US-IRAN RELATIONS: CONTACTS IN TURKEY AND IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 000014

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS TU IR
SUBJECT: US-IRAN RELATIONS: CONTACTS IN TURKEY AND IRAN
URGE U.S. STEPS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BEFORE IRAN'S JUNE
ELECTIONS

REF: 2008 ISTANBUL 560

Classified By: Deputy Principal
Officer Sandra Oudkirk; Reason 1.5 (d).


1. (C) Summary: Iranian contacts and local experts have
cautioned it would be a mistake if the USG, as it considers
whether, when, and how to engage Iran, withheld such an
approach in an effort to impact the outcome of Iran's
elections, in this case against Ahmadinejad. One expert
argued that Ahmadinejad's re-election might actually
strengthen prospects for better US-Iran relations. Comment:
We understand the idea of the USG offering a gesture in
support of engagement with Iran in the near-term may run
counter to current Washington thinking, as does the dissonant
notion that Ahmadinejad's re-election may be in USG
interests. But we consider these cautionary views worth
reporting, as we have heard such views consistently in recent
weeks not only from these well-informed contacts but from
many "regular" Iranians as well. End summary.


2. (C) Over the past several weeks, ConGen Istanbul's NEA
"Iran Watcher" has pulsed contacts in Iran (by phone and
email),as well as local experts who follow Iranian affairs,
on the question of US-Iran relations, prospects for improved
relations, and impact of any such diplomacy on the June
Iranian presidential elections.

Make a gesture, but sooner rather than later
--------------


3. (C) An influential senior researcher at Iran's Center for
Strategic Research (CSR) (protect),the Iranian Expediency
Council's think-tank, conveyed his views through a mutual
Turkish acquaintance, suggesting that "if the Obama
administration concludes it is in America's interest to
improve relations with Iran, make a gesture." He warned that
if Iran's political system or voters think Washington is
trying to use a gesture of dialogue to change the outcome of
Iranian elections, "you will not get the outcome you want."
He offered that an important early gesture from the USG which
would have an immediate positive impact on the Iranian
people, while confronting Iran's foreign policy establishment
with "its own hard choices" to make, would be a request to
send US diplomats to staff the US Interests Section on
Tehran. If proposed in a "respectful and non-confrontational
way," the "moderates" in Iran's decision-making arena would
"probably be in a position to respond positively." He
advised that "the sooner Washington makes such a gesture, the
less risk there is that Iran's response will get caught and
captured as an election issue."
Better relations means the SL wants a moderate President
--------------


4. (C) A private Tehran-based political consultant told us
that even if both the US and Iran started maneuvering towards
bilateral dialogue as early as February, and if progress is
made before June's elections, Iranian voters "will not give
any credit to Ahmadinejad, but in fact they will see
improving relations as a signal that Ayatollah Khamenei wants
a more pragmatic Iranian candidate to win in June." Arguing
that US-Iran relations are a fundamental issue touching on
regime viability and survival, "not a mere presidential
campaign issue like subsidies for the poor or aid to Gaza,"
most Iranian voters accept that only Khamenei will decide
whether and when to allow improved relations. Since he
signaled last year a willingness to consider such a step, and
since the Obama administration is seen in Iran as having
committed in its campaign to hold direct dialogue with Iran
("Iranians took that as a campaign promise not just to
American voters, but to Iranians too"),both Iranian voters
and the GOI expect the new administration to "make the first
move", soon. The absence of any such move before Iran's
elections would be seen in Iran as evidence that the new
administration, fairly or not, backed away from its promises.
On the other hand, positive steps towards improved relations
"would generate significant voter support for the leading
pragmatic candidate, like GHALIBAF or Larijani, because the
Supreme Leader would not have allowed improved relations if
he still wanted Ahmadinejad to win."

Don't try to tweak Iranian elections
--------------


5. (C) An Iranian journalist living in Istanbul argued that
"past efforts by the US to impact Iranian elections generated
results you did not want," citing the June 2005 Iranian
presidential elections as an example. In those elections,

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she claimed, "Washington and Europe confidently predicted
Rafsanjani and Karroubi" would be the second round
candidates, while at the same time "harping constantly about
the minor economic incentives Iran would get for suspending
enrichment, as if both were a foregone conclusion." That
mobilized hard-liners to make sure Ahmadinejad would get into
and win the second round, the journalist asserted. "The
moment the Obama administration hints at a favored candidate
for this year's elections, or uses its Iran policy to try to
leverage such a result, you can be sure you will get the
candidate you least want." She suggested that "99% of
Iranian voters" want better relations with America, "but on
Iran's terms and timing, not yours, and not as an election
issue, but as a shared national interest that benefits both
America and Iran."

But don't forego a genuine chance to improve relations
-------------- --


6. (C) A mid-level researcher at Iran's Center for Strategic
Research (CSR) who follows election procedures, public
diplomacy and media (protect),assessed to us that Iran's
voters have "lived through a generation of propaganda" and
thus are "sophisticated enough to recognize when someone is
trying to manipulate their voting intentions." She warned
that if Iran's voters think the US is intentionally delaying
for a few months a genuine opportunity to lessen tensions and
improve relations with Iran, in order to help a moderate
candidate get elected or to defeat Ahmadinejad, they will see
that as another bad faith gesture in "a historically long
line" of such gestures from the US. She explained that
Iranian voters understand that only the Supreme Leader can
decide when the system is ready to accept improved relations
with the US; "it is not something that will impact voting for
presidential candidates."

Delay favors Ahmadinejad; talk to the Supreme Leader
-------------- --------------


7. (C) A European political analyst who tracks Iran for an
international crisis response NGO told us that any delay in
U.S. initiative towards Iran plays in Ahmadinejad's favor.
"Ahmadinejad's letter to President-elect Obama was a smart
move, setting himself up for a win-win situation. If Obama
engages Ahmadinejad, he wins. If Obama ignores Ahmadinejad,
he also wins, because he can show that Obama's policy towards
Iran will not differ from President Bush's." The analyst
explained that Ahmadinejad wants to distract voters from the
economic situation and other dismal domestic issues. The
crisis in Gaza is having that effect currently, allowing
Ahmadinejad to stake out a tough position against Israel
beyond reproach from other candidates. Relations with the
U.S., and a failure of the US to reply to Ahmadinejad's
letter, "may fill that same role in run-up to the elections."
The smartest move the U.S. can make, he suggested, is to
seek engagement with Iran soon, "but do it via the Supreme
Leader's office" via his diplomatic advisor, former Foreign
Minister Velayati, a rival of Ahmadinejad's. "Ultimately, it
does not matter who is President. The USG is focused too
much on Ahmadinejad. He is not the issue, nor is the
presidential elections. Whoever wins in June, Iran's
fundamental policies will only change when the Supreme Leader
wants them to. That is why you need to find a way to talk to
the Supreme Leader's key advisors."

A counter-intuitive idea: Hope Ahmadinejad wins
-------------- ---


8. (C) An Istanbul-based western news correspondent who
travels frequently to Iran and maintains contacts with
Iranian policy-makers reinforced the same line of advice:
Iran's elections are too complex for the US to try to
manipulate via diplomacy, and any effort to do so will only
result in unintended and unwanted consequences. That said,
he also offered the dissonant advice that "an Ahmadinejad
re-election would actually strengthen prospects for a US-Iran
rapprochement" as only Ahmadinejad -- "like Nixon to China"
-- can win over Iran's hard-liners to accept improved
relations with the US. The correspondent believed it was
important that an Obama administration make a "positive but
reversible" gesture soon, not to Ahmadinejad, but to Iran as
a nation. "For example, request Iran's permission to send
U.S. diplomats to staff the Interests Section; issue a White
House statement on Iran's independence day acknowledging the
Iranian people's sacrifices and congratulating their
successes, while formally recognizing the constitutional
basis of Iran's government; and reaffirm Washington's policy
of not supporting regime change, actually enforcing that

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policy within the USG."


9. (C) Such gestures would, he felt, swiftly unlock momentum
towards compromise on the Iranian side as well. "But for the
compromise the USG most needs -- Iran compromising on its
enrichment program -- only Ahmadinejad, the personification
of Iran's right to peaceful nuclear technology, can persuade
Iran's hard-liners to accept such a deal over the long-term.
You need him in office to do that."

Comment
--------------


10. (C) We understand the idea of the USG offering a gesture
in support of bilateral dialogue in the near-term may run
counter to current Washington thinking, as does the
cognitively dissonant argument that only Ahmadinejad can
secure Iranian hard-liners' support for better relations and
a possible Iranian compromise on the nuclear issue. But we
consider these cautionary perspectives worth reporting, as we
have heard such views consistently in recent weeks, not only
from these well-informed contacts, but from many "regular"
Iranians as well.

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