s development work
appears to be the fact that the PRT does not have its own
development funds but must work through a rather bureaucratic
process back in Ankara. The PRT identifies potential
projects meeting stringent funding criteria and submits these
to Ankara for approval. Nearly all projects submitted are
ultimately funded and then passed to TIKA for implementation.
By the time approvals arrive, however, many projects can no
longer be implemented because of worsening security. To make
matters worse, the outgoing civilian head of the PRT has
confided that Ankara has launched an internal investigation
into possible corruption with regard to TIKA,s Afghan
operation and has relieved at least two TIKA staff of their


duties. According to Wardak Governor Fedai, TIKA uses the
same 5 or 6 contractors and, to Fedai,s displeasure, these
do not include contractors from the province. He worries
that communities do not benefit adequately from job creation,
and the projects lack the sense of ownership that utilization
of locals could bring. The Governor even suggests this has
at times created additional security issues as open hostility
has arisen between contractors and locals resentful over not
being given work. He has also complained privately about
what he characterizes as overpricing and shoddy workmanship.
Comment: Fedai,s points of criticism are sometimes heard in
other provinces across the country. End comment.


5. (C/NF) The PRT has built a police training and education
center and considers its police mentoring and training
program a success. The PRT trains on basic police functions
as well as special police skills. The Turks suggest this
work has had a positive effect on ANP capabilities. While we
presume that evaluation is accurate, it is difficult to make
an independent assessment since the Turks do not share with
CF elements in Wardak the specifics of their program. They
do not followficer in Mazar,
the Swedish military at the PRT believe Stockholm is unlikely
to try to stand in the way of the Turks. They suggest that
the government of Sweden, a non-NATO country, is unlikely to
feel able to block the reconfiguration even it wanted to,
considering NATO,s leadership of ISAF and Turkey,s
membership in NATO. Moreover, from a military perspective,
at least at first glance the change would seem positive,
since it would alleviate overstretching of Swedish forces.
This is balanced, however, by concern that the Turks would
not take over the Swedes, current support mission to the
efforts of the Afghan National Security Forces to stamp out
insurgents in the troublesome districts of Sayyad, in
Sar-e-pul, and Qush Teppeh and Darzab in Jowzjan. Sweden
would not want to see those areas become &accepted8
insurgent safe havens ) effectively left alone by the Turks.
That would only increase the security risks to Swedish
forces operating over the border in Balkh. An alternative,
they suggest, would be for Turkish CIMIC teams and Turkey,s
development actors at a new Turkish PRT to spend more of
their development dollars in Jowzjan and Sar-e-pul but leave
Sweden to continue taking the lead in security matters there,
acting more as a task force than a PRT in those areas.


Turkey might consider that situation ideal, they suggest, as
it would get credit for development work while Sweden would
have to take the rap for anything that goes poorly on the
security front.

Turkish Advance Party?
--------------


9. (C/NF) A company of 120 Turkish soldiers, ostensibly sent to
the north to serve as Election Support Forces, remains in
place in Mazar. This unit has somewhat the appearance of an
advance party for a Turkish PRT. It includes a CIMIC team,
med cap personnel, intelligence personnel and force
protection assets. We understand the Turks have been slow to
brief the Regional Command-North commander on their plans.
He wants them to deploy to the difficult Ghormach district,
currently administratively attached to southernmost Faryab
Province; and if they will not go there, he does not want
them to leave their camp in Mazar. Adding to the confusion,
the Turkish Consul General in Mazar told our State PRT rep
that he personally is not sure a Turkish PRT would do any
more development projects in Jowzjan and Sar-e-Pul than are
already being implemented there by the Turkish development
agency.

Comment
--------------


10. (C/NF) The creation of a new Turkish PRT covering Jowzjan
and Sar-e-Pul would not appear to be an unalloyed blessing,
at least if the Turks implement the model followed by their
PRT in Wardak. We suspect the alternative of leaving the
Swedes to address security, just as U.S. forces have had to
deploy to do the same in Wardak, would be appealing to the
Turks. But if, as the Turkish Consul General suggests, there
might not be a net increase in Turkish development projects
in the two provinces, the possible security issues may
outweigh the benefits. Before welcoming a Turkish deployment
of a PRT in Jowzjan, post recommends Department query the
Turks closely about their plans for addressing the worsening
security situation in their proposed new AOR as well as their
plans to carry out additional development projects.
EIKENBERRY