MURKY SECURITY SITUATION IN KANDAHAR CITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002292

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID AF
SUBJECT: MURKY SECURITY SITUATION IN KANDAHAR CITY

Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y
ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Begin Summary. While all parties concerned with
security in Kandahar agree that the enemy is stepping up
infiltration of Kandahar City (KC) in an apparent attempt to
disrupt the elections, there is disagreement as to the actual
threat they pose as well as the ability of the ANSF to deal
with the threat. Some observers report almost complete enemy
freedom of movement (FOM) in KC and warn that the ANSF has
lost, or abdicated, control in the city; other observers
believe that enemy infiltrators are being killed or arrested
in greater numbers than ever through increasingly effective
ANP-ANA-NDS joint operations. Much is at stake for the GIRoA
and ISAF in KC, and will be necessary to monitor the security
situation in the city more closely than ever in order to gain
more clarity and respond, if necessary, with ISAF and/or ANSF
reinforcements. End Summary.

Kandahar City Getting Too Hot for NGOs
--------------


2. (S) International and local security personnel employed by
NGOs report that at least 100 anti-government elements (AGEs)
have moved into KC over the past three weeks. The AGEs
reportedly have begun to move freely in the city's bazaars
during the evening, carrying small arms and RPGs. The ANP in
at least one KC sub-district (District 9) have allegedly
entered into a truce with AGEs, and the ANP's ability and
willingness to stand and fight in KC is in doubt, as they
appear to be avoiding confrontations with the enemy. USAID's
main implementing partner (IP) in Kandahar Province is
pulling its international staff out of its KC office, citing
the growing threat in the city and the possibility that AGEs
will soon be able to block the highway (Highway 4, aka Route
Aurora) between KC and Kandahar Air Field (KAF),which would
leave the internationals with no safe haven should their
compounds come under attack.

ANP Challenged, But Holding Its Ground
--------------


3. (S) Canadian officers at the Kandahar PRT who have
responsibility for supporting the ANSF to secure KC have a
different perspective on the security situation. The
Canadian combined arms company that operates in KC has
observed an increase in enemy activity ) movements of armed
persons at night, primarily ) but they dispute the claim
that armed AGEs are operating freely in the bazaars. The
company commander pointed out that off-duty ANP members in
civilian clothes were increasingly carrying weapons for
self-defense (as they are allowed to do),and that private
security guards also often carry personal weapons when they
go to the bazaars. On August 3, there was an incident in
sub-district 4 in which residents informed the ANP (which
called ISAF for assistance) that approximately 20 armed men
were walking through a street in the bazaar. According to
Canadian officers who arrived at the scene, the ANP had
converged on the area in force. A combined search of the
area by the ANP and ISAF elements failed to turn up any
suspicious persons.


4. (S) The alleged lack of response by the ANP to the
build-up of AGE numbers in KC, at least in sub-district 9,
might be related to the pull-out of Canadian civilian police
(CIVPOL) mentors, who previously stayed with the KC ANP in
their sub-stations day and night. The CIVPOL personnel were
transferred to FOB Walton, near KC, where they are training
new ANP recruits in advance of the elections. (Of the 25
Canadian CIVPOL stationed at the Kandahar PRT, 13 are now
working at FOB Walton, seven are on leave, two are at the
PRT, and two are attached to USPMT elements working on the
outskirts of KC.) According to Canadian military and CIVPOL
sources, the sub-district 9 ANP commander, Mullah Gul, is
corrupt and unprofessional, and they stated that they found
it plausible that he had struck a deal with the AGEs. On the
other hand, they cited a sub-district 9 ANP operation on
August 2 in which the ANP raided seven mosques in the
sub-district at night and interviewed persons they found in
them. They also cite numerous other examples of effective
ANP policing in KC over the past two weeks, indicating that
the ANP are aware of the increased threat and are responding
appropriately to it. According to the commanding officer of
the Canadian company operating in KC, Kandahar Provincial
Chief of Police BG Mirwais and his operations officer are
well aware of actual and potential problems in KC, especially
in sub-district 9, and are taking steps within their limited
resources to shore up security in threatened areas of the
city.


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5. (S) Despite the notional take-over of the lead on security
in KC by the ANA in April, the ANA's activity in the city has
tapered off as it deploys more of its resources to Arghandab
District in order to bolster security in that heavily
populated, politically important area. According to Canadian
sources, the ANP are in fact handling security in KC almost
single-handedly, with critical assistance from the NDS, which
consistently delivers accurate, actionable intelligence. The
enemy continues to target the ANP in KC; for example, on
August 3, an IED was set off at the front door of the ANP
provincial finance officer's compound. The attack was the
work of one of the two new IED "crews" which the NDS and ISAF
have detected in KC over the past two weeks. Both the NDS
and ISAF consider it unlikely that the enemy will mount large
scale, coordinated attacks in KC. Rather, they will most
likely maximize their use of IEDs, including SVBIEDs and
SBBIEDs, and continue to target primarily the ANP and GIRoA
civilian personnel.

Other Ominous Signs
--------------


6. (S) NGO personnel in KC also report a sharp increase over
the past two weeks in the number of "night letters" left at
KC mosques. In the letters, AGEs warn people not to vote,
not to support the GIRoA, and not to cooperate with ISAF, and
not to work for companies contracted by the GIRoA, NGOs, or
ISAF. On August 3, AGEs attacked a road crew working on Road
27 north of the Shah-Wali-Kot District Center. In the
lengthy clash, 10 heavily-armed private security guards were
killed or wounded. A road worker was killed in a rocket
attack in the same vicinity on August 5. Canadian officers
and intelligence analysts believe the night letters and
attacks on road crews, together with continuing attacks on
cell phone towers, are parts of a coordinated enemy plan to
create the perception among the population that KC is being
isolated.

Comment
--------------


7. (S) Although there are multiple indications of a serious
deterioration of security in KC over the past two weeks, the
situation is far from clear. There are conflicting
indications that the ANSF (primarily the ANP and NDS) are
functioning well and are effectively countering the enemy's
increased presence in, and pressure on, KC. It is
unfortunate, but not surprising, that Development
Alternatives International (DAI),USAID's largest
implementing partner, is choosing to move its international
staffs out of KC at this time, choosing to err on the side of
caution for the safety of their staff. Given the importance
of KC, it would be a mistake for the GIRoA and ISAF to
underestimate the enemy's increasing pressure on KC or to
overestimate the ANSF's ability to cope with the threat using
present resources. U.S. civilian representatives at the
Kandahar PRT will continue to monitor the situation in
consultation with Canadian Force elements at the PRT; ISAF
and/or ANSF reinforcements might be called for.
EIKENBERRY