BURMA -- AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH EU SPECIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000544


DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019
TAGS: PREL ASEAN ID BM EU
SUBJECT: BURMA -- AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH EU SPECIAL
ENVOY FASSINO

REF: BANGKOK 719

Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4(b+d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Hume discussed Burma with EU
Special Envoy Fassino on March 24. Fassino said the 2010
elections in Burma offered a historic opportunity and the
international community should try to influence the process
constructively. Fassino welcomed recent signals that
Washington might be willing to try new approaches. The
Ambassador said geopolitical concerns were uppermost for
Indonesia and should be an important factor in any new Burma
policy. He suggested the ASEAN Secretariat might serve as an
intermediary for achieving concrete steps. END SUMMARY.

MEETING WITH EU ENVOY


2. (C) EU Special Envoy to Burma Piero Fassino met with the
Ambassador on March 24. Czech Ambassador Pavel Rezac
accompanied Fassino. (Note: The Czech Republic currently
holds the EU Presidency.) Fassino, an Italian politician,
noted his earlier discussions in Bangkok (reftel) and said he
was also meeting with Indonesian FM Wirajuda and ASEAN SG
Surin while in Jakarta.

NO CHOICE BUT ENGAGEMENT


3. (C) Fassino said the international community had a choice
between two options in approaching Burma's 2010 elections:
remain uninvolved, to avoid appearing to endorse a flawed
process; and trying to influence the process. Fassino
favored the latter. The elections would occur in any event,
he said, so the EU wanted to try to use the vote as far as
possible. This was a crucial moment and it would be foolish
to pass up the opportunity.


4. (C) Fassino commented that Secretary Clinton's remarks on
Burma during her February visit to Jakarta indicated to him
that the new administration was looking for new approaches.
Her remarks suggested that the United States was prepared to
adopt a "flexible and pragmatic" line. This would open the
way for the international community to take a united
position. Both sanctions and "persuasion" had failed, it was
time to try something different. This was not exactly the
same as the domestic opposition's program, he stressed.


5. (C) Rather, Fassino said, the international community
should set some standards and seek commitments from the
regime for specific steps. For instance: engaging in
dialogue with the opposition, releasing political prisoners
and allowing non-regime elements to run for election. It was
important to "create space" for the opposition. Elections
were always dynamic situations and the election process could
open up possibilities for the opposition. ASEAN had
succeeded in coordinating humanitarian relief after Cyclone
Nargis; it should also be used.

GEOPOLTICAL FACTORS IMPORTANT FOR INDONESIA


6. (C) The Ambassador agreed that the Secretary's comments
indicated a search for a new approach. In concrete terms,
that meant searching for a set of policies that offered the
possibility of producing different results. For twenty
years, U.S. policy had been driven by the democracy agenda
and tied closely to Aung San Suu Kyi and to a strong stand on
human rights. But beyond this, there had been little
engagement. The United States now had no vested interests in
Burma. Washington might be open to new proposals and willing
to support a concerted effort, or at least a coordination of
multiple tracks, toward a practical solution.


7. (C) As a young democracy, the Ambassador said, Indonesia
wanted democracy to prevail in the region. Much of the
domestic Indonesian criticism of the ASEAN Charter sprang
from its perceived weakness on human rights. There was no
need to persuade FM Wirajuda on the need for reform in Burma.
The question for Indonesia was rather whether Burma was
going to be a part of the region or migrate toward China.
The Indonesian concern, in other words, was primarily
geopolitical. The traditional wisdom on Burma, however, had
put human rights first and geopolitical concerns second.


8. (C) That said, it was hard to imagine that Indonesia
would deliver a hard message to Burma. The Bali Democracy
Forum was a laudable initiative but had no agenda for action.
President Yudhoyono believed his relationship with the
Burmese leadership, though feeble, was having some effect.
SG Surin might be able to take some of the practical steps
needed to get the process moving. ASEAN could potentially
negotiate some of the concrete steps Fassino had proposed.

HUME