Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL2260
2009-08-06 11:55:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PROVINCIAL CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN

Tags:  KDEM PGOV PREL AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCKEI982
PP RUEHC RUCNAFG
DE RUEHBUL #2260/01 2181155
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061155Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0681
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002260 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: PROVINCIAL CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: A. KABUL 2120

B. KABUL 2040

C. KABUL 1560

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002260

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: PROVINCIAL CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: A. KABUL 2120

B. KABUL 2040

C. KABUL 1560


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Since the June 16 start of the
presidential campaign period, the major candidates have
followed traditional ethnic and tribal lines in their
campaigns through visits to traditional provincial
strongholds, with shows of strength in opponents' territory.
Political deals with tribal and ethnic leaders still comprise
the main focus for several campaigns (ref A),however, the
major candidates' campaign activities also include directly
engaging the people, in particular the recent televised
presidential debate (ref B) and some of the larger campaign
rallies. Campaigning in the provinces shows the traditional
versus the direct style of campaigning, seen in the small
versus large rallies: smaller rallies represent the deals
made with the traditional local powerbrokers, while the
larger rallies are a newer phenomenon. Violence continues to
limit all campaigns in the most dangerous provinces. End
Summary.


2. (SBU) Despite a campaign period limited to only two
months by electoral law, active campaigning kicked off
relatively slowly (ref C). First posters and billboards of
candidates appeared around Kabul, and per PRT reports spread
swiftly to major provinces such as Kandahar, Herat and Balkh,
and reached smaller provincial capitals such as Gardez by the
end of June, but that was all. While building name
recognition held value, a position on the issues was not a
priority for candidates. In late June, PRT officers in
Bamyan and Gardez separately reported that many influential
local leaders were refraining from public support of any
candidate, instead waiting to see who took a clear lead
before they would decide.

-------------- --------------
Home Base and Enemy Territory - Provincial Visits
-------------- --------------


3. (SBU) In Kandahar, often perceived as a lens to view
traditional Pushtun politics, the Karzai campaign launched
quickly in conventional Afghan style. Two of Karzai's U.S.
citizen nephews are managing the campaign in Kandahar and the
first major political rally of the campaign season took place
in Kandahar City on June 18 with approximately 1000 members
of the Pushtu Barakzai tribe holding a rally in Kandahar city
to show support for Karzai. Karzai's campaign denied

organizing the rally; however, the Barakzai tribe's close
ties with Karzai's half-brother, Kandahar Provincial Council
Chairman Ahmad Wali Karzai suggest it was probably less
spontaneous then claimed.


4. (SBU) In another early move, on June 24 Balkh Governor
Atta Mohammad Noor announced his support for Abdullah at a
provincial administrative meeting. He admitted that
government officials cannot campaign for a particular
candidate, but stated to the meeting that "as an individual,
I vote for Abdullah." His support in the province has been
extremely helpful to Abdullah's efforts.


5. (SBU) On July 1, Abdullah started a new campaign trend
when his appearance at a rally in political-hub Nangarhar
drew an estimated 20,000 supporters from Nangarhar, Kunar,
Laghman and Nuristan to downtown Jalalabad; in 2004, Karzai
took 95 percent of the vote in Nangarhar. The Nangarhar PRT
officer reported participants that included ethnic-Uzbeks,
Tajiks, and Pashtuns as well as a mix of tribal leaders,
intellectuals, and mujahedeen. The rally drew media and
public attention and added momentum to Abdullah's candidacy.
However, the ethnic mix of attendees, some bused in from
neighboring provinces, could suggest that Abdullah's campaign
was attempting to create the appearance of strength in
Pashtun majority Nangarhar for a candidate perceived as Tajik
by the Pashtun population. Senior Abdullah Campaign Advisor
Satar Murat told us Abdullah campaigned in Pashtun territory
to prove he was not only a Tajik, but also a Pashtun.


6. (SBU) In contrast, in some areas with limited campaign
activity - Farah and Uruzgan - PRT officers report that the
lack of activity is perceived to reflect the lack of
competition since Karzai is believed to have a strong lead
there. In 2004, Karzai won Farah with over 90,000 votes
(compared to the almost 26,000 received by runner-up Yunus
Qanooni (Kabul, Tajik) and Uruzgan with over 46,000 votes
(Qanooni received 2,500 for second place). In Kandahar,
where security limits political activity, campaign activity
remains extremely limited. In 2004, Karzai won Kandahar with
over 281,000 votes; Qanooni came in second with 9,202.
However, difficult odds do not always equate to lack of
campaign activity - in 2004 Karzai took popular campaign stop
Nangarhar province with over 422,000 votes compared to number
two Qanooni's 6,856.


7. (SBU) In Khost, where Karzai won over 207,000 votes in
2004 (Qanooni received 2,173 for second place) he appears
confident that Governor Qalandarzai can deliver a large
Pashtun voter turnout that will support his re-election.
Qalandarzai has been open with PRT officers about his desire
for a position in the cabinet of a second Karzai
administration. In Ghazni, another low activity campaign
area, Governor Osmamani told SRAP Holbrooke that he believed
90% of the people would vote for Karzai. In 2004, Karzai won
over 238,000 votes in Ghazni with Qanooni taking 18,999 for
second place.

--------------
Traditional Gatherings and Big Rallies
--------------


8. (SBU) Smaller and more traditional campaign events -
often formed by tribal leaders - are a hallmark of the
campaign. On July 6, two rallies - one by members of the
Ahmedzai tribe, one organized by the PC Chairman - announced
support for Karzai. On July 16, Second Vice-President
Khalili led a several thousand person pro-Karzai rally in
Jalalabad, but significantly smaller than Abdullah's July 1
appearance, a potentially dangers shift for Karzai since
Nangarhar represents the largest block of Pashtun voters in
the country. Several small rallies showed Abdullah support
in Balkh on July 19. In Uruzgan the same day 150 people
peacefully marched through Tarin Kowt carrying Karzai
election posters. In Zabul on July 21 over 100 local leaders
met to declare support for Karzai's candidacy. In Kunar, 300
people - including parliamentarians and provincial council
members - came together July 13 to demonstrate support for
Karzai. On July 25, MP and presidential candidate Ramazan
Bashardost held a rally in Khost with around 450 attendees,
and his campaign claims activity in seventeen provinces. On
July 15, around 200 people participated in a rally for female
presidential candidate Ferozan Fana in Asadabad. Small
rallies, particular those with the participation of local
leaders, also indicate campaign infrastructure and
organization. However, many participants will attend solely
for the free lunch provided by the candidate. Some observers
and even candidates have asserted that many Afghans are
politically savvy and will take the payoff but vote for the
politician of their choosing.


9. (SBU) On July 14 Abdullah told us he had visited Ghor,
Uruzgan and Badakhshan after the Jalalabad rally and claimed
that supporters had turned out in each location with
3,000-5,000 attending each rally. On July 17, Abdullah made
a campaign stop in Herat where over 20,000 supporters cheered
him on at a "rock-concert style" rally. He followed that
with a stop in Orgun - Paktika's largest town - where he
participated in a 3,000 person shura and a July 28 Panjshir
rally of around 3,000. In a nation that has spent 30 years
fractured by war and internal conflict and where political
alliances are often secret, large displays of public support
by multiple tribal and ethnic groups could offer a new
appeal. Abdullah and his supporters draw parallels between
his campaign and the opposition movement in Iran. His rally
in Herat was most illustrative of this, with men and women
assembled in blue banners and scarves, the color of the
Abdullah campaign.


10. (U) Karzai has waited until the last weeks of the
campaign period before making a large push to directly engage
the public since, according to some observers, he believes
that the final two weeks are the ones that will be
remembered. His presence at the large rally in Dar-e-Kayan
in Baghlan province on August 1 showed the start of this
phase of his campaign. Karzai,s August 5 Gardez rally
brought 13,000 people, and a speech about issues in addition
to the traditional rhetoric; Karzai,s embarking on his first
major campaign speech shows a shift in tactics for a
candidate who declined to participate in the televised debate
just a week before.

--------------
Violence Curbs Activity
--------------


11. (SBU) Campaign related violence has also been on the
upsurge in recent weeks. Although it appears focused against
the process instead of targeting a single candidate and
ideological ideal, it serves as a reminder for both
candidates and voters of the Taliban's role in the electoral
process. On July 15, unidentified gunmen shot Abdullah's
campaign manager in Kapisa. On July 22, minor candidate and
lower house MP Mullah Salaam Raketi, a former Taliban
commander survived an ambush in Baghlan. On July 26,
Karzai's first vice-presidential candidate Marshall Fahim's
motorcade was attacked by insurgents while in Kunduz. On
July 27, a suicide bomber was caught by the Afghan National
Police outside the Lashkar Gah office of minor presidential
Shah Nawaz Tani. On July 28, an Abdullah campaign official
was shot in Laghman in a reported Taliban ambush. On July
29, a Khost campaign office of Abdullah was blown up at
night, causing no casualties. On the same day, a bomb went
off in a Karzai campaign office in Herat.


EIKENBERRY