POST-ELECTION LANDSCAPE: FRAUD ALLEGATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002526

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: POST-ELECTION LANDSCAPE: FRAUD ALLEGATIONS
SHARPENING, IEC HOLDING TO ITS LINE

Classified By: PolCouns Annie Pforzheimer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: President Karzai's supporters continue to
sound confident, although some admit their leader is "weak"
and will only get weaker, and more beholden to his
supporters, if the election goes to a second round.
Abdullah, meanwhile, is claiming that fraud in the south
could steal his strong finish in this round. The press, and
to some extent the international community, continues to
watch out for serious fraud allegations, while the
Independent Election Commission (IEC) continues to call for
patience and calm. End Summary.

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A Karzai Victory Assured, Acccording to his Supporters
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2. (C) While President Karzai,s campaign has also indicated
that he will respect the process, he and his supporters have
made it clear that they expect the outcome of the election
will be determined in the first round. The campaign publicly
claimed that it secured between 55 percent and 70 percent of
the vote and quickly spread the news that the election
outcome would be determined in the first round. According to
a prominent businessman and Karzai donor, they reportedly
held a private celebration in the palace on August 22.
National Security Advisor Rasul told us that they will accept
quarantining of fraudulent ballots but reject the idea that
this process could have an outcome on the election results.
Even with low Pashtun turnout, they believe that they have
won the elections through Hazara, Uzbek and some Tajik votes.
They remain suspicious that the international community will
use the ECC to push the election into a second round.

3. (C) For example, MP Fazal Karim Aimaq (Kunduz, Aimaq) told
us August 24 he was one of many "reluctant Karzai
supporters." He said he had made a political calculation on
who would win the election and he had come to the conclusion
that Karzai would be re-elected. Aimaq remarked that
Herat-based warlord Ismael Khan had made a similar
calculation, although in both cases, "their hearts were
elsewhere." He explained that other like-minded Tajiks had
attempted three strategies before deciding to support Karzai:
1) reform Karzai so he would favor former mujahedeen like
himself; 2) form a strong opposition coalition with Ashraf
Ghani, Khalilzad, Jalali and Abdullah; and 3) form a
coalition that would include the Hazaras, Tajiks and Uzbeks.
He lamented that all three strategies had failed, so the only
remaining option was to join Karzai and attempt to influence
him from within the fold.


4. (C) Aimaq was confident that Karzai had won in the first
round. Although Aimaq acknowledged that fraud was an issue,
he was confident that IEC's findings would not change the
outcome -- since Karzai had appointed the the IEC
commissioners. He highlighted Karzai's strong numbers in the
south, in Dostum's home province of Jowzjan in the north, and
in Herat, where Aimaq claimed Karzai had won about 50-percent
of the vote, thanks to his alliance with Ismael Khan. Aimaq
ventured that if Karzai won less than 51 percent in the first
round, say only 45 percent, and Abdullah 25 percent, most
leaders would make a political calculation to back Karzai in
the second round. He predicted that if a second round is
necessary, Karzai would win by a landslide. The down-side of
this scenario would be that Karzai would have to make
promises to an even larger number of people with different
agendas, making him a weaker leader and even more "beholden
to everyone."

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Abdullah: A Warning, but Also A Pledge to Fight Legally
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5. (C) Late August 23, Dr. Abdullah's campaign called to ask
for an appointment the next day with Ambassador Eikenberry.
At the meeting on August 24, Abdullah raised again his fears
of wide-spread ballot-stuffing and voter turnout inflation in
the south, as the only fraud that could truly change the
outcome. Abdullah's estimates of his returns in the north
and west appear to track with those of Karzai's camp,
indicating that candidate agents and others are accurately
reporting the posted numbers from each polling station to
their headquarters. The divergence (Karzai's claims of
victory, Abdullah's concern) is in key provinces in the east
and south, as had been expected. Abdullah claimed that he
had videos of ballot stuffing, and a tape of a police chief
in Ghazni admitting his acts of manipulation.


6. (C) Abdullah's tone was fairly measured and he again
stated that he would do what was right for the country if he
lost, and would restrain his followers. However, he
reiterated his concern that he could not give up without a
fight, on behalf of his followers who had risked much for him

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and who had had their hopes raised. He told the Ambassador
that in his view, the success of the United States in
Afghanistan rested on our partnership with a government which
had true legitimacy; he might lose, he said, but "in two
years no one will be the winner" since Karzai's tenure will
be tainted and the country would fall into disorder. "In two
years, your Congress will be disappointed" and pressure would
mount to withdraw our support if nothing changes, he said.


7. (C) Ambassador Eikenberry reiterated that we would
support the ECC and IEC examination of all poll results. He
noted that the international community, and especially the UN
SRSG, were following this process closely and were meeting
frequently. He said the U.S. first principle was the
crediblity of the elections, and that we recognized this
would be a difficult period ahead. He asked Abdullah if there
was the possibility of his entering into a coalition with
other candidates; Abdullah said that for now he was keeping
his distance from them because they were attacking the
legitimacy of the election itself.

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Abdullah Making a Deal?
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8. (C) Although Abdullah has never told us he would consider
joining Karzai, these rumors continue and they seem to
originate primarily from the Karzai campaign. Abdullah's
usual statement to us is that he could have been anything he
wanted in the Karzai government, or he could have continued
his comfortable life going to international conferences and
living in India - but he made his choice to take a "serious"
role and oppose Karzai and his cronies. He reiterated to
Ambassador Eikenberry his interest in the 2010 Parliamentary
elections, although he admitted he had not done much in the
past month to organize the "national movement" he envisioned.

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Ghani: National Unity Government
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9. (C) The European Community Delegation and other EU
Presidency representatives report that in a meeting with
Ashraf Ghani on August 23, he told them that the country is
at a "turning point" and that the decisions made now can
determine the fate of the Obama/NATO strategy. He asserted
that the elections were illegitimate and to pretend otherwise
was to "waste time"; that the only way forward to preserve
order would be to create a Government of National Unity, and
to avoid a second round of voting; and that violence was a
very imminent threat to national order. He claimed that the
Ministry of Interior was not fully in control by Minister
Atmar and that Kabul was "unprotected"; he further stated
that Abdullah may not be able to control his supporters.


10. (C) Ghani stated that "all key players" must pay a price
to join a national unity government in order to present a
legitimate, stable alternative to either a stalemate or
violence. For example, Karzai's brother should be exiled
from Kandahar; neither major candidates can be allowed to
claim victory; all candidates should come together to call
for peace; and one major candidate (he suggested himself)
should renounce politics and assume the role of mediator.
Ghani's next move is unknown; according to Abdullah, Ghani is
in Dubai, and Ghani's office confirms he is out of Kabul.

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The Media Fixates on Fraud Allegations. . .
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11. (U) With less than day remaining before the IEC
releases 10 percent of the results, media reports have
focused on speculation on possible outcomes and allegations
that fraud and ballot stuffing marred the August 20
elections. Both Karzai and Abdullah,s campaigns continue to
publicly note concerns that fraud will impact the results.
Other candidates are also alleging fraud; the campaign of
Lower House Deputy Speaker Mirwais Yaseni claimed that
thousands of votes cast for Yaseni were removed from ballot
boxes in Kandahar. The allegations are likely to increase
with the IEC's rolling release of information, starting
August 25.


12. (U) Media reports also feature the plans and opinions
of the IEC and the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC).
IEC Chief Electoral officer Dr. Najafi addressed concerns
about fraud while on a local talk show, highlighting the
safeguards built into the system that will allow
investigators to identify areas were fraud likely occurred.
The ECC again reported receiving over 225 complaints about
violations and vote rigging, 35 of which ECC commissioners
have described as &very serious.8 Local press have

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reported on the ECC,s authority to nullify votes from areas
determined to have been impacted by fraud and the audits and
investigations the ECC is planning before final results can
be released by the IEC.

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While the IEC Calls for Calm and Patience
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13. (C) The IEC continues to publicly and privately
emphasize the need for calm and patience. Ambassador Carney
and PolCouns met August 24 with IEC Chair Ludin and three
other commissioners. Ludin appreciated U.S. support for a
"patient" approach that will allow the IEC to roll out
information as it becomes available and to work with the
Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC). (Comment: While it is
true that Karzai appointed the IEC's seven commissioners,
including its chairman and deputy, the IEC has broken ranks
in the past with Karzai. At the moment, the political classes
are choosing either the ECC or IEC as their trusted body.
End Comment.) Regarding some candidates', including
Abdullah's, concerns that the preliminary results to be
announced August 25 could include votes that are currently
under review, Ludin -- and perhaps more importantly, his
director for the technical side of the vote tally process --
assured us that that only votes that pass a certain level of
certification by the IEC will be announced.
EIKENBERRY