KARZAI ON ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE: SEPTEMBER 1

S E C R E T KABUL 002681

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: KARZAI ON ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE: SEPTEMBER 1
MEETING AT THE PALACE

Classified By: Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary: In our weekly meeting September 1, President
Karzai was confident, lucid and open to areas of
post-election cooperation should he be named the winner. We
discussed the need to support the ongoing elections process,
and he indicated that his negotiations with other candidates
was entering a final phase. He is likely to attend the UNGA.
On the post-election compact he was aware of the need to
rebuild trust with the international community, in particular
through merit-based appointments to the Cabinet and at a
sub-national level. He appears committed to some form of a
"Jirga" to solidify his government's legitimacy. End summary.

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Elections End Game
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2. (S) A relaxed President Karzai met with me for over an
hour on September 1, accompanied only by National Security
Advisor Rasoul. We touched on the media back-and-forth over
the alleged SRAP/Karzai rift (a recent Cabinet meeting was
reportedly acrimonious about U.S. "intervention" in the
elections, but Karzai finally rejected the idea of a
confrontational press conference) and Karzai accepted my
statement that this was "old news" which we should put behind
us. I reiterated our support for the elections process and
institutions.


3. (S) Karzai told me that at his meeting with Ghani the
night before, Ghani had offered to play the role of
"intermediary" with the United States. I told Karzai that he
had many of those already. Karzai said that Ghani had
stopped short of pledging his support but wants to play a
"useful" role. Mirwais Yasini, with whom he met on August
30, had allegedly been offered USD 100,000 by Abdullah but is
close to accepting a role in Karzai's team, Karzai said.
Karzai then raised concerns about Iranian influence in the
election, through funding of Abdullah to the tune of USD
80-100 million. I replied that we think Iran had given money
to all the candidates; Karzai did not disagree. On Iran's
motivations, I said that it seemed less logical for them to
want instability in Afghanistan but that we are more
concerned than we were a year ago. Karzai stated that he
sees Pakistan and Iran potentially collaborating to
destabilize Afghanistan and act against the United States.


4. (S) Karzai said that "reports" indicated that the United
States was also funding Abdullah. I strongly challenged him
and stated that we are not funding any candidate. I further
noted that repeating these kinds of rumors and unsourced
reports was unproductive.


5. (S) We discussed the international media and the renewed
focus on "warlords", particularly Fahim Khan. I said that
while newspapers are independent and the timing of their
articles is not under our control, our position on Fahim was
well known and we would not dissimulate. I pointed out that,
in fact, Karzai was not above using this issue to his own
advantage. He gained considerable political advantage by
bringing Dostum back to Afghanistan on the eve of elections,
but that thanks to international attention to Dostum's past
and Dostum's fear of arrest on human rights crimes, he
immediately went back to Turkey and would not pose an
internal political problem. Karzai agreed, noting that
Dostum's ability to rally the Uzbek vote had exceeded his own
expectations. When asked if this was loyalty or fear, Karzai
said it was hard to say but it was very clear that in five
years, Dostum's kind of influence would be far less as his
party (Jumbesh) matures and old affiliations become diluted.

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Attending UNGA
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5. (U) Karzai asked my advice about attending the UN General
Assembly. I noted that even if the final election results
are not known, he is head of state and should attend as such.
However, I said, there would likely be no meetings at that
time in Washington, per the normal procedures of the UNGA
period. We did not discuss any possibilities of a bilateral
meeting.

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Looking Ahead: A Promise to Vet Appointments
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6. (S) I laid out with Karzai the way forward in five steps
for a new government to win credibility and legitimacy, both
at home and with international partners. First, I said, the
credibility of the elections is vital not least in view of
the extraordinary efforts and investment of the international
community. Karzai agreed, and said that he was sure of
victory - at 53-54 percent, a much lower figure than he has
used previously. I said we were aware that insecurity had
worked against the turnout in areas he normally would have
expected to be his strongholds. Karzai said he plans to make
a speech September 2 that will affirm his government's
support of the process; however, he immediately added, can
the U.S. do anything to make the ECC and IEC work faster to
produce a final result? I replied that we are keeping our
distance from the IEC and EEC in order to make sure we are
not viewed as in any way trying to influence their work, and
advised him to do the same since a credibile election process
helps the next president be viewed as legitimate. (Note:
Karzai decided on September 2 not to make a public statement.
End Note.)


7. (S) The second step will be the restoration of trust with
the international community and the Afghan people through
merit-based appointments of key ministers and governors to
carry out the work of the new administration. For example, I
said, re-appointing Ismael Khan based on political favors
rendered will send entirely the wrong signal - he is not
competent to run a ministry, much less one in which there is
considerable donor support and interest. He also mentioned
the possibility of giving Nangarhar Governor Gul Agha Sherzai
a key ministry, for example Transportation (which may be
reorganized into sector-specific Ministries combined with the
Ministry of Public Works). I strongly objected to this idea
and Karzai admitted that Gul Agha would probably "destroy
civilian aviation" if given control of it. I also flagged
the importance of the Ministry of Mines, one of Afghanistan's
key areas of potential wealth generation, and he noted the
Ministry of Higher Education. Karzai gave his word that he
will "absolutly consult with the United States" before making
new appointments. He expects that his political supporters
will give him lists of constituents for the posts they were
promised, so he can choose the best qualified ones.


8. (S) Karzai took on board the three final steps I outlined
- announcing his "compact" with his own people in his
inaugural speech; delivering early results on that compact,
for example by prosecuting high-level targets on corruption,
drug trafficking, terrorism or other major crimes; and
finally, hosting a ministerial conference on Afghanistan in
Kabul -- which Afghanistan's major supporters would accept
provided a re-elected Karzai accomplishes the first four
steps. On the "compact" idea, Karzai understood the example
of the 1994 "Contract with America" and saw how it could
serve at the same time as an agreement with the international
community.


9. (S) He asked me if the U.S. opposed a Jirga, and if we do,
if it is because we fear the possibility of a Jirga asking
for a Status of Forces Agreement with the United States. I
pointed out that we do not necessarily oppose a Jirga but we
do see this as potentially undermining the institutions that
are in place for consultation, such as Parliament. Karzai
said that Jirgas have a strong traditional resonance and its
purpose would be to renew Afghan support for the
international presence, and give that support a real
"grassroots" basis. I noted that a SOFA at this point is not
a reasonable step, given the state of Afghanistan's legal
system, but that some kind of new operational understanding
could be a good idea.


10. (S) Finally, on the issue of reconciliation, Karzai
affirmed that he wants to move ahead and to keep Afghanistan
in the lead, within the existing guidelines that reconciled
Taliban must reject international terrorism, forswear
violence, and promise to abide by the constitution. He sees
two basic levels - the commanders and fighters in the field,
and the high-level approaches, including the Quetta shura.
The initiative should be announced as a nation-wide policy,
but be conducted at local levels as appropriate. I concurred
and asked who would be in the lead within the GIRoA; he said
that the Independent Directorate of Local Government, and the
Disarmament of Illegally Armed Groups, as well as the
National Directorate of Security, were the right mechanisms.
I said that the international community and especially the
United States would like to help with funding and
organizational support, but that our funding has restrictions
which make it vital that we understand which Afghan
structures will conduct reconciliation efforts.
EIKENBERRY