Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL246
2009-02-03 06:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PAKTIKA GOVERNOR CONFIRMS HIS DEPARTURE AND

Tags:  PGOV PREL AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1406
OO RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #0246/01 0340656
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 030656Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7111
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000246 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR WILKES
CG CJTF-101 POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: PAKTIKA GOVERNOR CONFIRMS HIS DEPARTURE AND
COMMENTS ON THE AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION PROGRAM

REF: KABUL 0101

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000246

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR WILKES
CG CJTF-101 POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: PAKTIKA GOVERNOR CONFIRMS HIS DEPARTURE AND
COMMENTS ON THE AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION PROGRAM

REF: KABUL 0101

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) At a meeting with the Ambassador on January 29,
Paktika Governor Mohammad Akram Khpalwak confirmed that he is
being replaced, in all likelihood within a few days by
current Kandahar NDS chief Abdul Qayum Katawazay. He
expressed support for the notion of a carefully organized,
government-controlled program to organize local residents in
support of community security; but, he suggested such an
initiative ) i.e., the Afghan Public Protection Program
(APPP) -- should be launched initially not in Wardak, as is
currently planned, but in the southeast, where tribal
structures are still intact. He underscored the urgent need
for sustained community engagement in order to convince
Pashtuns to stand up to extremism. The governor contended
that President Karzai, with whom he has recently met, is so
focused on the upcoming elections and U.S. criticism that he
doubts the President has much attention left to devote to
future-oriented projects, like community engagement/policing.
End Summary.

New Governor for Paktika
--------------


2. (SBU) Khpalwak told the Ambassador that their meeting was
intended as a farewell call, at least in his current capacity
as governor. He recounted that current Kandahar NDS Chief
Katawazay informed him on January 28 that President Karzai
had assured Katawazy that he would be named as the new
governor of Paktika province within the following 1-2 days
(this despite Katawazay,s candidacy having been rejected by
the Senior Appointments Panel, according to Khpalwak). As
for his own future, Khpalwak said he turned down the position
of Deputy Minister of Border and Tribal Affairs and believes
he still may have a chance at being appointed head of a
government commission; but otherwise he plans to return for
the time being to private life. He stressed that, whatever
happens, he intends to continue working for the good of
Afghanistan and its people.

Khpalwak: Community Engagement a Critical Need

-------------- --


3. (C) Without mentioning the initiative by name, Governor
Khpalwak said he has concerns that the Afghan Public
Protection Program is being launched first in Wardak, rather
than in the southeast (he suspects political motivations lay
behind the choice of Wardak). In his view, this kind of
program has great potential but needs to start small and
prove itself in order to gain traction with other
communities. This makes start-up success absolutely
critical. He also stressed the need to talk to communities
and get their full buy-in to help immunize them against enemy
propaganda that contends the U.S. is trying to pit brother
against brother through the creation of these forces.


4. (C) Elaborating, Khpalwak said he tried in vain last year
to gain backing in Kabul for a similar initiative in the
southeast. Any such program, he insisted, should entail a
contract between the authorities, the local
tribe/community/elders and the international community, with
responsibilities and expectations clearly laid out. It
should be broadly based, in the sense that it involves
economic, governance and security elements, with the
government remaining fully engaged and ultimately in control.
Otherwise, corrupt local strongmen might misuse such local
forces for their own purposes. As part of the agreement,
local communities should commit to excluding anti-government
elements and those out to harm internationals. In exchange
for effective self-policing, the authorities might agree to
keep their own and international forces at a distance. This
in turn would eliminate the incidents of civilian casualties
that so alienate the population. Development projects
employing local labor would be another important element, as
would be a credible reconciliation program. He pointed to
the Mangal tribe, straddling the Khost/Paktya border, as an
example of a community -- this one tribally based -- that he
believes would respond well to this kind of initiative.


5. (C) When asked why local tribes and communities are not
more supportive of the government and the international

KABUL 00000246 002 OF 002


forces who make concerted efforts to win their loyalty,
Khpalwak suggested support provided for local shuras to date
has been more verbal than real. Small-time Taliban
commanders who might want to reconcile or mullahs who might
want to speak out against the insurgents fear for their lives
) neither they nor the communities to which they belong have
confidence the government will not abandon them. Regarding
international forces, many communities have no direct
communications with them. What is needed, he argued, is a
full-blown strategy that entails active, day-to-day
engagement and support. In this context, he bemoaned the
lack of power and resources of governors and district
administrators. In the absence of such an approach, he
recounted, powerful tribal elders today are talking to the
Taliban and reaching agreements with them ) you don,t make
problems for us and we won,t make problems for you. We
cannot fight all the Pashtuns, he warned, but step-by-step we
CAN win over Pashtun communities to standing up to extremism.

Palace Focused on Upcoming Elections
--------------


6. (C) While not openly critical of the President Karzai,
Khpalwak expressed skepticism that the President will devote
much attention to devote to programs like community
engagement/policing. Instead, he says, his contacts with the
President and the Palace suggest they are strongly
preoccupied with upcoming national elections and recent
criticism coming out of the U.S. To the Ambassador,s
suggestion that he might want to find a role for himself in
managing the APPP, Khpalwak indicated he would follow up with
Minister of Interior Atmar (MOI is responsible for
implementing the program). He noted, though, that ultimate
decision-making authority will continue to rest with the
President.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) Given his obvious talent, intelligence, energy and
ambition, Khpalwak is unlikely to disappear entirely from the
scene. The fact that the President reportedly offered the
governor several other positions suggests the Palace
maintains a measure of confidence in him. But two factors )
perhaps alongside others -- may have contributed to his
displacement now. First, the Palace may not have been
convinced that he would work energetically enough for the
President,s re-election. The governor claims not to be
affiliated with any political grouping, and in his discussion
with the Ambassador he repeatedly stressed his pursuit of
what is best for the country. In this vein, he recounted a
meeting last year with the President, several top ministers
and selected governors where the President pressed the
governors to engage communities on the issue of cross-border
relations. Khpalwak said he spoke up, asking what the goal
of these engagements should be and where they might fit into
a nationally formulated strategy; but he received no coherent
response.


8. (C) While Khpalwak appears to have been slated for a
change for some time, a second factor perhaps contributing to
his ousting at this juncture may be simply that the President
needed his position. Reports suggest the President, possibly
on behalf of his half-brother in Kandahar, has felt obligated
to the Katawazay family.
WOOD