ELECTIONS AFTERMATH - ABDULLAH UNDER PRESSURE,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002637

SIPDIS

PARIS PLEASE PASS TO S/SRAP HOLBROOKE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: ELECTIONS AFTERMATH - ABDULLAH UNDER PRESSURE,
KARZAI CONFIDENT, GHANI STRATEGIZING

Classified By: Polcouns Annie Pforzheimer, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) In separate meetings August 30, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah
and Ashraf Ghani told us that they are losing faith in the
system of electoral challenges delivering a government that
will have full legitimacy. President Karzai, meanwhile, is
focused on his vote count and confident he will win in the
first round even if he loses whole provinces to charges of
fraud. Abdullah seemed ill at ease and under tension, as his
followers are urging him to reject the process. Ghani - who
plans to meet with President Karzai late August 31 - told us
that he may sue the IEC for being partial, and posited that
his role as a mediator could be the only way to a new
government that restores the people's faith. End summary.

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Abdullah: The Cool is Eroding
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2. (S) Dr. Abdullah met with Ambassador Tim Carney, SRAP
senior advisor Rina Amiri, and Polcouns Pforzheimer and
immediately expressed his suspicion with the upcoming SRAP
meeting in Paris ("why are they meeting so frequently?"),his
annoyance with the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)
("it's not independent at all") and his impatience with the
election results process. Carney reviewed the complaints
procedures and safeguards, but Abdullah maintained his
criticisms that the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) was
not being effective. He returned to the same bottom line he
has expressed previously: if inflated turnout showed a
province like Ghazni, where few people live and fewer voted,
having nearly the same number of voters as Kabul, then "I
will run one day out of patience."


3. (S) Abdullah asked repeatedly for the final list of
polling sites, in order to compare this to his agents'
records and to the tally numbers. Carney undertook to get
the UN and IEC to release this list, which should have been
made public immediately after the election. (Note: In a
later communication, UNDP-Elect director Cook promised
Ambassador Carney the list would be made public August 31.
End Note.) Abdullah vented his frustration that numbers
being released by the IEC were opaque and didn't show whether
or not they contained any "quarantined" boxes, that despite a
recent visit by SRSG Eide and some IEC technical experts
their spokesman does not explain the tactic of releasing
small amounts of voting numbers. "I have to explain this to
the people" he said, and it doesn't make sense; furthermore
they all think these results are final and don't understand
the challenge period ahead.


4. (S) Interestingly, Abdullah - who had extremely deep
pockets throughout the election period - bristled when we
suggested he conduct his own survey of polling sites and
locations to match results with the tally centers numbers.
That would be too much trouble, he said, and "I have no money
for an operation that would be like another campaign. The
international community is paying for observers and the IEC,
but who pays for this?" (Comment: this remark could signal
that one rumor we're hearing is true - businessmen who were
backing Abdullah are starting to move away from his camp and
towards Karzai, in view of Karzai's better chances of
winning. End comment.)


5. (S) Abdullah has been publicly quoted complaining about
fraud and the process to a visiting group of supporters and
other leaders from six eastern provinces, and he told us that
these kinds of groups visit him every day, sometimes
numbering a hundred people. He had a delegation visiting at
the same time he received us, and had buffet tables set up in
his garden for an Iftar dinner for dozens. He repeated his
concerns that an inflated turnout would be "unacceptable" to
all these groups and to him, and that he has tried using the
ECC complaints procedure but has nothing, to date, to show
for it. His people want to demonstrate but it's too
dangerous; he will "keep everyone at home" and not resort to
protests. But, he said, Afghanistan would be unable to
build anything substantive on top of an illegitimate
government, and the public opinion in the United States would
be affected.


6. (S) Predicting that the North would not be as upset as
those in the South who had voted for change, Abdullah said
some of his supporters are encountering violence and
retaliation. He blamed the Minister of Education for a
campaign to pressure teachers to support Karzai, and ruefully
compared Karzai to the parable of a thief who does the
unthinkable - steals the poor man's last blanket.


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-------------- --
Karzai - I Can Lose Two Provinces and Still Win
-------------- --


7. (S) Speaking to Ambassador Eikenberry alone on August 30,
President Karzai had his vote count totals at hand. He was
confident enough of his margin of victory that he could "lose
Paktia and Ghazni" and still end up in the "high 50's" (he
later clarified it would be closer to 53-54 percent),thus
ending the process at the first round. He complained that
the international media was overly focused on fraud
allegations. Ambassador Eikenberry replied that these
allegations and the complaints process were of importance to
us and we strongly support a fully legitimate election
process. Karzai said there was great urgency to get the
final results out, citing potential unrest near Kabul and in
the South. Eikenberry reaffirmed that the process needs
patience, and that we are urging all candidates to behave
responsibly.


8. (S) Karzai raised the future of U.S.-Afghan relations,
including questions about how we see Afghanistan-Pakistan
relations proceeding (and the future of the transit trade
agreement); long-term U.S. presence in Afghanistan
(Eikenberry clarified that we do not seek permanent bases,
but rather we are committed to long-term training and
assistance); and other post-election policy goals.
Eikenberry emphasized that the issue of the quality of
appointments to cabinet posts and governorships is crucial;
American policymakers cannot justify giving assistance to a
ministry headed by someone -- such as current Minister for
Water and Energy Ismael Khan -- who was politically important
to Karzai's election but incompetent to run a ministry.

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Ghani - Let's Go Back to Go Forwards
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9. (S) Ashraf Ghani, back from five days' rest and medical
treatment in Dubai, was uncharacteristically serene when
Ambassador Carney, SRAP Advisor Amiri, and Polcouns called on
him later the same day. Alone at his home, apparently
receiving no calls or visitors, he said the elections had
inflicted systemic damage on Afghanistan and were
illegitimate. Calling the North a "second Waziristan" in the
making, he said that the insurgency had won the election, the
government had been shown to be corrupt, and voters had lost
faith that their votes meant anything. "The elections were
stolen by the Elections Commission," he said, stating that he
and other candidates planned to sue the IEC in the Supreme
Court for bias.


10. (S) Ghani emphatically called for a return to the less
partisan principles of the Bonn Accords and suggested four
possible scenarios:

-- Karzai and Abdullah make a deal (unlikely);
-- the international community gives up on the central
government, and builds up the provinces (a long-term,
extraordinarly expensive commitment);
-- a transitional government is formed, by those who will
give up their future right to be engaged in politics. This
is a "back to Bonn" arrangement which would prepare the
country for legitimate elections in two years;
-- a "national" government, with Ghani's firm belief that
this can only work if UNSRSG Eide is replaced by someone who
can "choreograph what is happening - not just react to it."

Some of these options could require a Loya Jirga or other
Jirga that could begin with minimal legitimacy but then
create a government that will restore the legitimacy, through
non-corrupt practices and a compact with the Afghan people,
that Karzai has lost since 2004.


11. (S) Ghani claimed that Abdullah may try to mobilize 5,000
mullahs to denounce the elections, a tactic that Ghani termed
suicidal since once the mosques are against the government,
it can't be controlled. He also claimed that Abdullah was as
much a part of the establishment - and the problem - as
Karzai; for example, Abdullah had no problem getting ANA
airlift during the elections because his people remain in
positions of power throughout the government. Finally, Ghani
said, Abdullah does not truly control his people and should
be careful, the delegations that Abdullah is receiving from
the South are "sent by Karzai" so Abdullah will take the bait
and encourage demonstrations. Once he is linked to violence,
Abdullah will be dropped by the international community,
Ghani said.


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12. (S) Ghani said that he will see Karzai on August 31, in
the late evening, something he has put off but now feels is
necessary at least "to see his mindset." He indicated that
he is not so "principled" that he would never take a job in a
Karzai administration, but that when asked in the past his
price had been for Karzai to exile thirty of the most corrupt
members of the government - including Karzai's brother. He
now sees himself in a "mediator" role and with no future in
politics, he said, and repeated that the people need a sense
that someone is in control of the process, has a plan, and is
not only reacting to events. In that light, he has refrained
from public interviews or appearances since the election,
both during his time in Dubai and after his return.
EIKENBERRY