YOUR VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN

S E C R E T KABUL 000243


FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE, SCA/FO, SCA/A

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF
SUBJECT: YOUR VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, for reaons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) Embassy Kabul warmly welcomes your visit.


2. (C) The coming year will take its identity from the Afghan
presidential elections, and from increased U.S. military
deployments. We continue to face tough challenges in
Afghanistan, particularly on the security and governance
front. But conditions here are more nuanced than the
negative drumbeat coming from the media. Advances in
security do not grab headlines the way a spectacular suicide
attack does. Progress in development continues, including
increased access to improved public health and education
services. National and international will is holding. But
poor governance, corruption, and a growing gap between
President Karzai and the international presence, including
the United States, are problems.

Elections
--------------


3. (SBU) Presidential elections already influence nearly
everything political here. Karzai's popularity has fallen -
dramatically in some areas and among some constituencies. But
overall the Asia Foundation poll found that 66 percent of the
population still thought the national government was doing a
"very good" or "somewhat good" job (compared to 80 percent in
2007). In our view, especially in the absence of a credible
opponent, it is Karzai's election to lose. Personal
insecurity and corruption are Karzai's greatest
vulnerabilities. Karzai installed Hanif Atmar as Interior
Minister to turn up the heat on both problems. Minister
Atmar is working hard, but time is probably too short for
dramatic improvement before elections.


4. (C) The Independent Election Commission,s (IEC) January
29 announcement of the August 20 election date opens the way
for political players to hone their electoral strategies and
the international community to launch in earnest its security
and assistance plans. There will be some residual sniping
from the opposition over the legitimacy of Karzai,s
authority from the period when many, but not all, interpret
his term expires (May 21) and the election date. The last
thing Afghanistan needs is a three-month period of political
ambiguity in the lead up to elections and at the height of
the fighting season. We expect that after some backroom
wrangling, key political players will reach a pragmatic
accommodation that prevents a constitutional crisis.


5. (SBU) More problematic is the insecurity in the south and
east, which is prompting some - including Karzai, other
Pashtuns and some RC-South partners - to raise the specter of
Pashtun disenfranchisement and the possible illegitimacy of
the vote. It is too early to judge the prospects of failure.
In fact, voter registration is proceeding well in the south,
as it has elsewhere, with nowhere near the violence or
disruption expected. We are confident that voting itself
will be able to take place, not least because of the arrival
of additional U.S. combat brigades and the growth of the
Afghan army at more than 2500 troops per month. We expect
some violence, however.

Security
--------------


6. (C) Seventy percent of the violence continues to occur in
about 10 percent of the country,s 363 districts, largely
concentrated in the south and some districts in the east.
The Coalition and Afghan security forces have increased the
government,s area of control. In response, the Taliban has
shifted tactics from insurgency to terrorism, to challenge
the will of Afghans and the International Community. These
attacks along with rising criminality, especially
kidnappings, make the average Afghan citizen feel less safe,
and less confident in the government and the ANSF.


7. (SBU) Afghanistan will remain short of security personnel
for the foreseeable future. Presently there are about 80,000
Afghan army, 76,000 Afghan police, and about 37,000
international military personnel to maintain security. The
army is growing at more than 2500 per month and should reach
134,000 in 2011. The international forces are expected to
top 50,000 in 2010. We are working with Minister of Interior
Atmar to accelerate reform and training of the police,
develop more intelligence-based policing, take action against
corruption, and create vetted, specialized police units.


8. (SBU) We and the U.S. military are supporting President
Karzai's Afghan Public Protection Program initiative to
energize renewed community responsibility for security.
District councils and local shuras will nominate local
patrolmen, vetted by MOI, MOD and NDS to serve in a tribally
integrated, MOI-controlled government force as part of the
ANSF. This salaried force will coordinate closely with
ANA/ANP/coalition forces and receive training for its mission
by MOD forces with MOI mentors. The APPF will be a
community-based security force, not &tribal8 or
&militia,8 that will bind community control to local
representatives of different ministries of the central
government.

Governance
--------------


9. (SBU) Karzai struggles to find the balance between
institutional and traditional, informal governance, in an
environment of poverty, social exhaustion, illicit power
centers arising from decades of political breakdown,
governmental incapacity, criminality, and insurgency.
Electoral dynamics are further complicating the problem,
leading Karzai to make expedient decisions on one hand, but
also to appoint top-flight leaders like Atmar to deliver
police services on the other. There are no easy answers, and
neither Karzai nor the international community can fight all
battles all the time. But we can do better.


10. (SBU) In Kabul, the focus is on capacity building,
creation of a merit-based, professional bureaucracy, and
delivery of services to the public. Strong ministries
include Foreign Affairs, Defense, Public Health, Education,
Finance, Communications, Rural Development, and
Counter-Narcotics. The Central Bank is well-led. Interior
and Agriculture have new, better leadership. We work closely
with those entities. We also work effectively with the other
ministries, but mixed agendas or a legacy of weakness slow
progress. For instance, the Supreme Court and the Ministry
of Justice suffer from the acute lack of qualified
professionals, a history of law enforcement that combines
elements of Sharia, tribal, and now normative law, and a lack
of national consensus on the way forward.


11. (SBU) Outside Kabul, U.S. civilian and military efforts
are aimed at strengthening local government at all levels.
The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) is an
important partner in strengthening links between
institutional and traditional governance structures. We work
equally with traditional leadership structures, as well as
those who gained power through force or wealth during the
days of conflict, but have proven themselves ready to
cooperate with constitutional government and rule of law.
Lack of local consensus, traditionally weak connections
between the capital and localities, long-standing rivalries
and distrust among communities, and the presence of
illegitimate insurgent or criminal spoilers complicate the
task. The goal is responsive, reliable leadership in local
communities, which binds them to the capital in a reciprocal
way.

Economy
--------------


12. (SBU) After real economic growth of 11 percent in
2007-08, growth has declined sharply and is forecast to reach
only 2-3 percent in the 2008-09 fiscal year ending in March,
the result of sharply lower agricultural output caused by a
severe drought last winter. Meanwhile the government is
struggling to meet the fiscal performance targets under its
three-year IMF program approved in June 2006. Total
government revenues are expected to fall below 7 percent of
GDP this year, one of the lowest rates in the world.
Progress in revenue generation is critical if Afghanistan is
to reduce dependence on foreign assistance over time. Delay
in completing the IMF program could delay implementation of
debt reduction promised by Russia and other creditors.
Afghanistan,s development indicators are among the lowest in
the world. Foreign aid has fueled economic growth since

2002. Sustaining growth and boosting revenues will require
market reforms and stronger efforts to fight corruption. One
bright spot is a new, reformist Commerce Minister who aims to
improve the climate for private sector development.

Taliban reconciliation
--------------


13. (SBU) Reconciliation with Taliban or other insurgent
leaders is controversial here. Many welcome the possibility
of reduced violence and instability via a possible
reconciliation with the Taliban, while others (mainly
non-Pashtuns, women, and certain civil society groups) fear a
Pashtun deal that could come at the expense of their
interests. So far, all reconciliation efforts have been
premised on respect for the constitution, which has allowed
us to support these initiatives. Although the recent Saudi
attempt to begin talks about talks generated much interest,
there has been little concrete progress in that or any other
initiative.

Narcotics: Positive Trends, Challenge in the South

-------------- --------------


14. (SBU) Poppy cultivation dropped by 19 percent in 2008,
the first reduction since 2005. The UNODC predicts another
double digit decline in cultivation in 2009. Just as
notable, the number of poppy-free provinces grew from 13 to
18 (of 34) in 2008, and is expected to rise again this year.
More importantly, the Afghan government, UN and ISAF all now
recognize the clear and direct links between the insurgency
and the narcotics trade. Where governance and security
improve, poppy cultivation declines, and vice versa. Poppy
cultivation has died away in the north and east of the
country, including in traditionally big poppy cultivating
provinces of Badakhshan, Balkh, and Nangarhar. In Nangarhar,
Governor Sherzai is using aggressive law enforcement and
public information campaigns to suppress poppy cultivation
for the second year in a row. Outside the unstable south,
more than half the farmers interviewed by UNODC cite pressure
from government authorities as the prime factor in convincing
them to shift to licit activities. Meanwhile, NATO has
mandated an expanded role for ISAF in interdiction efforts
against narcotics labs and traffickers.


15. (SBU) The narcotics challenge continues in the south,
where seven provinces now account for 98 percent of the
country's opium, and trafficking is tied to the insurgency.
Agricultural assistance programs alone are not sufficient to
reduce cultivation in these areas; over 65 percent of
villages in the south are receiving agricultural support this
year also reportedly plan to grow opium poppy. In Helmand,
Governor Mangal (with US, UK and ISAF support) is leading an
aggressive campaign to expand governance and eliminate
narcotics cultivation in a 100-square mile area of Helmand.
The Mangal Plan consists of an intensive public information
campaign, combined with agricultural assistance and Afghan
army-protected eradication in key areas. This effort, if
successful, should serve as a model for comprehensive
governance/counternarcotics strategies in other parts of the
country.

International Community and Afghanistan
--------------


16. (C) Relations between the government and the
international community are uneven. International support is
holding, as demonstrated by the promise of increased
deployments at the April NATO Summit in Budapest, increased
contributions at the June Donors' Conference in Paris, and
support for a larger Afghan army at the September JCMB
meeting in Kabul. There is a real improvement in bilateral
relations with the Zardari government of Pakistan, although
there is some doubt in the Afghan mind that Zardari can get
control of all elements of the military and intelligence
apparatus there. The UN presence is weak and SRSG Kai Eide
has not yet been able to play the key coordination role hoped
for, not least because of insufficient budgetary and
personnel commitment from New York.


17. (S) There are often disagreements between the
internationals and the Afghan Government regarding issues of
corruption, governance, rule of law, freedom of the press,
and other areas. Internationals bridle, for example, when
Karzai attributes the bulk of corruption in Afghanistan to
international aid donations. The most important gap between
the government and the coalition is over the issue of
civilian casualties: both sides agree it is a problem that
needs to be fixed, but there is not yet agreement on the
balance between necessary security operations and necessary
protections for civilians. General McKiernan, aiming to
minimize civilian casualties, has directed substantial
changes to coalition tactics, techniques and procedures.
Privately, we are offering Karzai real changes in our
operations that will vastly improve coordination and Afghan
ability to shape our operations, but Karzai is seemingly
fixated on negotiating a very public Military Technical
Agreement in which we would by necessity be less forthcoming.


WOOD