IRAN/DIPLOMACY: FORMER IRANIAN MFA DG URGES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 000047

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; BAKU FOR MCCRENSKY;
BAGHDAD FOR BUZBEE AND FLINCHBAUGH; ASHGABAT FOR TANGBORN;
DUBAI FOR IRPO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IR TU
SUBJECT: IRAN/DIPLOMACY: FORMER IRANIAN MFA DG URGES
ENGAGEMENT BUT WARNS AGAINST BOLSTERING AHMADINEJAD

REF: A) 08 ISTANBUL 85 B) ISTANBUL 14

Classified By: Deputy Principal Officer Sandra Oudkirk; Reason 1.5 (d).


1. (C) Summary: Kia Tabatabaee, a former Iranian MFA
Director General now working for the "Developing Eight" (D8)
organization in Istanbul, told us that Iran awaits US steps
towards engagement. He urged the US and EU3 to put aside the
nuclear issue "for a few months" and cooperate on regional
issues like supporting Iraqi and Afghan elections and
political development, stopping narcotics smuggling from
Afghanistan, and sharing information on Al Qaeda and other
terrorist groups targeting Iran and the US. But he cautioned
against bilateral US-Iran meetings until after Iran's
elections, so as not to bolster Ahmadinejad's chances. He
handicapped the current Iranian presidential candidates,
pointing to Tehran Mayor GHALIBAF as most able to beat
Ahmadinejad. Tabatabaee was an engaging, polished, talkative
interlocutor with whom we will stay in contact absent
instructions to the contrary. End Summary.


2. (C) In a January 28 meeting in Istanbul with the
(Iranian) Director of the Organization of the Developing
Eight States' (D8) Secretariat in Istanbul to discuss D8
issues (septel),former Iranian MFA Director General for
Economic Affairs and Ambassador to Russia and to Iran's UN
Missions Geneva Kia Tabatabaee initiated a discussion of
US-Iran relations and of Iran's presidential elections.
Given Tabatabaee's official status (according to him) since
January 1, 2009 of being an accredited international
organization employee and no longer on the Iranian
government's payroll as a seconded diplomat to the D8, we
engaged him in the discussion. (Comment: We had agreed to
meet with Tabatabaee to discuss D8 issues at the suggestion
of D8 Secretary General Dipo Alam (ref A),a friend and
contact of the Consulate's, following assurances of
Tabatabaee's non-GOI status.)

US-Iran relations: Find common regional goals
--------------


3. (C) Noting that he had just carefully read the transcript
of President Obama's January 28 interview with Al-Arabiya,
Tabatabaee made a fist with his hand, then theatrically
reached over, unclenched his fist, offered his hand, and said
"Enough is enough. Iran wants to engage." He said the
President's decision to speak first to Al-Arabiya was a
brilliant one. We queried how he thought future engagement
between the US and Iran might proceed, and on what topics.
Tabatabaee suggested that both sides need to "exploit common
interests and goals with regard to regional issues, cooperate
on those, and use that cooperation to build naturally towards
engaging on the central issue of Iranian-US relations."


4. (C) Tabatabaee pointed to the desire for stable,
peaceful, successful elections in both Afghanistan and in
Iraq in 2009 as a shared goal that would benefit from joint
Iranian-US cooperation and would bolster stability in both
countries. "Such stability is of even greater national
interest to Iran than it is to you." He added that US
cooperation with Iran and other regional countries under a UN
umbrella to fight narcotics smuggling from Afghanistan would
also be warmly welcomed in Iran both by the GOI and the
population. Tabatabaee also suggested that sharing
information to combat Al Qaeda and "other extremists in the
region that target both Iran and the U.S." would be a
valuable, mutually beneficial area for cooperation.
Consultation and cooperation between US and Iranian diplomats
on these issues, even in a multilateral setting, would
generate significant confidence on the GOI's part. "Focusing
on common interests and working pragmatically with each other
on those issues would prove your peaceful intentions towards
Iran and at the same time defuse some common threats." The
Iranian people, he offered, were expecting no less from
"their great hope, President Obama."

But "put aside the nuclear issue for a few months"
-------------- ---


5. (C) We pointed out that any engagement with Iran would
need to include a serious effort on Iran's part to comply
with UNSC obligations with regard to its nuclear activities.
Tabatabaee instead urged that the nuclear issue "be put to
the side, even if only for a few months," claiming that every
time Washington or an EU3 capital makes a statement about the
nuclear issue it bolsters Ahmadinejad because it reinforces
the domestic perception that he is effectively defying a
Western attempt to limit Iran's sovereignty. He asserted

ISTANBUL 00000047 002 OF 003


that the issue was not so time sensitive that it must always
"take center stage and crowd out issues that we can work
together on." Tabatabaee also suggested that if the US and
EU3 were clearly to refrain from raising the nuclear issue in
public speeches and discussions of Iran in coming weeks, the
West would likely see signs of Iran's enrichment-related
activities slowing down considerably, and "Ahmadinejad won't
have a reason to harp about it on the campaign trail."

And no bilateral meetings before June
--------------


6. (C) Somewhat at odds with what we have heard recently
from several other experienced Iranian interlocutors (ref B),
however, Tabatabaee urged that the USG not move quickly into
bilateral engagement with Iran. He urged Washington to delay
any one-on-one meetings with Iranian counterparts until after
Iran's June presidential elections. "Setting the table
beforehand and even meeting multilaterally to cooperate on
regional issues would be prudent," he explained, "but if
high-level American and Iranian officials meet each other
bilaterally before June elections, Ahmadinejad's hand will be
strengthened."

Slamming Ahmadinejad
--------------


7. (C) Tabatabaee launched into a surprisingly candid
critique of Ahmadinejad, skewering him over both his domestic
and foreign policy records. "Now that I am no longer an
Iranian government employee, I am free to speak my mind: he
has been terrible for Iran." Tabatabaee admitted that his
dislike of Ahmadinejad was cemented when Ahmadinejad ordered
the MFA in summer 2006 to remove senior diplomats considered
by Iran's hard-liners to be too westernized, including
Tabatabaee.

Iran's presidential elections
--------------


8. (C) Asked if the international community may have to
learn to live with four more years of Ahmadinejad, Tabatabaee
demurred that it was "four months too soon to predict the
election outcome", though he proceeded anyway to handicap the
race as it currently stands (including key figures who
haven't yet declared their candidacy): Former Speaker
Kerroubi, considered a reformist, is "not realistic enough to
see he can't make it to the second round, and besides, the
time of clerics as presidents is past; Iranian voters give no
extra credit now to the clergy." Former Prime Minister
Mousavi "is a credible candidate and would make a capable
president but most Iranian voters are too young to remember
him. He is from the too-far past." Former President
Khatami, "the one and only, as his supporters call him, is
too afraid of risking his reputation and will not enter the
race unless Supreme Leader Khamenei gives him a public
endorsement, which is unlikely. Even if he runs, there are
too many former reformers who still have not forgiven his
weakness in failing to confront the hard-liners who neutered
his presidency." Tehran Mayor GHALIBAF "is the only
opposition candidate who can appeal both to conservatives and
to reformers, and therefore who can beat Ahmadinejad. He is
a strong leader, and if he can run an effective campaign he
can win." Tabatabaee described a recent incident from a
January 10 meeting between Ahmadinejad and GHALIBAF to
discuss Tehran's traffic problems. A serious argument broke
out between the two, according to Tabatabaee, with GHALIBAF
physically confronting the smaller Ahmadinejad until aides
restrained them both. "GHALIBAF is not afraid of
Ahmadinejad; he dislikes him and wants very much to run
against him and beat him."


9. (C) Having offered up GHALIBAF as the best candidate to
beat Ahmadinejad Tabatabaee acknowledged that "nobody knows
what will happen; it all depends on who the Supreme Leader
endorses. The elections results will tilt that way." He
noted that "more than usual there is a lot happening behind
the curtain that even Iranian observers don't understand."
He noted that Iran's Military Chief of Staff earlier this
week was quoted in an Iranian newspaper strongly endorsing
Ahmadinejad. According to Tabatabaee the letter prompted a
harsh rebuttal from Kerroubi, accusing the official of
illegal interference in an Iranian election. Tabatabaee
concluded that "something is definitely cooking behind the
scenes" and cautioned that many more "elections twists" are
likely to appear in the coming weeks.

Comment and bio notes

ISTANBUL 00000047 003 OF 003


--------------


10. (C) Tabatabaee was engaging, polished, and smooth. He
is clearly well-practiced at gauging carefully and delivering
effectively whatever messages he thinks will win over his
interlocutor. He speaks excellent English laced with
American idioms presumably gleaned from his time as a
university student in Texas. He has been the D8 Secretariat
Director since August 2006 (as a consolation prize from the
MFA following his forced exit as MFA DG for Economic
Affairs). He has two children -- a son in Switzerland and a
daughter in university in Iran -- and a wife who lives in
Tehran but flies monthly to Istanbul to see him.


11. (C) Politically, Tabatabaee made no effort to hide his
strong support for Gahlibaf's candidacy. He joked that
whether he stays as Director of the D8 Secretariat for three
more years or returns to Iran in 2009 depends on whether
Ahmadinejad or GHALIBAF wins the election. Given
Tabatabaee's willingness to expound at length on Iranian
politics and US-Iran relations, and in light of his MFA
experience, we see Tabatabaee as potentially a very useful
interlocutor and intend to stay in contact with him absent
instructions to the contrary from the Department.
Wiener