INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY -- INFLUENTIAL EXPERT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001667

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/P, EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP
NSC FOR J. BADER AND D. WALTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2019
TAGS: PREL KDEM ASEAN ID BM
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY -- INFLUENTIAL EXPERT
CALLS FOR "POST-ASEAN" APPROACH

REF: JAKARTA 1628

Classified By: Pol/C Joseph L. Novak, reasons 1.4(b+d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: One of Indonesia's leading foreign affairs
commentators has called for the GOI to pursue a "post-ASEAN"
foreign policy. Rizal Sukma, the influential director of
Jakarta's Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS),argued in an October 5 op-ed that the G-20 is
creating an opportunity for Indonesia to show greater
leadership. Taking advantage of this requires freeing
Indonesia somewhat from ASEAN and building strong ties with
countries such as the U.S. Sukma's views stem in part from
frustration over how he believes ASEAN has constrained a more
aggressive regional approach on Burma. The op-ed also likely
reflects some of the behind-the-scenes debates regarding
priorities in President Yudhoyono's next term, which begins
on October 20. END SUMMARY.

URGING INDONESIA TO GO BEYOND ASEAN


2. (U) Indonesia should take greater advantage of the
opportunities created by the emergence of an international
order centered on the G-20. This, according to an op-ed by
Rizal Sukma, a foreign affairs expert who frequently advises
the Presidential Palace and other senior GOI officials. In
an October 5 op-ed in the "Jakarta Post," Indonesia's leading
English-language daily, Sukma hailed the increasing
prominence of the G-20 as an opportunity for developing
countries like Indonesia to exercise greater global
leadership. To exercise such leadership, Sukma urges
Indonesia to look beyond its traditional foreign policy
horizons in Southeast Asia. (Note: The full text of Sukma's
piece is included in paragraph 8.)


3. (U) Sukma recommends a number of policy changes necessary
for Indonesia to take advantage of this evolving global
context. Indonesia must make the G-20 central to its foreign
policy-making. The country must also balance its traditional
focus on multilateral diplomacy with a heightened focus on
bilateral ties with key countries, including the United
States, Japan, China, the ROK, Australia and India.
Developing formal partnerships--such as that under
development with the United States and other countries--is a
key step in this effort.


4. (U) Indonesia must be prepared to act independently of
ASEAN when it serves the country's national interests, Sukma
counsels. That said, he acknowledges the importance of
Indonesia working with neighbors Singapore and Malaysia, and
fellow-democracies Thailand and the Philippines. While he
steps back from abandoning ASEAN all together, Sukma firmly
knocks the regional organization from its central place in
Indonesian policy-making.

AN ONGOING DEBATE


5. (C) Sukma's op-ed reflects an ongoing debate within the
Indonesian foreign policy establishment and a likely struggle
over the direction of policy-making during President
Yudhoyono's next term. Over the past few years, a cohort of
Indonesian "ASEAN skeptics" has emerged, including Sukma and
other experts at CSIS as well as some members of the
Indonesian Parliament. The skeptics charge that ASEAN's
consensus-based decision making constrains Indonesia's
leadership of the region. Sukma has frequently told Mission
interlocutors of his frustration over ASEAN's blocking of a
more aggressive regional approach to promoting reform in
Burma. That frustration apparently helped fuel the approach
outlined in the op-ed. While no prominent expert has called
for Indonesia to withdraw from the regional organization,
skeptics like Sukma urge that Indonesian leaders should make
policy with less concern for the views of other ASEAN members.


6. (C) However, other foreign policy leaders, including many
of the senior officials at the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DEPLU),remain committed to ASEAN's central place in
Indonesian foreign policy. They still hold fast to
Indonesia's traditional multilateralism and are loathe to
interfere in what they regard as the internal affairs of
other states. For them, ASEAN remains a comfortable place
for Indonesia to exercise cautious and limited leadership on
regional issues.


7. (C) At this point it is unclear which view will have the
upper hand in shaping Indonesian policy over the coming

JAKARTA 00001667 002 OF 003


years. Given President Yudhoyono's cautious approach, we are
unlikely to see any dramatic change in Indonesia's policy
toward ASEAN. That said, FM Wirajuda's increasingly strong
rhetoric on Burma might presage a more assertive Indonesian
toward some regional issues (see reftel) .

TEXT OF OP-ED


8. (U) The text of Rizal Sukma's op-ed follows:

Begin text:

A Post-ASEAN Foreign Policy for a Post-G8 World

Rizal Sukma
The Jakarta Post
Monday, October 5, 2009

It has long been predicted that international relations of
the 21st century would be different from those in the 20th
century. And, recently, that prediction has become closer to
reality when leaders of G-20, meeting in Pittsburgh, agreed
to elevate the forum into a more strategic level, signaling
the end of a world dominated by eight developed countries
(The G8). The fate and the future shape of global politics
are now increasingly defined by both developed and developing
countries. We are now entering a G-20 world.

Being a member of the G-20, Indonesia is part of that
strategic transformation. This is an opportunity too
valuable to be missed. It opens up a whole new range of
possibilities for our efforts in redefining our place within
the international community. It reinforces the question
whether the current foreign policy format, which still treats
Southeast Asia and ASEAN as the first concentric circle, is
still adequate. A new world requires a new foreign policy.
It is time to recognize that we need a post-ASEAN foreign
policy for a post-G8 world.

So, what does a post-ASEAN foreign policy for Indonesia
entail? First, Indonesia should reinforce faithfully the
true spirit of bebas-aktif (free and active) foreign policy
as envisioned by the founders of the Republic. Indonesia's
foreign policy under the stewardship of President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono and Minister Hassan Wirayuda has done this,
but the point needs to be emphasized further. Indonesia
should free itself from any undeserving obligation to follow
the wishes of any state or a grouping of states, including
ASEAN, if doing so would sacrifice our own national interests.

Recently, Indonesia has begun to demonstrate a degree of
autonomy vis a vis ASEAN. We are no longer hesitant to take
a different position from other ASEAN countries if we have
to. We should not let ourselves become the one who should
always make compromises. But, we should not feel
uncomfortable if our position would mean the absence of
consensus, and therefore the absence of agreement. That is
the true meaning of a bebas-aktif foreign policy.

Second, Indonesia needs to re-define the theory of
"concentric circles" which guides the conduct of its foreign
policy. Instead of emphasizing the geographical aspect of
the concept--which defines Southeast Asia and ASEAN as the
first and most important concentric circle or foreign policy
theater for Indonesia--Indonesia should also incorporate
other dimensions such as strategic necessity, functionality,
values, and identity as parameters for defining the arena
where it should pursue its national interests.

In terms of strategic necessity, for example, countries like
Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, Australia, China, India and the
United States are far more important to Indonesia than any
other countries, and should form the first concentric circle
of foreign relations. In functional terms, layers of the
circle should be defined according to issues at hand. The
G-20 should also be part of our foreign policy's first
concentric circle. Due to shared values in democracy, our
relations with democratic countries need to be enhanced. And,
identity as a moderate Muslim-majority nation would also
oblige us to play a more active role in the Muslim world.

Third, Indonesia needs to balance its commitment to
multilateralism with that of bilateralism in the conduct of
foreign relations. We need to give more emphasis to certain
bilateral relationship within and outside ASEAN. Within
ASEAN, we need to deepen our relations with Malaysia and

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Singapore (for strategic necessity) and with Philippines and
Thailand (for shared values in democracy). Outside ASEAN, we
need to strengthen our "strategic" or "comprehensive"
partnership with global and regional major powers, especially
the US, Japan, Australia, India, South Korea, and China.

Fourth, Indonesia should also identify its international
position closer to the Asia-Pacific region. By doing so, its
foreign policy horizon would be expanded and new
opportunities and initiatives would be possible. The way we
see our self, and define our place within the international
system, would enlighten us in our search for new ways to
pursue our national interests. The most important agenda in
this regard is to take part in shaping the emerging regional
architecture in the region.

Fifth, a post-ASEAN foreign policy does not mean that we need
to abandon ASEAN. But, we need to treat ASEAN for what it
really is, namely, as an organization incapable of moving
beyond what it is meant for: preserving regional stability
and security by maintaining good inter-state relations among
member states. We should continue to persuade ASEAN to
change for the better, but we need not waste our energy if
other members are erecting all the barriers, and doing
whatever they can, to ensure that such noble idea remains an
illusion and unattainable. We should work through ASEAN
whenever we need to, push for a certain agenda whenever we
can, and go beyond it whenever we must.

In short, a post-ASEAN foreign policy for Indonesia is not an
"extra-ASEAN" foreign policy as some would suggest. That
still connotes the strategic centrality of ASEAN in our
foreign policy, while others are merely "extra". It is a new
direction for Indonesia's foreign policy in which ASEAN is no
more important, if not less, than other venues such as the
G-20. It is a blueprint for Indonesia to follow if it does
not want to always punch below its weight. It is a platform
for a democratic Indonesia to strengthen its relevance amidst
rapid strategic and geopolitical transformation in the
Asia-Pacific and beyond. President Yudhoyono's second
administration is in a position to do just that.

End text.

OSIUS