MOI ATMAR MAKES THE CASE FOR THE AFGHAN PUBLIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000256

SIPDIS

KABUL FOR COS USFOR-A
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR JWOOD
OSD FOR MCGRAW
CG CJTF-101, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MARR MASS KDEM AF
SUBJECT: MOI ATMAR MAKES THE CASE FOR THE AFGHAN PUBLIC
PROTECTION PROGRAM

REF: KABUL 44

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for Reasons 1.4(b)(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Since mid-January, Minister of Interior
Atmar, with the support of COMUSFOR-A/COMISAF GEN McKiernan
(reftel),has launched an energetic outreach initiative on
behalf of the Afghan Public Protection Program (APPP). Atmar
has lauded the program as a way to improve community security
in the near term, while enhancing the role played by
communities in providing for their own defense. Atmar has
also sought to counter widespread concerns that the Afghan
Public Protection Force (APPF) is a means to arm tribal
militias. Having already briefed the international community
(IC) on January 12 and addressed IC concerns in follow-up
bilateral meetings, Atmar reached out to the Afghan public in
a January 31 press conference, again highlighting the need to
make daily life safer for the public and reiterating "these
(APPF) units are not militias; they are not guards. They are
official units of the Interior Ministry..."


2. (C) While successfully building public and international
support for the APPP, Atmar must still deal with the
inevitable challenges of rolling out a new program.
President Karzai has yet to voice public support for the APPP
and his recent remarks regarding the need for security forces
to focus on borders rather than internal security could be
construed as critical of the APPP. (It is, however, highly
unlikely Atmar would still be publicly promoting the APPP if
Karzai genuinely opposed it.) Meanwhile, the Independent
Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) and MOI are working
together to address the issue of what shape community
accountability for APPF will take. END SUMMARY.

ATMAR'S PUBLIC OUTREACH
--------------


3. (C) In a January 31 press conference, Atmar noted the APPP
would have its own uniform and work alongside the Afghan
National Police (ANP),using the same weapons (AK-47
Kalashnikovs) as the police. (An AP press report erroneously
quoted Atmar as saying the U.S. would provide funding for
these arms, which is not the case. The APPP will be armed by
the MOI.) Atmar stressed that, while currently funded by the
U.S., the APPF would fall strictly under the command of
Afghan National Security Forces. "They are part of the
security forces of Afghanistan and by no means will they be
under the command of anyone else, other than the leadership
of the Afghan government."

ATMAR ENGAGES THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
--------------


4. (C) Atmar first briefed the international community on the
APPP January 12 at a Chiefs of Mission meeting hosted by
UNAMA SRSG Eide, Atmar thanked GEN McKiernan (in attendance)
for his assistance in developing and supporting the APPP.
Atmar noted that, in addition to MOI, other GIRoA partners
would be MOD, NDS, IDLG and the Ministry for Border and
Tribal Affairs. Atmar stressed that the Afghan Public
Protection Force (APPF) would be a regular government force,
an instrument of and responsive to the central government.
These forces would not, he emphasized, be de facto arbakai
(local men traditionally selected by tribal or village elders
defend their community). Atmar emphasized he had no doubt of
the initiative's success and said his only regret was that
APPP would still be in pilot phase when elections are held.

WHY CREATE THE APPP?
--------------


5. (C) Atmar first identified the three main factors that
motivated creation of the APPP:
-- Deteriorating community security, especially regarding the
safety of highways, schools, clinics. It was, Atmar noted,
unacceptable to expect people to live under such conditions.
-- The need to free the police to perform traditional law
enforcement, community policing and ensure justice/rule of
law. The Afghan National Police (ANP) do not have the
numbers, capacity, training or equipment to serve a
counter-insurgency role in the communities.
-- The need to provide communities with direct involvement in
security. While the APPP forces would not be arbakai or
tribal militias, the patrolmen would be nominated locally so
men from the community would be serving in the local APPP

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force.

WARDAK - PILOT PROGRAM FOR APPF
--------------


6. (C) Atmar said APPP would begin as a pilot program in
Wardak Province. Wardak was chosen because of its proximity
to Kabul, the significant role Wardak plays in the capital's
security, and Atmar's view that the Wardak Council would be a
strong partner. Initial estimates for APPF force number in
pilot phase was 1200 but Atmar noted that, as the APPP grew,
the unit numbers would depend on level of threat in the area,
population size, and geographic factors. (In his January 31
press conference, Atmar said he couldn't predict future
numbers, but eventually APPP numbers could range from 10,000
to 20,000 in one area or 50,000 - 100,000 in another,
depending on the need.)

STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE APPF
--------------


7. (C) Atmar outlined the mission and structure of the future
APPF. Its role would be to deny insurgents operating space
in local communities; it would have no law enforcement role.
Additionally, the force would have its own uniform and be
equipped, armed, and trained specifically for its COIN
mission. Regular MOD forces would train the APPF, with MOI
mentors, and a curriculum for a three-week training program
had already been created. The U.S. has already begun a
"train the trainers" program for APPP.

APPF COMMANDERS APPOINTED BY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
-------------- --


8. (C) In terms of command structure, Atmar said the APPF
would fall under the District Police Chief. District Police
Chiefs currently have one deputy for general back-up, but in
the near future, they will have three. The second deputy
will coordinate anti-crime/intel support for CN, CT, etc.
The third will oversee the local APPF. APPF commanders and
officers will be appointed by MOI not by the community. The
community will nominate the "patrolmen/footsoldiers." At the
central level, some combination of MOI, MOD and NDS will
further vet community nominations. Members of the APPF would
receive 10-15 percent less pay than police.


9. (C) An interagency group would be tasked with regularly
inspecting and monitoring the APPF; clear benchmarks would be
determined to measure success. Atmar said the group or team
would consist of representatives from MOI, MOD, NDS, IDLG,
MBTA, and USFOR-A. (Atmar noted the GIRoA would also welcome
a UNAMA representative to the group.) Monitoring would look,
not just at performance, but also at coordination and
cooperation with other security elements - ANP, ANA, etc.
The local community would also provide feedback on the
performance of the APPF. Atmar said the MOI wanted to
conduct monthly monitoring, rather than quarterly to avoid
lag time in assessing progress on benchmarks.


10. (C) Atmar pointed out that there was no long-term plan on
how to sustain the APPP financially. Resources were in place
for the next year to 18 months (primarily from the U.S.,
except for weapons),but Atmar said now was the time to think
about providing additional resources for support and
expansion of the APPF once it proved successful in Wardak.
He expected the program to move past being a U.S.-Afghan
bilateral effort to eventually become multilateral. The
GIRoA would then seek assistance from other troop
contributing countries.

SUPPORT FOR APPP WILL NOT DETRACT FROM SUPPORT FOR POLICE
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Atmar stressed that the launch of the APPP would not
mean a diminishment of MOI's commitment to police reform and
expansion. Atmar remained determined to increase police
numbers but the first priority must be establishing
accountability and transparency before increasing ANP
significantly. Atmar pointed out again that rather than
detracting from building police capacity, the APPP was key to
establishing a secure environment to allow police to do their
job.

MOI ATMAR: SHURAS WILL ENFORCE APPF DISCIPLINE
-------------- -

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12. (C) On January 19, Ambassador Wood revisited the question
of community responsibility for the APPP with Atmar. The
Ambassador stressed the importance of local communities
feeling ownership of the program, taking control, and being
self-reliant. Lack of a sense of community ownership
probably lay behind the earlier failure of the Afghan
National Auxiliary Police (ANAP),which became dominated by
individual strongmen.


13. (C) Atmar responded that the APPF was a "hybrid" binding
community control to local representatives of different
ministries of the central government. The underlying idea
was to address key concerns of the community by giving the
District Councils (Shuras) responsibility for vetting the
APPF. The Council members would nominate candidates from
every village and thus assume responsibility for their
cousins, sons, and nephews. If APPF members did something
wrong, it was the Shura which would enforce discipline.
Atmar added that the ANAP was often unpaid, which would not
be the case with the APPF.

IDLG DEPUTY: ACCOUNTABILITY MUST ULTIMATELY LIE WITH MOI
-------------- --------------


14. (C) In a January 19 meeting with the DCM and PRTOff, IDLG
Deputy Director Karimi agreed that shuras should play a role
in nominating local men for the APPF. And, while he could
see communities participating in administering punishment,
Karimi believed MOI (through the local police chief) should
be held responsible for APPF conduct, not the communities.
It would not be right, he maintained, to punish communities
for misconduct by APPF members. "The shuras will help MOI
get the right people - nothing more." (Atmar has not
suggested punishing communities for APPF failures, and IDLG
Director Popal and Atmar appear to be working closely on
ironing out the details of APPP implementation.)

KARZAI AND APPP
--------------


15. (C) The APPP comes in direct response to a request from
President Karzai to develop a program to engage the
grassroots in their own protection. Karzai has long
advocated strengthening the community's role in governance
and Atmar's continued promotion of the program indicates at
least tacit support from the President. However, Karzai's
public comments earlier this month indicate he may have
concerns regarding some aspects of the APPP. He has not yet
publicly endorsed the program and continues to believe that
it is too national and institutional, and therefore, not
rooted enough in local communities. We have explained that
for reasons of operational control and accountability of
funds, oversight by the national government is necessary.
WOOD