CANADA,S REVISED COIN STRATEGY IN KANDAHAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002335

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2019
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PREL AF CA
SUBJECT: CANADA,S REVISED COIN STRATEGY IN KANDAHAR

REF: KABUL 2292

Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y
ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Begin Summary. Representative of Canada in Kandahar
Ken Lewis outlined Canada's revised COIN strategy for
Kandahar, which is designed to bring greater focus of effort
in a smaller, more targeted geographic area. This "Key
Village Approaches" strategy has captured the attention of
COMISAF and the new NATO Secretary General as a potential
model for stabilization efforts in Kandahar and beyond. The
positive attention from NATO and ISAF leadership has helped
the Canadian leadership in Kandahar sell this approach in
Ottawa. As a result, Lewis noted that Ottawa had overcome
its reluctance to support the operations and that Canada
would launch between 12 and 20 stabilization efforts in key
villages between now and March. While the new strategy is a
welcome development, it will be undermined if overall
governance, development and security in Kandahar City are not
improved. State and USAID PRT officers are working with the
Canadians to complement this updated approach, possibly
through increased development work in Kandahar City. End
Summary.

Canada Announces New COIN Strategy
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2. (C) In a meeting with Kandahar PRT (KPRT) DFAIT, CIDA, and
USG Civilian staff on August 8, Representative of Canada in
Kandahar (RoCK) Ken Lewis announced that, effective
immediately, the Government of Canada (GoC) has officially
abandoned the operations order under which it has been
operating in Kandahar ("OP KANTOLO") in favor of a new COIN
strategy to be implemented in a new Area of Operation (AO).
The new strategy is centered on the "Key Village Approaches"
(KVA) -- village-level stabilization operations that will be
referred to as "OP KALAYs." The operations will be more
geographically focused in a new AO that is limited to
Kandahar City (KC),Dand District, and the eastern parts of
Zhari and Panjwayi Districts. (Note: Dand is not an
official district, but the GIRoA treats it as a district in
all respects. It comprises the southern suburbs of KC and
borders Daman District to the south and east and Panjwayi
district to the south and west.)


3. (C) OP KALAY 1, which began approximately 90 days ago in
the Deh-e-Bagh village cluster in Dand District (a cluster
that includes the District Center compound),has received
attention from ISAF leadership, including COMISAF, as well as
RC-South leadership. This Canadian model for village-level
stabilization aims within a 90-day cycle to stabilize key
villages on the approaches to KC, which have traditionally
been used by the enemy to infiltrate the city. The cycle
includes a one-week clear phase, with the rest of the 90 days
devoted to intensive reconstruction programs, especially
cash-for-work projects to rehabilitate irrigation
infrastructure, and intensive GIRoA and ISAF engagement with
community and district shuras. After 90 days, the stabilized
communities, in partnership with the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF),are supposed to have developed the motivation
and resolve to defend themselves against anti-government
incursion. Lewis also cited the anticipated 2000-man
increase in ANP numbers in Kandahar, which is a key element
of the planned KALAY operations. Longer-term development
projects led by NGOs are subsequently phased in, with the aim
of helping locals generate income through more productive
agricultural livelihoods.


4. (C) The KVA, as tested thus far by OP KALAY 1, does not
represent a new COIN approach to stabilization, but rather
builds on lessons learned in the UK's Musa Qala operation and
the Netherlands' Deh-Rawood operation in 2008. The Canadian
model has captured the attention of NATO Secretary General
Rasmussen, said RoCK Lewis, who accompanied the SG on his
August 5 visit to the Deh-e-Bagh village in Dand District.
Reportedly the NATO SG endorsed the approach and said that
NATO would adopt the KVA strategy as a keystone of its COIN
doctrine. The NATO SG's endorsement of the GoC's KVA
obviously pleased Lewis, who, with Task Force Kandahar (TFK)
commanding officer BG Jonathon Vance, has pushed hard on
Ottawa for permission to implement OP KALAY 1. State PRT
officer said that Lewis told PRT staff on August 8: "We've
been playing whack-a-mole for years; now we're finally going
to make sustainable progress."

Canadians on the Ground Delighted with New Approach
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5. (C) Lewis emphasized that the drastically reduced Canadian

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AO will allow a much more favorable force ratio for the
Canadian battle group. In an apparent total victory over
Ottawa's reluctance fully to back the KVA, Lewis announced to
KPRT staff that, "Between now and March, we will not just
have OP KALAY 2 and 3 as we'd planned before; we'll have OP
KALAY 2 through 20." He went on to say that the target of 20
operations was BG Vance's idea, and that 12 operations would
be a more realistic expectation.

Fielding Enough Civilians
--------------


6. (C) GoC civilians at the KPRT have worried from the
beginning of OP KALAY 1 about how their agencies would field
enough "stabilization officers" (analogous to USG civilians
at DSTs) to support the future KALAY operations, given that
the original version of the KVA called for a civilian
stabilization officer to be left behind to look after the
build phase following the initial 90 days. Lewis stated that
the KVA specifies only three stabilization officers: one
supervisor at the KPRT, one at Dand District Center, and one
at Panjwayi District Center. This revision of the previous
approach takes into account both the available staffing and
the ever-sensitive issue of potential GoC civilian casualties.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) The GoC leadership in Kandahar believes that Canada
has at last found a successful strategy that will allow them
to demonstrate progress against the insurgency before their
planned withdrawal from the Afghanistan mission in 2011. The
uplift of U.S. military and civilian assets in Kandahar has
allowed the GoC to retool its COIN strategy, and the new KVA
is the result of this effort. The challenge now as these new
KALAY operations are launched will be to make sure that the
stabilized areas remain stable, that sufficient personnel are
assigned to the effort, and that their efforts break out of
the "whack-a-mole" pattern that has plagued Canadian efforts.



8. (C) An additional challenge will be maintaining Canada's
"focus of effort8 on KC. GIRoA and ISAF leaders agree that
the enemy would score a huge IO victory should KC be
seriously threatened. Although the KVA aims to enhance KC's
security by establishing a buffer zone of stabilized,
AGE-resistant villages around the city, the GoC has not made
progress on a comprehensive reconstruction and governance
strategy for KC itself. Lack of clean water, lack of
electricity, increasing overcrowding, and persistent enemy
IED-making activity within the city, threaten to undermine
the basically pro-GIRoA tendency of the KC population. To
address this issue, GoC civilians at KPRT have begun
discussions with State and USAID officers about augmenting
their efforts with U.S. funding and programming for KC.
EIKENBERRY