KARZAI THE CANDIDATE GIVES KARZAI THE PRESIDENT A

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002304

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2029
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: KARZAI THE CANDIDATE GIVES KARZAI THE PRESIDENT A
BETTER PERSECTIVE

Classified By: Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary: President Karzai's recent success in
energizing political support appears to have put him in a
better frame of mind about the future, making our most recent
discussion of post-election strategic goals more coherent and
useful. That said, he is still spending more time working on
deals with allies and rivals to get elected, versus imagining
his future compact with the international community and the
Afghan people. End summary.

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Out of the Palace ...
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2. (S) During an hour and a half conversation on August 6,
attended only by Karzai's National Security Advisor Zalmay
Rasul, Karzai appeared more calm, rested and coherent -- and
less paranoid -- than in the past. He has held a few large
rallies in the past week, and evidently this activity has
energized his base and other voters formerly unexcited by his
campaign to date. I told him that his general exhortation to
the electorate to vote helps the process and is much
appreciated by the international community. As he gets the
word out to mobilize voters, he can positively influence the
voters' perception of insecurity.

3.(S) Karzai told me that he questions those who attend his
rallies about Afghanistan's relationship to the United States
and asks if they want the U.S. to stay; they are positive in
their response. He noted that the "problems of several weeks
ago" i.e., friction with the U.S., are improved. (Comment:
He is making an effort to close the gap with the United
States; a problem that was mostly of his own creation. End
Comment.)


4. (S) Karzai has significant political skills and he now
displays fresh confidence in his candidacy. He assessed his
current support as "maybe" over 50 percent, with Abdullah
next and Bashardost third; Ghani he views as a very distant
fourth. He thinks that Ghani is trying to join him and noted
that his currentMinisters are unhappy at the prospect of
having to work with someone as acerbic as Ghani in the
future. He admitted to putting out feelers to the Abdullah
campaign but said, as of August 6, that this effort had been
unsuccessful.

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... And Worried About Wrong Outcomes
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5. (S) Karzai was most interested in my view of the security
and feasibility issues a second round would raise. I said
that it would no doubt be difficult, but that I was confident
security could be provided although at the cost of some of
the anti-Taliban campaign efforts underway; what would be
harder to deliver might be suficient Independent Electoral
Commission (IEC) capacity and international monitors. Karzai
repeated his previous statements that he feared the
"inevitable" ethnic divisions that a second round would
engender, that there is an overwhelming public desire for
national unity, and that he is still respected as a unifying
force.


6. (S) Pressing further, Karzai asked me if we should try to
"avoid" a second round. I repeated that he should run the
best campaign he could; that his mobilization would help
change circumstances on the ground; and that it is possible
he would be able to win in the first round -- but I also
emphasized that we would work within the Afghan Constitution.
I said that his opponents were looking at their own
political futures and reputations with the international
community and in that light, would likely be amenable to
finding an acceptable outcome through talks and compromise to
issues that arise from the election.


7. (S) Karzai flagged intemperate remarks by Abdullah's
campaign manager that a second round could see a version of
Iranian protests -- but with weapons. I replied that we had
taken swift action with Deputy Ambassador Ricciardone warning
Abdullah of the consequences of such rhetoric and he had
immediately, and publicly, distanced himself from it.
Furthermore, in a recent Afghan television interview, I had
underscored our position that we denounced all violent
rhetoric and actions related to the elections. On security,
Karzai later noted that he had been able to make an
election-related trip to Gardez province without Taliban
disruption. I noted that his security is excellent but that

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he should take heed of specific threats.

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Post-Election: A "Jirga" or a Real Plan?
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8. (S) Karzai raised next the idea of a Jirga after his
possible first-round or second-round victory as a method of
unifying the country. I stated that, frankly, Americans
could not pass judgement on the cultural impact and message
of such an event. His next comment, however, gave a specific
reason: using the Jirga to "restart" the relationship between
the Afghans and the international community, to accept their
longtime presence. I said that this statement underscores a
certain lack of understanding of the message I have conveyed
previously: the Obama Administration's goal, and that of the
American people and Congress, is not to be in Afghanistan
indefinitely. We need a plan for how the Afghan National
Security Forces can, with our assistance, take up their full
responsibilities. (Note: The day before, Karzai told a
visiting CODEL that Afghanistan would only take the lead in
its own security operations after receiving advanced military
weapons, and then only after "five years or ten years... we
want you here forever"; he offered Bagram and Kandahar as
permanent bases. End Note.)


9. (S) As I restated the point that a dialogue on security
and sovereignty had to include a serious discussion of when
and how Afghanistan would take the lead in security
operations, I also stressed that our intent was to preclude
Afghanistan reverting to the conditions that existed on
September 10, 2001. I elaborated that the way forward on
security includes a new arrangement for detentions, provided
that there is judicial and corrections system reform; new
rules for private security companies; and training support
for the ANSF. On development, governance and regional
arrangements, we remain committed to a long-term role. At
the same time, the U.S. government and international
community will be insistent on improvements in government
accountability and measures taken to address corruption.
American support will wane if no such steps are agreed to.


10. (S) On peace talks with the Taliban, I stressed that we
remain clear that it will be Afghan-led, with opportunities
for those who renounce terrorism and the use of force, and
adhere to the Constitution. Karzai remains sensitive to the
idea of legitimizing the Taliban as a "pan-Afghan movement"
and I reassured him that the Secretary of State had framed
our policy in unmistakeable terms as an Afghan initiative
which we support. We agreed with Karzai that there were
several tiers of activity:
-- foot soldiers, who could be dealt with through military
operations, government influence, and financial assistance;
-- mid-level operatives, where the approach best described as
integration should vary by province - we should be
opportunistic and flexible;
-- strategic level - the ideological leaders, where U.S.
diplomatic suport could be useful with Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan. Karzai said that "de-listing" (UNSCR 1267) Mullah
Omar would take away Omar's prestige.

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Governance: The Right People In Charge ...
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11. (S) We then returned to the discussion about governance
issues and specifically corruption. The U.S. and
international community are providing substantial aid and may
give more, I said, but need benchmarks. We want to make our
aid delivery more effective and are doing so by making more
of it go through Afghan institutions. However, corruption
and accountability are at the top of our agenda and must be
addressed, I went on. The U.S. is insistent on this, and we
have the right to be.


12. (S) I specified that we have seen an improvement in the
cabinet but it is necessary for all critical ministries to be
led by ministers who are not just honest, but also competent.
For example, the Ministries of Water and Energy, and Mining
needs a better minister; Karzai called Water and Energy
Minister Khan a "patriot" but I countered that this was not
good enough in areas that we are about to fund significantly.
We insist on capable leadership or we are wasting both money
and opportunities. Karzai promised that he will not remove
any good ministers without telling us, and said that while he
has made political promises to his backers they will not be
able to specify individuals to fill the promised ministries;
they will instead give him a list of qualified candidates for
him to choose.

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... But Not A CEO
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13. (S) Karzai once again raised his "CEO" plan, specifically
related, we believe, to the deal he will shortly strike with
Ashraf Ghani. He asked point-blank if the U.S. wants him to
establish a CEO position, and if so do we want him to offer
it to Abdullah or Ghani? I responded that a CEO to him
apparently represents one of three things: a means of
establishing a better-functioning executive, a government of
national unity, or finding someone that the United States
likes to work with. I emphasized to him that the U.S.
government is interested in improved executive
administration, not names.
EIKENBERRY