Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL2305
2009-08-11 07:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

SKY INTERVIEW SHOWS PARADOXES IN AFGHAN TRIBAL

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL PTER AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #2305/01 2230746
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 110746Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0751
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002305 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PTER AF
SUBJECT: SKY INTERVIEW SHOWS PARADOXES IN AFGHAN TRIBAL
THINKING

Classified By: Political Counselor Ann E. Pforzheimer for reasons 1.4(b
) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002305

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PTER AF
SUBJECT: SKY INTERVIEW SHOWS PARADOXES IN AFGHAN TRIBAL
THINKING

Classified By: Political Counselor Ann E. Pforzheimer for reasons 1.4(b
) and (d)


1. (U) Summary: Prince Ali Seraj of the Afghan royal
family hosted a gathering of tribal elders and religious
scholars on August 1st to share with us information on
various tribe-related issues, the current political
situation, and the recent developments in their home
provinces. We unexpectedly shared the meeting with a SKY
News correspondent. Embassy officers attended the event, but
did not speak, except to ask one or two short questions. End
Summary.

Pre-Meeting with Ali Seraj
--------------


2. (C) Before the gathering of tribal representatives
began, Seraj met with Embassy officers to discuss the current
state of affairs in the country, and the upcoming elections.
Seraj said he believed the International Community (IC) was
not taking the right approach to rebuilding Afghanistan
because it was relying too much on working with the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA),
and not enough on working with "the people". He argued the
IC needed to build a strong foundation for the country by
working directly with the people in the areas of security,
personal freedoms, and basic economic development.
Afghanistan, he said, could not be rebuilt in the image of
the West - the tribes are a key element of Afghanistan, and
must be engaged via the jirga system for rebuilding to
succeed. IC representatives, he alleged, have not been
meeting with the real senior elders - those elders are key
leaders of their people, and will not meet with anyone below
ambassador or minister-level representatives.

Tribesmen Gathering
--------------


3. (U) The tribal members we met represented a wide
cross-section of tribes and ethnic groups, including
Pashmayee, Safi, Nurestani, Turkmen, Babar Khani, Sarayee,
Tajik, Mohmond, Kuchi, Arab, Pashtun, Ali Kheir, and Abdul
Rahimzai. Seraj described the group as being composed of
religious scholars (Ulema),tribal elders, and clerics. SKY
News reporter Alex Crawford posed a series of questions to
the assembly to elicit their thoughts on a wide variety of

topics.


4. (U) On elections, the group said they were very
interested in the election, and that almost all of them
planned to participate and vote. They did not voice fears at
that time over security, and said they were encouraging their
people to participate.

Key Problems Facing Afghanistan
--------------


5. (U) The tribal representatives all agreed, however, that
security was the greatest problem facing the country. When
asked by Crawford, almost all of the representatives said
they wanted Coalition Forces to leave the country. They
believed the departure of NATO/ISAF (including the United
States) would promote peace in the country, and thus
stability. They did not think Afghanistan needed
international support to establish security, and said they
wanted Islam to be the "strongest force" in Afghanistan.
(Note: Though the participants did not say it directly, some
seemed to believe the presence of NATO/ISAF was weakening
Islam in Afghanistan. End Note). They asserted that
security worsened after the arrival of international forces.


6. (U) The representatives believed faulty aid delivery was
another problem. They said the Afghans had not received any
benefit from the billions of dollars spent in the country,
and that donors supported faulty (i.e. corrupt) leaders who
used assistance money earmarked to help the people to enrich
themselves. Those leaders are building their own cities and
secure compounds, while investing in the drug trade, they
alleged.

What Can The President Do?
--------------


7. (U) Crawford asked the representatives what they thought
were the three most important things the Afghan president
could do to establish peace. The most important item, they
said, was to re-establish Afghan sovereignty, as they
believed the IC controlled the government. Second, the
president should order Coalition Forces to leave the country
because their presence was causing the lack of peace. If any
CF were to remain in the country, they should be dedicated to
reconstruction, while security should be the purview of the

KABUL 00002305 002 OF 003


Afghans. Third, they believed much of the money being sent
to the Afghans had disappeared. They wanted the president to
make sure assistance money went directly to the people. When
Crawford asked the representatives if the IC had done any
good at all in Afghanistan, they said they had not seen any.

International Versus Afghan Taliban
--------------


8. (U) While the tribal representatives pressed for the
departure of NATO/ISAF, they also agreed the nation still
needed international troops to suppress the militants and
extremists. They said that if NATO/ISAF would work with and
empower the tribes, the tribes could help establish peace in
the nation. The representatives made a strict distinction
between international militants (al Qaeda) and Afghan
Taliban, whom they described as defenders of their villages.
They argued that al Qaeda operatives were being sent to
Afghanistan by "outsiders," and were being supported by an
international mafia. They alleged that the IC in general,
and the British in particular, was providing al Qaeda with
weapons to continue their fight - particularly the British.
The Taliban, however, are from the people. If the United
States wants to lead the IC's efforts in Afghanistan, it must
come to terms with these facts.


9. (U) Crawford asked the representatives for their
thoughts on the Taliban. Was it a mistake, she asked, to get
rid of the Taliban government? The representatives replied
that the Taliban of eight years ago were Pakistanis sponsored
by the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) agency.
The representatives were happy the foreign Taliban had been
removed, but complained that many Afghan Taliban had been
lost too. The people are tired of fighting. Some of the
representatives said they wanted Seraj appointed leader so
that he could bring peace. They believed he would promote
good governance in the nation, and fight corruption. They
said if the United States wanted continued unrest in the
nation, it should continue to support the corrupt officials
and warlords of the current regime.


10. (U) The representatives claimed that 70% of the Taliban
belonged to the tribal groups these representatives
controlled. They claimed that if they told the Afghan
Taliban to put down their weapons, they would do so. The
Afghan Taliban, they argued, were fighting the corruption of
the warlords now controlling Afghanistan. Were Seraj made
president, he could call the Taliban back to reconcile, they
claimed. When asked by Crawford, the representatives said
they believed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar should also be reconciled
and brought in to GIRoA.

Way Forward
--------------


11. (U) The tribesmen told Crawford the first goal of the
next Afghan president must be to establish peace. The
president must bring the corrupt to justice and establish
larger Ulema Councils to give him advice on how to proceed.
He should also establish a tribal council to advise him on
the people's concerns, and to help him quell the violence.
Finally, they said, only a true Islamic government could
bring peace to the nation. Mullah Omar was fighting the
foreigners because of their presence in an Islamic country.
If the foreigners left, there would be no need to fight.
However, they didn't trust Omar either - they believed the
ISI was using him against the Afghan people.


12. (U) The tribesmen told Crawford that while they did not
seek a resurrection of the Taliban government of 10 years
ago, which was supported by the ISI against the Afghans, they
would welcome a government of Afghan Taliban tomorrow since
it would be truly Islamic. They did not believe a democratic
government that was hostile to Islamic law would be
acceptable to the Muslims. They told Crawford there were
three types of Taliban in Afghanistan: 1) those supported by
the British government; 2) those supported by the Pakistani
government; and 3) those fighting for their villages. Only
the family of Zahir Shah, the former king, could unite the
Afghan people.


13. (U) Seraj spoke up and told Crawford the Afghans would
never make deals to diminish their religion, their
independence, their country or their tribes. The
representatives agreed and said the Afghans did need IC
assistance, but not in the form of weapons. The Afghans need
food, and to be treated with respect. If the IC treated them
as brothers and equals, they said, Afghanistan would never be
a haven for terrorists.


14. (C) In an aside after Crawford's interview, Seraj ended
the meeting by telling EmbOffs that if Abdullah Abdullah and

KABUL 00002305 003 OF 003


Ashraf Ghani continued to incite the people, there could be a
blood-bath after the elections if Karzai won. The USG must
hold them responsible if such a result occurs, and must tell
them it will do so. Abdullah and Ghani must be made to say
they do not want to see unrest after the election, no matter
who wins, Seraj said.


15. (C) Comment: Crawford's questions seemed to be designed
to highlight a negative area in the relationship between
Afghans and the IC. They also served to point out the
paradoxes in the representatives' thinking. As noted above,
the tribesmen were unanimous in their desire for the IC to
leave Afghanistan, especially the Coalition Forces. Almost
in the next breath, however, they desired our help to
suppress the militants, and the IC's help in rebuilding the
nation. They condemned the Karzai government and supported
the appointment of Seraj as leader, though he is not a
candidate and has pledged support to Karzai. The purpose of
this event seemed to be two-fold: to allow the tribesmen to
voice their dissatisfaction to a member of the international
press and to highlight a possible future role for Seraj as
peacemaker. He has often in the past denied his desire to be
president, but has spoken of himself as someone who could act
as go-between for the Afghan tribes and the IC. Such a role
would certainly enhance his prestige, and could be parlayed
to feed his future aspirations. End Comment.
EIKENBERRY