TRANSFER OF AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE TRAINING CONTRACT

UNCLAS KABUL 002327

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/RAP, INL, INL/AP, SCA, AF
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PINS MARR SOCI PREL PGOV AF
SUBJECT: TRANSFER OF AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE TRAINING CONTRACT
RESPONSIBILITY

THIS IS A JOINT MESSAGE FROM US AMBASSADOR AND COMISAF


1. Summary: Ambassador and COMISAF join in recommending transfer
of the responsibility for implementation of basic Afghan police
training and field mentoring from the Department of State to the
Department of Defense in order better to provide Afghan police the
basic security skills needed in a counter-insurgency environment. To
do so, DOD should generate and manage a new contract for the police
training program when the current DOS contract with DynCorp expires
in January 2010. We further recommend that DOS/INL should continue
to contract for and manage specialized, INCLE-funded programs in
civilian policing, police professionalization, women's police,
family response units, and rule of law.

End Summary.

NEW DIVISION OF LABOR NEEDED
--------------

2. We recommend a shift in the division of labor and responsibility
between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State
DOS)in executing the multi-million dollar training program for the
Afghan National Police (ANP). Despite excellent coordination
between the Embassy and Combined Security Transition Command -
Afghanistan (CSTC-A),the lack of a single, unified chain of command
has sometimes created confusion and unnecessary delays in
implementing the program. We must maximize program effectiveness,
especially as the ANP training program ramps up in coming months.


3. The Embassy's country team and CSTC-A agree that the police
training program contract should be transferred from DOS (Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)) to DOD as
soon as possible while minimizing the disruption of current training
programs. Senior interagency approval will be required. Under the
new arrangement, the Chief of Mission (COM) would continue to
provide police program policy, oversight and broad direction, while
CSTC-A would have overall responsibility for implementing the
policy, including contracting and contract management.


4. Ambassador and COMISAF further recommend that the transfer of
responsibility coincide with the expiration of the current contract
and beginning of a new one in January 2010. Approval of the
transfer now would provide time for limited bidding competition, for
CSTC-A and the Embassy to fill staffing needs, and to reallocate the
several distinct training programs between them. For example, while
CSTC-A would assume contract implementation for all basic police
training, the Embassy's INL office would continue to manage certain
specialized police training programs.

BACKGROUND - DIVISION OF ROLES BETWEEN CSTC-A AND INL
-------------- --------------

5. The Department of State assumed control of the Afghan National
Police (ANP) training program in 2005, after the Germans launched
the program in Kabul in 2003. DynCorp was awarded the first
contract and won the second contract when it was re-competed in the
summer of 2008. The current CSTC-A/Embassy INL relationship began
in FY 2007, when funding for the ANP became part of DOD's budget for
training and equipping the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF --
including the Afghan Army and Police). CSTC-A transferred funding
to INL, which managed the DynCorp contract and maintained the major
training facilities while CSTC-A implemented the other program
elements, including the recruiting, supply/equipping, and
post-training support.


6. Since 2007, ANP training has evolved from its original focus on
civilian policing to a widely expanded training curriculum including
counterinsurgency and tactical skills, which are more similar to
CSTC-A-run training programs for the Afghan National Army (ANA).
Many aspects of this expanded role are more suited to U.S military
management rather than INL's civilian policing experts. At the same
time, Embassy/INL has developed specialized areas of training in
civilian policing such as the Criminal Investigations, Women's
Police Corps and Family Response Units.

NEW DIVISION OF TRAINING ROLES
--------------

7. Specifically, we recommend that CSTC-A assume contractual
responsibility for the primary ANP police training program, which
would cover Regional Training Centers; Basic ANP training; mentoring
within the Ministry of Interior and CSTC-A's Police Mentoring Teams
embedded in ANP units in districts throughout Afghanistan.


8. Under this plan, INL would revert to its traditional police
training role, generating a separate contract to support development

of the full range of civilian police functions, including
higher-level leadership and management, criminal investigation,
professional development, the Women's Police Corps, the Family
Response Units and other training. Separate INCLE funds should be
requested for these programs.


9. The actual timing of generating a new contract under DOD will
depend on a variety of factors, most significant of which is the
speed with which DOD and CSTC-A can award the contract and have the
staff in position to administer it. We recommend transferring the
responsibility for the basic training contract in January 2010, when
the current contract expires. This transfer point offers the best
balance of speed, practical feasibility, and compliance with DOD
contracting rules. In the event that DOD is unable to properly
compete, award and select a follow-on contract by the expiration of
the current contract in January 2010, then the DoS should extend the
current contract for a limited period until a new contract is
awarded.

FACTORS IN DOS AND DOD CONTRACTING POLICIES
--------------

10. Department of State (DOS) Contract Policies: Under USG-wide
directives, both DOS and DOD acquisitions policies preclude the
appointment of other agencies' personnel from holding responsibility
for contract oversight or management in "mixed contract
administration services." This means that it is not legally
allowable for INL to cede operational control of contractors to
CSTC-A as long as INL is responsible for managing the contract. The
contract itself is not transferrable.


11. Department of Defense (DOD) Contract Policies: Current DOD
contracting policy is to avoid entering into large, all-encompassing
contracts like the existing INL contract with DynCorp. DOD needs
time to develop separate Statements of Work (SOWs) for each aspect
of the contract under consideration. DOD contracting policy also
usually requires a time-consuming "full and open competition" for
contracts. However, DOD can shorten the process under exceptional
authority for 'Unusual and Compelling Urgency', subject to a senior
DOD policy decision. Beyond establishing the 'unusual and
compelling urgency' of the Afghan case, such a decision also would
depend upon DOD and CSTC-A having the necessary staffing to manage
the contract.

CONTRACT TRANSFER RECOMMENDATION
--------------

12. The current contract expires in January 2010, with an extension
clause built-in. INL had originally planned to extend the contract
through April 2010, to match it up with INL's over-arching Civilian
Police contract. In light of the new imperative to transfer basic
police training responsibility to CSTC-A, the Embassy and CSTC-A
recommend generating a new contract under DOD when the current
contract expires in January 2010. CSTC-A is currently working
toward this goal. This is the Embassy's and CSTC-A's preferred
option. There are several advantages to this recommendation: It
would allow time for a limited competitive bidding process and for a
smooth transition between the DOS and DOD. On the other hand, it
would not give the CSTC-A commanding general the immediate
operational control he would prefer to have, and CSTC-A may not have
time to break up the contract into smaller elements for separate
contracting, as normal DOD contracting policy stipulates. The
January time frame will also not allow for DOD's normal "full and
open" competitive process. DOD would have to scramble to complete
the acquisition process in time. If DOD failed to meet the January
2010 deadline, there would be pressure to extend the current
contract on a month-to-month basis. Finally, INL may not have time
to obtain INCLE funding for the police training programs not covered
by CSTC-A.

PENDING POLICY AND PROGRAM DECISIONS
--------------

13. Support for the Justice and Corrections Programs: These
Embassy-managed programs are crucial to the developing Rule of Law
system in Afghanistan. There is dedicated space at several RTCs for
both programs and the programs are planning to expand their presence
to the others. Before control of the RTCs is transferred to CSTC-A,
it will be vital to guarantee continued RTC support for these
programs in the provinces.


14. Separation of Training/Mentoring Responsibilities: There are
several programs, such as the Family Response Units, Women's Police
Corps, and Criminal Investigations Training, and police
professionalization courses that should stay within the Embassy's
scope of responsibilities. The exact list will need to be

discussed, funding sources arranged, facilities agreed to, etc. To
improve the existing coordination for all police training programs
between the Embassy and CSTC-A, the Embassy proposes embedding State
Department officer of appropriate rank and experience at CSTC-A,
with authority over the contract.


15. The Embassy currently employs six Police Advisors (PAs) as
personal services contractors. The PAs provide civilian police
expertise, continuity in the program, and considerable day-to-day
program management. The Embassy will need to retain some of PAs,
based on the extent of its role in police training. CSTC-A still
needs to determine if they will absorb the remaining PAs under a
separate contract.


16. Air Wing Support: CSTC-A will need to arrange airlift support
for the program, since it does not have its own resources.
Currently, the INL/NAS Air Wing provides passenger and cargo support
for the police training program. The police program consumes over
80% of the Air Wing's flying hours and is partially reimbursed
through ASFF funds in accordance with the DOS-DOD MOA. CSTC-A's
airlift needs will dramatically increase as ANP training is
expanded. This is a substantial issue that will need to be resolved
well in advance of the prospective program transfer.


17. Asset Turnover: NAS will have to account for the police
program's facilities and equipment and conduct a proper transfer of
these government-purchased items to CSTC-A for use in the follow-on
contract. All of the non-expendable equipment and facilities
constructed at the training centers will eventually be turned over
to the GiROA, but a complete accounting will need to be made for
transfer to CSTC-A. The land use agreements between the U.S.
Embassy and the Government of Afghanistan also will have to be
modified.


18. Action request: We recommend that the Department of State and
Defense:

--(1) Approve the proposed change in the division of police
training roles and responsibilities between the Embassy and CSTC-A;

--(2) Negotiate and implement the needed policy operations, and
contractive decisions; and

--(3) Sign a new Memorandum of Agreement between the DOD and DOS.


EIKENBERRY