Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09JAKARTA2071
2009-12-17 10:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

U/S BURNS' DECEMBER 10, 2009, MEETING WITH

Tags:  PREL PARM KNNP KDEM OVIP BURNS WILLIAM ID AF 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002071 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP
NSC FOR J.BADER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP KDEM OVIP BURNS WILLIAM ID AF
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' DECEMBER 10, 2009, MEETING WITH
INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER NATALEGAWA

Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4 (b+d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002071

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP
NSC FOR J.BADER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP KDEM OVIP BURNS WILLIAM ID AF
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' DECEMBER 10, 2009, MEETING WITH
INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER NATALEGAWA

Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4 (b+d).


1. (SBU) December 10, 2009; 4:15 p.m.; Bali Democracy Forum;
Bali, Indonesia.


2. (SBU) Participants:

U.S.
--------------
Under Secretary William Burns
Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, Embassy Jakarta
Scot Marciel, EAP Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Dan Rochman, Embassy Jakarta political officer (notetaker)

INDONESIA
--------------

Marty Natalegawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Bunyan Saptomo, Director, Directorate of North and Central
America, Department of Foreign Affairs
Department of Foreign Affairs notetaker


3. (C) SUMMARY In a December 10 meeting with Indonesian
Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa on the margins of the
second annual Bali Democracy Forum (BDF),Under Secretary
Bill Burns stressed the importance of translating the
Comprehensive Partnership (CP) into tangible achievements,
such as the signing of the Peace Corps MOU, in advance of an
anticipated Presidential visit next year. In response to U/S
Burns' suggestion that Indonesia move forward on ratification
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty prior to the United
States, Natalegawa said the GOI was considering that step.
Natalegawa said the GOI was studying Japanese and Australian
regional architecture proposals but did not want to act too
quickly to add to the list of existing structures. He said
Indonesia would continue its efforts on Burma and the Middle
East and was thinking seriously about how it could help in
Afghanistan. Natalegawa said the onus was on Iran to respond
positively to the IAEA Tehran Research Reactor proposal. On
climate change, the GOI was working to craft specific
sectoral targets for emissions reductions in support of
President Yudhoyono's ambitious overall targets. Natalagawa
noted he hoped to have an opportunity to visit Washington in
coming months to help set the stage for a Presidential visit
to Jakarta. END SUMMARY.

BDF AND COMPREHENSIVE PARTNERSHIP



4. (C) FM Natalegawa stressed how pleased he and President
Yudhoyono were that U/S Burns could participate in the BDF.
The BDF's potential to promote democratization came from its
inclusivity and the fact that it was not simply a discussion
among likeminded nations. Natalegawa noted that U/S Burns'
visit to Bali and Jakarta for bilateral Strategic
Consultations was one in an ongoing string of productive
high-level bilateral interactions, including discussions
between Presidents Obama and Yudhoyono and between FM
Natalegawa and Secretary Clinton at the Singapore APEC
Leaders Meeting that underscored the deepening and
strengthening of U.S.-Indonesia relations. Natalegawa noted
that the Secretary's call to him in advance of President
Obama's speech on Afghanistan reflected the value of close
consultations on key issues. With the increasing pace of
high-level discussions as background, it was important to
reach a number of early achievements, such as the signing of
the Peace Corps MOU, to sustain momentum for a potential
visit by President Obama in mid-2010, Natalegawa concluded.


5. (C) U/S Burns stressed that the U.S. side also committed
to translating the CP into tangible achievements. Beyond the
Peace Corps MOU, it would be beneficial to conclude the
science and technology agreement in advance of the planned
visit to Indonesia of Presidential Science Envoy Bruce
Alberts in mid-January. Fast action on the proposed Defense
Cooperation and Overseas Private Investment Corporation
agreement would also help lay the groundwork for a successful
Presidential visit.

NONPROLIFERATION


6. (C) U/S Burns noted Indonesia's admirable record of
leadership on nonproliferation issues. By signing the
Additional Protocol, Indonesia had set a strong example for

JAKARTA 00002071 002 OF 003


other Southeast Asian nations. Similarly, it would be
beneficial if the GOI moved forward quickly on ratification
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Doing so in
advance of the United States would further solidify
Indonesia's leadership role, and could provide a positive
influence on ratification efforts in the United States.
Natalegawa agreed that the anticipated visit of President
Obama gave added incentive to make progress on all elements
of the CP, including nonproliferation. While Indonesia's
intention has been to begin ratification immediately after
the United States, the option of doing so first had begun to
look increasingly attractive.

REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE AND BURMA


7. (C) FM Natalegawa said Indonesia was studying Japan's
proposed East Asia Community and Australia's Asia-Pacific
Community proposals but did not want to act too quickly. The
situation was fluid, so a new structure, if locked in, could
become quickly outdated. The general regional trend was
toward greater regional integration, and Indonesia continued
to feel that the United States must be a key actor in the
region. The GOI remained to be convinced that any of the
proposals currently on the table would be the best addition
to current structures. Meanwhile, within the existing
framework, the GOI felt it had an important role to play on
problem-solving within Southeast Asia, including on Burma,
where it would continue to work behind the scenes to
encourage the Burmese generals to open dialogue with the
opposition and ethnic groups.

IRAN AND NORTH KOREA


8. (C) U/S Burns and Natalegawa agreed on the importance of
staying in touch on Iran and North Korea nuclear issues. On
Iran, U/S Burns pointed out that the IAEA's Tehran Research
Reactor proposal offered at the Geneva talks was a promising
beginning, but Iran had backed away from its initial
acceptance, in part due to domestic difficulties.
Nevertheless, the administration's patience was not
unlimited, and if Iran continued to refuse to take meaningful
steps, we would have to consider other steps. Natalegawa
said Iran's internal situation was not conducive for positive
movement and agreed that the ball was firmly in Iran's court.
Indonesia would do what it could to convince Iran to take
advantage of the opportunities before it.

MIDDLE EAST AND AFGHANISTAN


9. (C) Natalegawa said Indonesia's contribution to Middle
East peace efforts had been modest and focused on Palestinian
capacity building, including training for Palestinian
diplomats. Indonesia hoped to be able to play a similar
"niche" role in Afghanistan through police training.
Natalegawa noted that because of intense interest in the
Middle East among the Indonesian public, the GOI was somewhat
constrained in what it could do publicly on that issue. U/S
Burns expressed appreciation for Indonesian efforts on the
Middle East, encouraged the GOI to consider steps it could
take to reach out to Israel, and said it would be useful to
maintain close contact on both that issue and on efforts in
support of Afghanistan.

CLIMATE CHANGE


10. (C) Turning to climate change, Natalegawa said it was
not productive to focus solely on whether emissions reduction
commitments were legally binding or simply political
commitments. What was more important was inclusiveness.
Developing countries must not see climate change as a matter
to be left to the developed world to solve. President
Yudhoyono's ambitious stance on Indonesian emissions
reflected the seriousness with which he took the issue.
Indonesia was working aggressively to craft specific sectoral
targets for emissions reduction, since it did not make sense
to get international assistance to support its efforts before
those efforts were defined, Natalegawa added.

PRESIDENTIAL VISIT


11. (C) FM Natalegawa said the coming six months would be
extremely busy but also productive, in preparation for the
anticipated visit of President Obama. The FM added that he

JAKARTA 00002071 003 OF 003


was considering a visit to Washington in advance of a
Presidential visit to Indonesia in order to help shape the
agenda.


12. (U) U/S Burns cleared this message.

HUME