Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09JAKARTA1902
2009-11-17 11:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

NONPROLIFERATION COOPERATION WITH INDONESIA --

Tags:  PREL MNUC IAEA NPT ID 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0187
OO RUEHDT RUEHPB
DE RUEHJA #1902/01 3211100
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171100Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3853
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 8028
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0229
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1135
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 001902 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, S/SANAC, ISN, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP
NSC FOR D WALTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019
TAGS: PREL MNUC IAEA NPT ID
SUBJECT: NONPROLIFERATION COOPERATION WITH INDONESIA --
VISIT OF SANAC EINHORN AND AMB. BURK

Classified By: DCM Ted Osius, reasons 1.4(b+d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 001902

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, S/SANAC, ISN, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP
NSC FOR D WALTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019
TAGS: PREL MNUC IAEA NPT ID
SUBJECT: NONPROLIFERATION COOPERATION WITH INDONESIA --
VISIT OF SANAC EINHORN AND AMB. BURK

Classified By: DCM Ted Osius, reasons 1.4(b+d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: During their November 4-6 visit to Jakarta,
Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control
(S/SANAC) Einhorn and Special Representative of the President
for Nuclear Nonproliferation Amb. Burk urged their Indonesian
counterparts to try to encourage Iran and North Korea to
respond positively to recent U.S. actions and explained
American positions on a wide range of nonproliferation and
disarmament issues. They also expressed hope that their
visit would be the start of a sustained bilateral dialogue.
GOI interlocutors described their efforts to encourage
positive movement by Iran and the DPRK.


2. (C) SUMMARY (Cont'd): Presidential Spokesman Dino Djalal
said President Yudhoyono saw "no strong reason why" Indonesia
had not yet ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and
said Indonesia could ratify in advance of the United States,
earlier than its previously stated commitment to do so
immediately after the United States. Based on his experience
during a presidential visit to Iran last year, Djalal
described Ayatollah Khamenei as the key to a solution on the
Iran nuclear issue, given Ahmadinejad's absolute deference to
Khamenei, but noted that Khamenei appears isolated from
information. ASEAN Secretary General Surin made a push for
the U.S. to support and sign the protocols for the Southeast
Asian Nuclear-Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ). Parliamentary and
DEPLU representatives requested further information on export
controls and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
SANAC Einhorn said the USG would provide that in the near
future. END SUMMARY.

U.S. OVERVIEW OF NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT POLICY


3. (C) Throughout their meetings in Jakarta, visiting SANAC
Robert Einhorn and Special Representative of the President
for Nuclear Nonproliferation Amb. Susan Burk stressed the
value of deepening U.S.-Indonesia cooperation on
nonproliferation and disarmament in the context of the
bilateral Comprehensive Partnership. They noted that the

United States and Indonesia had often taken opposing
positions in the past on these issues. SANAC Einhorn said he
hoped that would change under President Obama, noted the
administration's view that nonproliferation and disarmament
are integrally related, and reviewed its efforts to
reinvigorate both nonproliferation and disarmament efforts.
The inclusive approach of the USG recognizes the important
role that major non-weapons states such as Indonesia can
play. Indonesia is particularly important, as a founding
member of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and now as a member
of the G-20. SANAC Einhorn said he hoped his visit would not
be a one-off engagement on nuclear issues, but rather the
start of continued bilateral dialogue and engagement,
particularly in the run-up to the April 2010 Nuclear Security
Summit and the May 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review
Conference (RevCon).


4. (C) SANAC Einhorn made clear that North Korea must commit
to complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula through irreversible steps, adding that full
implementation of UNSCR 1874 was also essential. He urged
Indonesia to press Iran to fulfill its NPT, IAEA, and UNSC
obligations, including cooperation in IAEA inspections at the
newly revealed Qom enrichment facility, and noted that the
Obama administration had &extended its hand8 for engagement
and remains open to the possibility of greater engagement if
Iran took positive steps. SANAC Einhorn stressed to his
Indonesian interlocutors that the American goal for Iran was
not regime change, but rather a change in its behavior. He
noted that Indonesia could play a useful role in encouraging
Iran to move forward with the IAEA-sponsored proposal to
refuel the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) including agreement
that it send most of its current stocks of low-enriched
uranium (LEU) abroad for further enrichment and fabrication
for eventual return for use in the TRR. Iran,s agreement to
move forward would be a &win-win8 and would serve as a
confidence building measure to reduce anxiety over its
accumulation of nuclear material.

ASIAN AFFAIRS -- DPRK AND IRAN

JAKARTA 00001902 002 OF 005




5. (C) At a November 5 meeting, Amb. T.M. Hamzah Thayeb,
Director General for Asia Pacific and African Affairs at the
Department of Foreign Affairs said the GOI saw nuclear
developments in Iran and North Korea as destabilizing and
thus bad for Indonesian interests. He noted that Indonesia
would "persevere" in continuing in its efforts to persuade
both Pyongyang and Tehran. On the DPRK, Thayeb acknowledged
the lack of progress, despite the urgings of all concerned
parties, for the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks.
Indonesia had made it clear to the DPRK that Indonesia
opposed the acquisition by Asian countries of a nuclear
weapons capability, as it would spur an arms race that would
not be beneficial for the Asia-Pacific region. Thayeb
commented that the lack of a peace treaty ending the Korean
War had led the DPRK not to trust the other parties and
wondered if that was the reason for the DPRK,s unwillingness
to denuclearize. Einhorn noted that the United States is
prepared to pursue a permanent peace regime on the Korean
Peninsula but that it could only be finalized with complete
and verifiable denuclearization.


6. (C) Thayeb said that Indonesia had told Iran that Tehran
must comply with its NPT commitments and IAEA safeguards
obligations but that Iran continued to view acquisition of a
nuclear program as a means of gaining international respect.
Muhammed Asruchin, Director for South and Central Asia, said
that the Iran nuclear issue may best be solved in the
framework of a comprehensive peace for the Middle East. He
noted that there was a great deal of public support in
Indonesia for Iran, due to Muslim solidarity and what the
public viewed as the American double standard for Iran and
Israel. Einhorn responded that Israel was not the only or
major motivation for Iran,s nuclear program and that
postponing a solution on the Iran nuclear issue until peace
could be achieved in the region would result in missing the
opportunity to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapons capability.

SPECIAL ENVOY ON NORTH KOREA


7. (C) At a November 6 meeting, Special Envoy for North
Korea Amb. Nana Sutresna said the North Korean ambassador in
Jakarta continued to meet with him about the possibility of a
future visit to Pyongyang, possibly by the end of the year,
though Sutresna was still unclear as to the purpose of a
visit. The GOI had also yet to reach a decision about the
utility of such a visit. Sutresna said his previous multiple
visits had not achieved much. Despite his recent efforts in
Jakarta to encourage the DPRK to return to the Six-Party
Talks, his North Korean interlocutors continued to maintain
that the DPRK nuclear issue can only be resolved via
bilateral talks with the United States. Sutresna believed
that the DPRK,s ultimate objective in seeking bilateral
talks with the United States was an assurance that the Kim
Jong-il regime would survive even after denuclearization.

PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN DINO DJALAL


8. (C) At a November 5 meeting, Presidential Spokesman Dino
Djalal said President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) welcomed
the renewed leadership of the USG on nonproliferation and
disarmament, particularly highlighting the GOI,s positive
impact that President Obama,s Prague speech made in Jakarta.
Djalal noted that, although the GOI has publicly committed
to ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
immediately after the United States ratifies, SBY is
unconvinced that Indonesia needs to wait even that long.
Accordingly, the President has made Indonesian ratification
an early priority for his second administration, which began
October 21, even in the absence of prior American
ratification. Djalal said it was realistic to expect the
treaty could be ratified within the next year as part of the
new Parliamentary session. SANAC Einhorn welcomed this
possibility and said that early Indonesian ratification could
be very helpful in building momentum for ratification by the
U.S. Senate and could also help spur other states to ratify
the treaty.


9. (C) SANAC Einhorn noted that SBY's presence at the
Nuclear Security Summit would also be of great value, as the

JAKARTA 00001902 003 OF 005


leader of a country that has suffered terrorist attacks, has
a nuclear research program, and has a history of engagement
on nonproliferation issues. Djalal said SBY was aware of the
invitation but would not be able to make a decision on
attending until closer to the date.


10. (C) Djalal discussed SBY's visit to Iran last year,
noting that SBY reserved comment on the nuclear issue until
his private meeting with Ahmadinejad, at which SBY urged him
to take the matter very seriously. SBY told Ahmadinejad that
Iran could not take Indonesian support for granted, given
that the GOI would only back Iran so long as its nuclear
program was for peaceful uses only. SBY was willing to speak
frankly to Iranian leaders and told Ahmadinejad that you
"can,t play around with the IAEA." Djalal said that at his
meeting with SBY, Ahmadinejad returned a number of times to
the theme of reclaiming the "lost Islamic glory" that was
"stolen" by the West. Djalal recounted a separate meeting
between SBY and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that he and
Ahmadinejad also attended. Khamenei expressed similar strong
views about the West "robbing" the Islamic world. Throughout
that meeting Ahmadinejad did not speak, and "his body
language was like a child" according to Djalal. Djalal said
it seemed that Khamenei, who was treated as a "demigod," was
virtually in solitary confinement due to his apparent
isolation from outside information. Djalal assessed that any
nuclear agreement with the West would have to be "blessed" by
Khamenei, who would have to be assured that it was a "good
deal." He added that many governments in the region were
"very nervous" about Iran and committed to again raise our
concern with SBY.

CHAIRMAN AND DEPUTY OF DPR COMMISSION ONE


11. (C) At a November 6 meeting hosted by DCM, MP Sidarto
Danusubroto, Vice Chairman of Parliamentary Commission One
(foreign affairs) said he would lead a delegation of
Indonesian parliamentarians to Iran the week of November 9
for an Asian Parliamentary Assembly conference. In response
to SANAC Einhorn's explanation of the issue, he said he would
try to advocate on behalf of the IAEA proposal on the TRR to
his Majlis counterparts. MP and Commission One Chairman
Kemal Stamboel suggested that if Iranians were afraid they
might not get their fuel back, Indonesia could consider
serving as a third country depository for Iran's LEU
"escrow."


12. (C) Danusubroto said Commission One had yet to take up
the matter of CTBT ratification in the current session, which
just began in late October. Kemal said he believed it would
not be difficult for Indonesia to ratify the CTBT shortly
after the United States and took on board SANAC Einhorn's
suggestion that Parliament could pursue ratification in
advance of the United States.


13. (C) Einhorn explained the need for Indonesia to enact
comprehensive export controls as proliferators sought "weak
links" in the region where they could set up front companies
for the illicit procurement and transshipment of controlled
and sensitive dual-use technologies. Danusubroto said that,
although Commission One does not have the lead on the issue,
both Commission One and the Trade Commission would appreciate
the opportunity to learn more on the subject. Similarly,
Danusubroto requested information on the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) and how it corresponds to the
framework of international law. Einhorn said the USG would
be happy to provide information on both subjects to
Commission One.

ASEAN VIEWS


14. (C) At a November 6 meeting, ASEAN Secretary General
Surin Pitsuwan praised the Obama approach to Southeast Asia
and nonproliferation as a "new beginning" and called for
forward movement on the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free
Zone (SEANWFZ). Specifically, he asked that the United
States sign the protocols for the treaty. Surin said the
support of the nuclear weapons states for SEANWFZ would
strengthen the regional nonproliferation regime, and as that
regime strengthened, the treaty could become a useful tool to

JAKARTA 00001902 004 OF 005


deal with potential nonproliferation violations, such as in
Burma. Einhorn replied the United States was reviewing its
policy on nuclear-free zones generally; it was the goal of
the United States to support countries which wished to
develop such zones. The P-4 (France, Russia, the UK, and the
United States) had asked ASEAN states to respond to its
concerns over SEANWFZ in a 2002 letter. The P-4 were still
awaiting a response, and the ball was in ASEAN,s court, but
we were willing to work together to move forward. Einhorn
also noted that, among the ASEAN states, only Singapore and
Indonesia had ratified the Additional Protocol to IAEA
safeguards agreements and urged Surin to press the remaining
ASEAN members to do so. Surin replied that he expected
progress on the matter, since ASEAN leaders had already made
a political commitment for their nations to sign.


15. (C) Einhorn suggested that ASEAN consider establishing
an ASEAN-wide sensitive goods export control list along the
lines of that created by the European Union. Additionally,
it may be useful if the ASEAN Secretariat developed the
expertise to deal on a regional basis with fuel cycle
questions and other issues related to the control of nuclear
materials as member countries begin to build up their nuclear
infrastructure. Surin took Einhorn,s suggestions on board
but recommended that the P-5 countries jointly propose these
efforts, which could be endorsed during the Intersessional
Meeting (ISM) of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF ISM
could then institutionalize the concept. Einhorn further
urged that ASEAN states join the Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT),pointing out that only Cambodia
had joined to date. An ASEAN &group endorsement8 of the
GICNT could be useful.

NPT AND OTHER MULTILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES


16. (C) At a November 6 meeting with Andy Rachmianto, Deputy
Director of the DEPLU Directorate for International Security
and Disarmament, and Bunyan Saptomo, Director of the
Directorate of North and Central America, Amb. Burk laid out
American priorities for strengthening the global
nonproliferation regime at the upcoming NPT RevCon. Amb.
Burk said the United States wanted to see a balanced review,
focusing on all three pillars -- nonproliferation, arms
control, and peaceful use of nuclear technology. The United
States had already demonstrated its recommitment to
disarmament, particularly through talks on a renewed START
treaty with Russia. On nonproliferation, it was important to
strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, seek greater adherence
to the Additional Protocol (AP),and improve compliance.
There was a particular need, she noted, to address abuse of
the withdrawal process, which would require NPT parties to
develop a response in cases where a party violated the treaty
and then announced its intention to withdraw, as was the case
with North Korea. The United States was not seeking to
change Article 10, but hoped that the RevCon would
reestablish a subsidiary body on Article 10 issues, and Burk
urged Indonesian support for such a move. She also expected
a "rich debate" on peaceful uses and said the United States
would like the RevCon to encourage the IAEA,s work on fuel
banks and assurances.


17. (C) Rachmianto agreed with the importance of the three
pillars and was pleased with the Obama administration's
balanced approach, which had created "new momentum" on these
issues for the first time in a decade. He concurred on the
need for strengthened IAEA safeguards and greater adherence
to the Additional Protocol, but he said that some Middle East
countries were sensitive to any movement toward making the
Additional Protocol mandatory. For the GOI, he added,
Article 10 was very clear -- every state has the right to
withdraw -- although accountability can be addressed within
the existing framework of the NPT. Indonesia could "live
with" an Article 10 subsidiary body, but we would have to "be
cautious" on creating conditions for withdrawal. Einhorn
noted that IAEA Director General ElBaradei has said that he
needed adherence to the AP to accomplish the IAEA,s job of
determining if undeclared nuclear activities were occurring.
He urged Indonesia to take the lead in seeking ASEAN-wide
adherence to the AP, which would be a huge contribution to
the NPT RevCon and could also help to allay regional and

JAKARTA 00001902 005 OF 005


global concerns about Burma,s nuclear ambitions.


18. (C) On the Middle East resolution within the NPT RevCon,
Rachmianto said that addressing all three pillars would not
be sufficient in 2010 if there was not progress on the Middle
East issue. He said that NAM countries were seeking a
standing committee to deal with the issue and the dynamic
among NAM countries on this topic had changed since 2005,
particularly singling out Syria. Einhorn pushed back,
stating that no single country should be allowed to hijack
the NPT RevCon because there was too much at stake.
Indonesia could help by asking Egypt, the key backer of the
Middle East resolution, to put the issue in perspective.


19. (C) In response to a question from SANAC Einhorn
regarding NAM perspectives on Iran, Rachmianto said Iran has
held that it was not obligated to notify the IAEA about the
covert Qom nuclear facility, since Iran had only signed, but
not ratified, the Additional Protocol. He added that he
expected Iran would maintain that position in NAM
discussions. Einhorn pointed out that it is Iran's original
NPT and IAEA comprehensive safeguards obligations,
particularly under Code 3.1 modified and not the Additional
Protocol, that are relevant in this case.


20. (C) Rachmianto said the Indonesian National Atomic
Energy Agency (BATEN) was studying fuel cycle proposals but
that some countries in the region were still allergic to
studying those issues within the IAEA framework. Indonesia
was open to these suggestions, however, and had asked its
technical experts to review the various proposals.


21. (C) Turning to the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
(FMCT),Einhorn requested that Indonesia encourage Pakistan
to engage in negotiations rather than continue to create
procedural roadblocks. Rachmianto said that Indonesia
understood the importance of this but had already tried to
persuade Pakistan without success.


22. (C) Rachmianto noted that the GOI has already created an
interagency team to draft the documents required for CTBT
ratification, but added that it needed to make Commission One
members more aware of the issue. Rachmianto said he
understood the importance of having a comprehensive export
control law, but the GOI lacks a sense of urgency because
Indonesia does not produce or export sensitive dual use
goods. Regarding PSI, he said Indonesia continued to have
concerns about interdiction and liability issues. Einhorn
explained that PSI allowed high seas interdiction only in
accordance with international and national laws and offered
that the USG would be happy to provide further information,
either in documentary form or by a visit of experts to
Jakarta. Rachmianto said efforts on behalf of a collective
ASEAN statement on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism were still in early stages. In addition, Indonesia
remained willing to host a regional workshop on UNSCR 1540.


23. (U) This message was approved by SANAC Einhorn.


HUME