POST-ELECTION COMPACT: UNAMA'S ENGAGEMENT SUPPORTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002416

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: POST-ELECTION COMPACT: UNAMA'S ENGAGEMENT SUPPORTS
U.S. GOALS

Classified By: Polcouns Annie Pforzheimer, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: SRSG Kai Eide's presentation at the UNAMA
meeting on post-election engagement by the International
Community with the Government of Afghanistan showed
considerable fidelity to the U.S.-launched Post Election
Compact consultative process. Eide noted that the
international community should make its expectations of a new
Afghan government clear, but must inspire, rather than impose
on, the Afghans. Ambassadors assembled at the meeting were
in general agreement. End summary.


2. (C) Speaking at the August 17 weekly UNAMA meeting, Eide
noted to assembled Ambassadors that engagement with a new
Afghan government must happen quickly after inauguration. The
international community must use its time well to make its
expectations clear, he said, and to communicate a joint
strategy with new vision and new programs for the short and
long terms to highlight basic issues for the new government.
The SRSG stressed that this must not/not be seen as imposing
on, but rather as inspiring, the new Afghan Government.


3. (C) Eide set forth five -- extremely familiar -- clusters
of issues, reflecting the considerable communication he has
had with the Embassy on our consultative process to date:

-- Sovereignty: He recalled the earlier rubric of
Afghanization. This new focus would require the international
community do things, and the new Afghan authorities to assume
responsibilities as a sovereign state;

-- Peace and Reintegration: This is the old "reconciliation",
a plan for how to move forward must be developed. All 41
presidential candidates spoke about reconciliation, which may
please the "other side," Eide said, but Afghans should also
praise the Afghan National Army. A need exists to rebalance
the rhetoric so the new government is not seen as desperately
running toward a reconciliation process. The vital need is to
project strength;

-- Institution Building: Eide emphasized that we should spell
out requirements for governance in a way that shows strategy,
not just "bits and pieces," for both the Afghan and our own
publics. We should also address rule of law, accountability,
and corruption to form a national consensus on broader
political arrangements;

-- Economic Development: The need is to project the
impression that a strategy exists here, too; and

-- Afghanistan's Future Status in the Region: In the longer
term, Afghanistan must have a status that inspires confidence
in it within the region.


4. (C) After setting forth these clusters, Eide noted that
inevitably countries, both around his table and outside, will
want to host a conference. He argued for the need to hold
off and leave that question to the next Afghan President so
that he might have the option of a Conference in Kabul.
Nothing, the SRSG argued, would better project the message of
engagement than to have a conference in the Afghan capital,
though he acknowledged the difficulty of hosting 120
countries here. As for timing, in looking at the combination
of the electoral calendar and the Afghan weather, he
suggested some time in the First Quarter of the New Year that
would give the Afghan new government time to prepare.


5. (C) Comments began with the Russian Ambassador who
supported Kai Eide's points, singling out the first and
second clusters. He asked about a national consensus and how
the Taliban fit into that. Kai Eide clarified that the need
is for an Afghan national consensus to be able to have talks
with the Taliban and not to just see ethnic groups talking
within themselves, Pashtun to Pashtun, for example. The
Australian Ambassador expressed the hope to build on what has
been done rather than start from scratch; Eide concurred.
The Japanese Ambassador wondered if such a conference would
be another donor meeting. Kai Eide replied that it would not
be a donor meeting, but rather politically focused. The
Indian Ambassador noted the need to reiterate international
community support to Afghanistan. He also saw a need to make
a distinction between such a conference and those in Paris
and London. He agreed that the best part of Kai Eide's point
is that no country would take initiatives but rather all
would get together in Kabul.


6. (C) Ambassador Eikenberry emphasized that the compact
under discussion was best one between the next Afghan
president and his people. The international conference would
be convened to add legitimacy to and support for the Afghan's
own compact. He also noted that there are close linkages to
the clusters. For example, discussions with the Afghans on

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national security that focus only on sovereignty (eg,
building capable ANA and ANP) mean little without parallel
dialogues on Afghanistan regional role and peace talks with
the Taliban. The clusters that SRSG highlighted can be framed
in terms of mutual obligations and responsibilities, in ways
that are politically appealing to Afghan citizens (eg, "the
return of full sovereignty").


7. (C) Among the group there was general agreement on
accepting Eide's proposed way ahead, with an understanding
that conversations among the participants would resume after
the August 20 elections.














































EIKENBERRY