Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL2347
2009-08-13 15:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:
AFGHAN MINISTERS DISCUSS COUNTER-NARCOTICS WITH
VZCZCXRO1764 PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL DE RUEHBUL #2347/01 2251555 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 131555Z AUG 09 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0810 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 2095
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002347
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SRAP, INL/FO, INL/AP, PASS TO ONDCP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2019
TAGS: SNAR KCRM PREL AF
SUBJECT: AFGHAN MINISTERS DISCUSS COUNTER-NARCOTICS WITH
DASD WECHSLER
Classified By: Deputy Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone,
reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002347
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SRAP, INL/FO, INL/AP, PASS TO ONDCP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2019
TAGS: SNAR KCRM PREL AF
SUBJECT: AFGHAN MINISTERS DISCUSS COUNTER-NARCOTICS WITH
DASD WECHSLER
Classified By: Deputy Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone,
reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counternarcotics and Global Threats William Wechsler
traveled to Afghanistan 28-30 July to meet with U.S., Afghan,
and international officials to assess the counter-narcotics
(CN) situation in Afghanistan. Meetings with the Afghan
Ministers of Counter Narcotics (CN),Defense, and Interior
focused on interdiction and the coordination of
counternarcotics efforts. Two of the three disagreed with
U.S. policy to cease supporting poppy eradication. All three
ministers agreed that Afghan and international coordination
of civilian efforts to "hold, transfer and build" should be
improved in the wake of successful military operations
against insurgents. END SUMMARY.
Khodaidad: CN Efforts Need Better Coordination
-------------- --
2. (SBU) Minister for Counter Narcotics Khodaidad started the
conversation on a positive note, pointing out that the
upcoming release of the UNODC's 2009 Afghan Poppy Survey
could lead to as many as 21 Afghan provinces being declared
poppy-free in 2009, three more than in 2008. Khodaidad
acknowledged the shift in the USG's CN strategy away from
eradication, but argued that eradication remains a necessary
threat to poppy cultivators' decision-making cycle and should
continue. He agreed with DASD Wechsler that it is important,
however, to ensure that eradication targets traffickers and
large landowners, not poor farmers.
3. (SBU) On arresting high-value narcotics traffickers and
high-ranking corrupt government officials, the Minister
stated he is certain the International Community has enough
evidence to help the Afghan justice system bring credible
cases against them, but has not been as forthcoming in
presenting this evidence as it could be, probably for
political reasons. He recommended that, after the elections
the international community should press the new Government
of Afghanistan to arrest high profile suspects and bring them
to justice in order to demonstrate seriousness regarding the
CN effort. According to the Minister, interdiction efforts
are not as effective as they should be, because the
relatively low number of arrests and seizures to date has not
made much of an impact, given the huge scale of the narcotics
problem. He acknowledged the arrests of several high value
traffickers during the past year, but stated that much more
needs to be done before traffickers start taking the threat
seriously.
4. (SBU) DASD Wechsler and the Minister then discussed
coordinating CN efforts between various Afghan Ministries,
with the Minister expressing frustration that this is not
done more effectively. DASD Wechsler raised Colombia's
integrated Centro de Coordinacion de Accion Integral (CCAI)
approach, noting that it had proved to be an effective
mechanism for intra-ministry coordination in fighting
narcotics in Colombia. Khodaidad was familiar with the
program and agreed that it could provide some useful lessons
for Afghanistan.
Atmar: CN Shift Welcome, But Also Need Eradication
-------------- ---
5. (C) Minister of Interior Mohammad Hanif Atmar began by
welcoming the U.S. CN policy shift, announced recently by
Senior Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP)
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, to place greater emphasis on
interdiction and agricultural support. Atmar agreed that
more agricultural development was critical for long term
success in moving Afghanistan away from an illicit
agricultural economy. However, he did not agree with SRAP's
assessment that eradication efforts had failed and should be
eliminated from the CN strategy. According to Atmar, Afghan
eradication efforts have made slow but steady progress and
overall CN law enforcement efforts have been positive. DASD
Wechsler reinforced the policy as announced by SRAP, noting
that while Afghans could still conduct some eradication if
they found it necessary, the U.S. was de-emphasizing
KABUL 00002347 002 OF 003
eradication and would place much more emphasis on
interdiction and agricultural support.
6. (C) The Minister expressed dissatisfaction with President
Karzai's recent decision to release from prison five
convicted narcotics traffickers. DASD Wechsler stressed how
damaging such actions are to the CN effort, to the
development of the rule of law, and to international
support. Atmar argued that the release of the five
traffickers was related to the reconciliation effort and not
to the elections. He stated that the Afghan government would
not let such releases happen again and said that several
high-ranking GOA officials will resign if it does.
7. (SBU) DASD Wechsler and the Minister discussed the need
for an integrated campaign plan to coordinate CN efforts.
Atmar argued that the international community should empower
the Afghans to take control of the broader national
development process and cited the National Solidarity Program
as a successful Afghan-led process. Unlike the Minister for
Counternarcotics, the Minister was not familiar with
Colombia's CCAI and asked for more information on Colombia's
integrated interagency approach.
8. (C) On interdiction, Atmar stated that the Ministry of
Interior lacks the ability to conduct Intelligence Led
Policing. He said that CSTC-A's focus on developing
mainstream police and DEA's focus on specialized units have
left a gap in police intelligence capabilities. The Minister
proposed better law enforcement intelligence gathering and
analysis as key to improving interdiction efforts, and
requested additional resources to build such a capability.
(Note: The Embassy is working with Atmar's office to help
create the intelligence cell that Atmar described, and to
provide U.S. expert support.)
Daud: Counter Narcotics Police Need Help
--------------
9. (SBU) Deputy Minister of Interior for Counter Narcotics
Daud echoed Atmar's call for developing police intelligence
capabilities and in particular those of the Counter Narcotics
Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). He noted that the recent U.S.
interagency assessment of CNPA had accurately described many
deficiencies in the organization, and suggested that the U.S.
and the Afghan government develop jointly a plan for CNPA to
ensure unity of effort and efficient use of resources. He
advocated a regional approach in developing CNPA provincial
capabilities, and requested U.S. assistance for encouraging
regional cooperation. He stated that CNPA requires the
capability to work with its counterparts in neighboring
countries in order to better coordinate investigations
international traffickers and illicit finance. DASD Wechsler
agreed that developing the capabilities of the CNPA would be
a high priority for the USG in the coming year.
Wardak: MOD Forces Not Ready for CN Role
--------------
10. (SBU) Minister of Defense Abdul Rahim Wardak opened by
discussing the Ministry of Defense (MOD)'s role in the CN
effort. He said he had initially been reluctant to support
CN efforts and the establishment of the Counter Narcotics
Infantry Kandak (CNIK) in 2008. Wardak said recent Poppy
Eradication Force (PEF) and CNIK efforts in Helmand suffered
from command and control issues and poor joint planning. He
acknowledged that CNIK was not equipped or trained to execute
the job for which it was deployed. In regard to CNIK's
future, Wardak said that for MOD to support the interdiction
effort it will require a well-trained, well-equipped and
mobile army unit.
11. (SBU) Wardak stated that improving interdiction efforts
will depend on getting more reliable intelligence. He did
not believe that the international community and GOA had
developed adequate procedures to share and fuse CN
intelligence. As a consequence, Wardak said, most
interdiction operations are conducted ad hoc rather than as
parts of an integrated plan.
KABUL 00002347 003 OF 003
12. (SBU) Wardak complained that Afghan government CN
strategy was non-comprehensive, disjointed, and too focused
on eradication. He recalled the 2008 operation in Musa Qala
where the Afghan Army was able to clear the area but
civilian government agencies were not immediately able to
hold the terrain or deliver aid to the residents. He urged
improved coordination and creation of a comprehensive
campaign. DASD Wechsler again highlighted Colombia's
integrated Centro de Coordinacion de Accion Integral (CCAI)
as a possible coordination model. Wardak reflected on a
recent visit by his generals to Colombia and was interested
in learning more about the civilian side of Colombia's
approach.
13. (SBU) This cable has been reviewQd by DASD Wechsler.
EIKENBERRY
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SRAP, INL/FO, INL/AP, PASS TO ONDCP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2019
TAGS: SNAR KCRM PREL AF
SUBJECT: AFGHAN MINISTERS DISCUSS COUNTER-NARCOTICS WITH
DASD WECHSLER
Classified By: Deputy Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone,
reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counternarcotics and Global Threats William Wechsler
traveled to Afghanistan 28-30 July to meet with U.S., Afghan,
and international officials to assess the counter-narcotics
(CN) situation in Afghanistan. Meetings with the Afghan
Ministers of Counter Narcotics (CN),Defense, and Interior
focused on interdiction and the coordination of
counternarcotics efforts. Two of the three disagreed with
U.S. policy to cease supporting poppy eradication. All three
ministers agreed that Afghan and international coordination
of civilian efforts to "hold, transfer and build" should be
improved in the wake of successful military operations
against insurgents. END SUMMARY.
Khodaidad: CN Efforts Need Better Coordination
-------------- --
2. (SBU) Minister for Counter Narcotics Khodaidad started the
conversation on a positive note, pointing out that the
upcoming release of the UNODC's 2009 Afghan Poppy Survey
could lead to as many as 21 Afghan provinces being declared
poppy-free in 2009, three more than in 2008. Khodaidad
acknowledged the shift in the USG's CN strategy away from
eradication, but argued that eradication remains a necessary
threat to poppy cultivators' decision-making cycle and should
continue. He agreed with DASD Wechsler that it is important,
however, to ensure that eradication targets traffickers and
large landowners, not poor farmers.
3. (SBU) On arresting high-value narcotics traffickers and
high-ranking corrupt government officials, the Minister
stated he is certain the International Community has enough
evidence to help the Afghan justice system bring credible
cases against them, but has not been as forthcoming in
presenting this evidence as it could be, probably for
political reasons. He recommended that, after the elections
the international community should press the new Government
of Afghanistan to arrest high profile suspects and bring them
to justice in order to demonstrate seriousness regarding the
CN effort. According to the Minister, interdiction efforts
are not as effective as they should be, because the
relatively low number of arrests and seizures to date has not
made much of an impact, given the huge scale of the narcotics
problem. He acknowledged the arrests of several high value
traffickers during the past year, but stated that much more
needs to be done before traffickers start taking the threat
seriously.
4. (SBU) DASD Wechsler and the Minister then discussed
coordinating CN efforts between various Afghan Ministries,
with the Minister expressing frustration that this is not
done more effectively. DASD Wechsler raised Colombia's
integrated Centro de Coordinacion de Accion Integral (CCAI)
approach, noting that it had proved to be an effective
mechanism for intra-ministry coordination in fighting
narcotics in Colombia. Khodaidad was familiar with the
program and agreed that it could provide some useful lessons
for Afghanistan.
Atmar: CN Shift Welcome, But Also Need Eradication
-------------- ---
5. (C) Minister of Interior Mohammad Hanif Atmar began by
welcoming the U.S. CN policy shift, announced recently by
Senior Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP)
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, to place greater emphasis on
interdiction and agricultural support. Atmar agreed that
more agricultural development was critical for long term
success in moving Afghanistan away from an illicit
agricultural economy. However, he did not agree with SRAP's
assessment that eradication efforts had failed and should be
eliminated from the CN strategy. According to Atmar, Afghan
eradication efforts have made slow but steady progress and
overall CN law enforcement efforts have been positive. DASD
Wechsler reinforced the policy as announced by SRAP, noting
that while Afghans could still conduct some eradication if
they found it necessary, the U.S. was de-emphasizing
KABUL 00002347 002 OF 003
eradication and would place much more emphasis on
interdiction and agricultural support.
6. (C) The Minister expressed dissatisfaction with President
Karzai's recent decision to release from prison five
convicted narcotics traffickers. DASD Wechsler stressed how
damaging such actions are to the CN effort, to the
development of the rule of law, and to international
support. Atmar argued that the release of the five
traffickers was related to the reconciliation effort and not
to the elections. He stated that the Afghan government would
not let such releases happen again and said that several
high-ranking GOA officials will resign if it does.
7. (SBU) DASD Wechsler and the Minister discussed the need
for an integrated campaign plan to coordinate CN efforts.
Atmar argued that the international community should empower
the Afghans to take control of the broader national
development process and cited the National Solidarity Program
as a successful Afghan-led process. Unlike the Minister for
Counternarcotics, the Minister was not familiar with
Colombia's CCAI and asked for more information on Colombia's
integrated interagency approach.
8. (C) On interdiction, Atmar stated that the Ministry of
Interior lacks the ability to conduct Intelligence Led
Policing. He said that CSTC-A's focus on developing
mainstream police and DEA's focus on specialized units have
left a gap in police intelligence capabilities. The Minister
proposed better law enforcement intelligence gathering and
analysis as key to improving interdiction efforts, and
requested additional resources to build such a capability.
(Note: The Embassy is working with Atmar's office to help
create the intelligence cell that Atmar described, and to
provide U.S. expert support.)
Daud: Counter Narcotics Police Need Help
--------------
9. (SBU) Deputy Minister of Interior for Counter Narcotics
Daud echoed Atmar's call for developing police intelligence
capabilities and in particular those of the Counter Narcotics
Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). He noted that the recent U.S.
interagency assessment of CNPA had accurately described many
deficiencies in the organization, and suggested that the U.S.
and the Afghan government develop jointly a plan for CNPA to
ensure unity of effort and efficient use of resources. He
advocated a regional approach in developing CNPA provincial
capabilities, and requested U.S. assistance for encouraging
regional cooperation. He stated that CNPA requires the
capability to work with its counterparts in neighboring
countries in order to better coordinate investigations
international traffickers and illicit finance. DASD Wechsler
agreed that developing the capabilities of the CNPA would be
a high priority for the USG in the coming year.
Wardak: MOD Forces Not Ready for CN Role
--------------
10. (SBU) Minister of Defense Abdul Rahim Wardak opened by
discussing the Ministry of Defense (MOD)'s role in the CN
effort. He said he had initially been reluctant to support
CN efforts and the establishment of the Counter Narcotics
Infantry Kandak (CNIK) in 2008. Wardak said recent Poppy
Eradication Force (PEF) and CNIK efforts in Helmand suffered
from command and control issues and poor joint planning. He
acknowledged that CNIK was not equipped or trained to execute
the job for which it was deployed. In regard to CNIK's
future, Wardak said that for MOD to support the interdiction
effort it will require a well-trained, well-equipped and
mobile army unit.
11. (SBU) Wardak stated that improving interdiction efforts
will depend on getting more reliable intelligence. He did
not believe that the international community and GOA had
developed adequate procedures to share and fuse CN
intelligence. As a consequence, Wardak said, most
interdiction operations are conducted ad hoc rather than as
parts of an integrated plan.
KABUL 00002347 003 OF 003
12. (SBU) Wardak complained that Afghan government CN
strategy was non-comprehensive, disjointed, and too focused
on eradication. He recalled the 2008 operation in Musa Qala
where the Afghan Army was able to clear the area but
civilian government agencies were not immediately able to
hold the terrain or deliver aid to the residents. He urged
improved coordination and creation of a comprehensive
campaign. DASD Wechsler again highlighted Colombia's
integrated Centro de Coordinacion de Accion Integral (CCAI)
as a possible coordination model. Wardak reflected on a
recent visit by his generals to Colombia and was interested
in learning more about the civilian side of Colombia's
approach.
13. (SBU) This cable has been reviewQd by DASD Wechsler.
EIKENBERRY