POST-ELECTION COMPACT: KARZAI TEAM CONSULTATIONS

S E C R E T KABUL 002422


E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: POST-ELECTION COMPACT: KARZAI TEAM CONSULTATIONS

Classified By: Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary: In final pre-election consultations,
President Karzai and his security team agreed to the general
concept of the strategic dialogue and a post-election
"compact" but had few new ideas to contribute in light of
their intense focus on elections. Karzai in particular was
engaged in what he terms an "enjoyable" and "useful" dialogue
that provides a framework instead of the usual one-by-one
raising of issues. End Summary.

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Karzai: Talks Give Perspective
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2. (S) In a private meeting with President Karzai on August
12, I reviewed the strategic dialogue that had begun a month
before regarding post-election areas of priority cooperation
between the new Afghan administration and the international
community. We discussed the five areas of cooperation
(sovereignty, reintegration/amnesty, governance/corruption,
economic development and regional relations) and then pointed
out the inter-relationship among these areas. For example, I
said that progress in maintaining peaceful relations with
Afghanistan's neighbors, and in reintegrating Taliban
insurgents, could have an important impact on the size of the
army that Afghanistan needs; Karzai emphatically agreed.


3. (S) Karzai responded that he enjoys the discussions that
show "deeper" thinking and finds them useful. He asked
whether the U.S. wanted Afghanistan to rengotiate the Durand
Line, as an example of a broader strategic goal. I responded
that we thought Afghanistan and Pakistan should look at the
example of Europe, where the emphasis is on cooperation, not
borders. In response to another question from Karzai, I said
that the U.S. is not looking for permanent bases in
Afghanistan, but rather access as needed.


4. (S) Returning to the issue of sovereignty, Karzai asked if
there could be explicit timeframes or agreement on issues
such as detainees. On reintegration he said that he
appreciated that the U.S. supports an Afghan-led process but
said he would need international support for a mechanism. He
asked who I thought should lead such an effort and I
mentioned Stanekzai as a respected figure.


5. (S) We also touched on the clear inter-relationship
between corruption and economic development. I said that we
consider this almost a "business proposition": is money
being well spent? And if a ministry is not led by a
competent minister, the international community will not put
money into it. No investment without competency - I pointed
to the difference between a competent minister (Rahimi, in
Agriculture) and the opposite (Khan, in Water and Energy) and
Karzai agreed. The time for patience is over, I said - you
have many impressive ministers and we should not settle for
less. Karzai agreed to consult with us on key ministries in
the future.


6. (S) I followed up by mentioning that governors are also
very important to us, and that he had many better
appointments but many were still bad. Karzai ruefully
agreed, noting however that sometimes we had pushed governors
who turned out to be disappointments although most of our
recommendations were good. "I made some good choices and
some very bad ones" he said, stating that he could consider
giving the international community a mechanism, possibly
through Independent Directorate for Local Governance director
Popal, to be "reassured" on his choices.


7. (S) We discussed how corruption is perceived in the United
States, and I said that he had made this perception even more
entrenched through actions such as pardoning convicted drug
traffickers. Karzai replied that this was "very important"
to discuss and that he appreciated hearing our concerns at
this strategic level. I said that if we saw a commitment to
progress on these issues we were open to the idea of an
international conference, in Kabul.

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The Security Team: Preoccupied but Still Strategizing
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8. (S) In a meeting that evening with Minister of Defense
Wardak, Minister of the Interior Atmar, and NDS Director
Saleh, I reviewed our strategic framework with an emphasis on
sovereignty, reintegration/amnesty, and regional relations.
I mentioned that we were viewing U.S. participation in
security operations here in an atmosphere of wanting our
leading role to end soon, rather than a continuation of "our"
war on terror conducted in Afghanistan territory. I laid out
the inter-relationships of our five areas of cooperation,
including the issue of the size of the army (in view of
regional relations); the issue of reintegration as it might
be affected by Afghans controling detentions; and the issue
of how a precondition to successful reintegration would be a
cooperative relationship with Pakistan.


9. (S) MOI Atmar stated that the most urgent issue at hand
for him was election security and he was having trouble
looking beyond the next few days - but that in that regard,
any help we could give with Pakistan and border security
would be appreciated. If there is no improvement in security
and voters in the South and East cannot access the polls,
then the Taliban may have an easier time recruiting in that
areas with the message that the government is "imposed" and
not legitimate. NDS Director Saleh noted that his Pakistani
counterpart will not speak to him, and Wardak said that
General Kiyani is visiting August 17.


10. Atmar approved of the idea of a compact and wanted it to
be based on the Obama strategy; the Paris Declaration; and
the Afghanistan Compact -- because the framework is important
but so are the programs which give it life, he said. On
sovereignty (detention, Afghan lead in combat) he said that
he welcomed this and pointed out that the Afghan National
Police are already in the lead, and paying the price in lives
lost without air support or adequate weapons. He asked only
that the pace of police training be accelerated. I reminded
the group that while the United States can train and equip
security forces, we cannot provide its ethos - its
leadership, recruiting and retention. Minister Wardak
replied that he agreed.


11. (S) NDS Director Saleh said that his concern was that
Afghanistan might be weakened by the elections, gaining some
legitimacy but losing because there has been so much scrutiny
of the government's failings. He cautioned that Karzai must
honor his political commitments if he wins, which could mean
unqualified ministers and governors. Furthermore, Karzai is
determined to promote peace through a "Loya Jirga" after the
elections, which would potentially become a platform for
reintegration -- but could also fail. If Karzai wins through
a good turnout, the possibility of a peace deal is greater
because he will have more Pashtun legitimacy, Saleh said. If
it is in a second round, with a "cabinet of rivals" his hand
will be weaker.


12. (S) I noted in response that whoever wins will be judged
by how they handle such difficulties, and if they pick a
qualified cabinet. There is no time to repeat past mistakes,
I noted. Saleh agreed but went on to emphasize the need to
launch a strategic offensive against Taliban nerve centers,
making them irrelevant by pushing them to less viable
geographic locations. Saleh said that attacks would lower
turnout which in turn could undermine legitimacy. "Everyone
is preparing for an angry reaction" he noted realistically.


13. (S) On a final note, Wardak said that we could help
relieve the political pressure on the president if he is
reelected by weighing in to get the right ministers chosen.
He also said that "foreign hands" might be part of
post-election disturbances - and that UNAMA had not done
enough to dispel fears of fraud. On taking over Afghan
security with the ANA, he said that at the current rate of
training this could happen only in 2013, but he would like it
to be sooner. All the ministers asked that the U.S. commit
to an "enduring strategic partnership" with Afghanistan,
because "we know what will occur if we are left alone with
our neighbors."
EIKENBERRY