AFGHAN ELECTIONS: SUCCESSFUL, SUBDUED AFGHAN-LED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002453

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: AFGHAN ELECTIONS: SUCCESSFUL, SUBDUED AFGHAN-LED
DAY OF VOTING

Classified By: Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Millions of Afghans had the opportunity to
go to the polls today to vote for the Presidency and 420
Provincial Council seats. The traditionally dangerous areas
in the south and east reported numerous small attacks,
although there were no major security incidents that
significantly affected polling. Turnout varied by region,
generally robust in the north and west, lower in much of the
south and east, and possibly weaker than expected in Kabul,
where voting was largely calm but subdued. According to the
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC),6,199 of 6,519 polls
opened -- 1,500 more than in 2004. An estimated 85 percent
of the Pashtun population are estimated to have had access to
the centers, but it appears many fewer may actually have
voted. No reliable early returns exist. Although there is
considerable uncertainty about levels of fraud and possible
low voter turnout in Pashtun areas due to insecurity or
apathy, the 20 August electiosn did proceed nationwide in a
remarkably organized and coherent fashion. End Summary.

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Despite Predictable Violence, the Vote Went On
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2. (C) Attacks and intimidation by insurgents were
predictable and in line with threat assessments. The
traditionally dangerous areas in the south and east reported
numerous small attacks. Of greatest concern was the
insurgent attack in Baghlan that caused the death of the
district police chief, as well as the possible hanging of two
voters by the Taleban in Kandahar. We also received a report
that two polling centers in Herat were burned and some voting
materials detroyed. However, no major attacks occured that
significantly affected polling. The GIRoA,s attempt to
limit media reporting of security incidences on Election Day
mostly collapsed following international community pressure
and that of media groups, but was unhelpful and resulted in
some incidents of conflict with the media.


3. (U) Minister of the Interior Atmar, Minister of Defense
Wardak and National Directorate of Security Director Saleh
stated in a 6 p.m. press conference on election day that
eight members of the Afghan National Army and nine Afghan
National Police were killed and many others injured, but that
most Afghans voted without intimidation. Those who defied
intimidation showed great courage, Atmar said.


4. (U) Many of our interlocutors suggested that voter
turnout was lower than usual during the morning hours because
people were waiting to see how dangerous it was to go to the
polling stations. Throughout the day the IEC's main message
was "polls are open, we're working with security forces to
deal with problems, and Afghans should get out and vote
before 4 p.m." To set an example, President Karzai and
Independent Election Commission Chairman Ludin cast their
votes soon after polling began. Voting was extended for one
hour, to 5 p.m., in light of some polls' late start. At 6
p.m. Kabul time ISAF noted that "its forces were engaged in
insurgent forces today, including indirect and direct fire
attacks against FOBs and patrols, but these engagements were
not/not election related. Indeed, insurgent violence
directed against election sites and events was quite capably
handled by ANSF, and ANSF did not request ISAF support in any
election-related security events."

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Scale of Fraud Reportedly Sporadic, not Systemic
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5. (SBU) Prior to polling day, we saw some blatant,
last-minute attempts at fraud, led by Karzai,s security
ministers with the apparent complicity of some local election
officials. This involved moving ballot boxes to insecure
areas; ISAF in particular tried to minimize the impact
through denying logistic support and we registered our
concerns with the Afghan authorities. We received reports
from several provinces that the ink used to mark voters'
fingers "washed off" on their fingers. Candidates Bashardost
and Ghani are among those who complained the ink was flawed.
The IEC is investigating these allegations and suspects the
ink bottles may not have been adequately shaken. UNAMA
Director Galbraith termed this a "minor issue." Some
provinces reported isolated cases of minors with voter ID
cards voting or intending to vote. Allegations of fraud will
become a key theme in the next week, especially if Karzai
claims to clear the 50% hurdle.


6. (SBU) Dr. Abdullah gave a press conference several hours
after voting closed, stating that he was pleased, overall,
with the elections process. He added that he had some

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complaints about possible irregularities and fraud, and would
bring those complaints to the Electoral Complaints
Commission. His advisors were in touch with the Embassy
during the day with complaints but appeared at all times to
be seeking local remedies as well as bringing their concerns
to the IEC.


7. (U) By far, the most commonly reported technical glitch
on Election Day concerned faulty hole punchers. However, the
IEC quickly remedied the problem by instructing poll station
officials to cut off a corner of each voters' voter ID card
to indicate they had voted. Other complaints concerned the
lack of privacy in certain polling stations, where voting
booths were in plain sight of observers or with windows
directly behind them. A third complaint was the lack of
balloting material, but the IEC addressed this by shifting
materials within districts.

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Domestic Observers: A Careful, Positive Assessment
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8. (U) The domestic observer group "Free and Fair Election
Foundation of Aghanistan" (FEFA),based on two rounds of
reporting by its observers, released a statement at 9 p.m.
praising Afghans for their commitment to developing a lasting
democratic system. FEFA stated that the IEC, candidates and
campaigns, state security institutions, the media, and civil
society all played instrumental roles in ensuring that people
could exercise their right to vote. FEFA, which fielded over
7,300 observers in all 34 provinces, reported that many
polling centers throughout the country opened late and in
some instances closed early. FEFA observers also noted the
problems with holepunchers and questions regarding the
durability of the indelible ink to mark voters' fingers,
although there were also reports that the ink re-emerges
after one attempts to wash it off. FEFA observers also
reported complaints that some IEC local staff were not
impartial, that female electoral staff was largely absent at
many polling stations throughout the country, and that cases
of male proxy voting were reported.


9. (U) According to FEFA's preliminary impressions, voter
turnout appears to have been lower than during the 2004
presidential elections. FEFA also described election day
security in less positive terms than the MOD and MOI, noting
"grenade and rocket attacks directed at polling and city
centers which emerged as a major form of disruption in many
partys of the country. These attacks continued throughout
the day." In closing, FEFA noted that the electoral process
is now entering the critical phase of vote counting and
verification, and at this time had no initial assessment of
the election's crediblity.

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Will the Poll Numbers Hold?
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10. (SBU) Various public polls had placed Karzai in the mid
40%s; Abdullah in the mid-high 20%s; Bashardost around 10%
and Ghani trailing with around 6%. The last-minute variables
that may have affected these figures included Karzai,s
presence at Sunday night,s debate and Abdullah,s absence;
Dostum,s return (favoring Karzai); and minor candidates
attempting to drop out, most in favor of Karzai. Against
this, possible low voter turnout in the South and East may
jeopardize Karzai's hope for a first round win.


11. (U) For the first time in Afghanistan,s history, the
country has had a truly national debate about issues,
personalities and politics. The explosion in Afghan media )
sometime inaccurate, often biased ) has enabled virtually
every Afghan to be exposed to the debate, including Pashtun
women who cannot leave the house, but sometimes listen to the
radio. Encouraged by our approaches, the candidates have set
out crude platforms and policy positions. Candidates have
held large and small rallies alike around the country, taking
their platforms to the people. This is a success story we
need to reinforce and build on as part of the move to build
up Afghan civil society and institutions to hold their new
government to account.


12. (C) The election has also refocused attention on the
ongoing influence of former warlords, such as Dostum, Fahim
Khan or Khalili for Karzai, or the Jamiat warlords for
Abdullah. Although both candidates claim to support
merit-based appointments, the signal their associations
convey is unwelcome for both us and many Afghans. The
selection of qualified Afghan government leaders must be one
of our highest post-election priority: without them, delivery
on other objectives will be much more difficult.

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Our Role
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13. (SBU) The United States released several significant
statements during the campaign period, in particular the
President's June 16th statement and the Secretary's on August
17th. The President's statement was critical to efforts to
"level the candidate's playing field" while the Secretary's
reminded key Afghan political leaders of the need for
responsible post-election behavior. The Embassy released a
statement at the end of the day, which reads in its entirety:

Begin text:

The American people congratulate the people of Afghanistan as
this Election Day concludes, on the historic occasion of your
nation leading, for the first time, democratic elections for
President and Provincial Councils. Along with others in the
international community, we await the announcements of
official results by the Independent Electoral Commission in
the days ahead.

End text.


14. (U) We must manage expectations that results will be
quick. The Afghan authorities have the lead on messaging;
relevant election authorities plan to hold at least daily
updates over the next couple of weeks. The key dates ahead
are:

--Aug 21-22: Observer Mission Reports
--Aug 25: Initial Results from IEC (not August 23, as
previously announced)
--Sept 3: Preliminary Official Results
--Sept 17: Final Certified Results
--Oct 10: Possible Inauguration

Approximate Runoff Schedule

--Oct 1: Runoff
--Oct 15: Preliminary Results
--Oct 29: Final Results
--Nov 28: Inauguration


15. (C) The next few days may be very challenging. FEFA's
cautiously positive assessment is very important since it
represents an Afghan "report card" on the conduct of voting
today. Election Day was a significant step in the Afghan
people's difficult path towards democracy. Threats and
violence did not derail the process, although turnout in some
regions appears low. Now the votes must be tallied,
complaints reviewed, and official results released. The
ultimate test will be whether the Afghan people accept the
electoral outcome and view their government with increased
legitimacy.


16. (C) Although too early to tell, we see two likely
scenarios emerging. First is that Karzai claims a
first-round victory which in light of possible low Pashtun
voter turnout would not be viewed as credible, especially by
Abdullah's adherents, with consequent charges of fraud
leading to political gridlock and possible instability. The
second would be that Karzai obviously gained less than 50% of
the vote, in which case the election passes to a second round
with the attendant difficulty of managing the runoff and
maintaining national cohesion during the subsequent campaign
in which ethnic cards may be come the weapons of choice for
contending factions. Mitigating against severe instability
is the strong Afghan desire to avoid a return to the dark
days of their civil war and Taliban past. That commonsense
approach was clearly evident during the extended campaign
period that proved remarkably civil with low levels of
violence.
EIKENBERRY