ANP'S WALI KHAN PRAISES MILITARY SUCCESSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 000947

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PK
SUBJECT: ANP'S WALI KHAN PRAISES MILITARY SUCCESSES

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Classified By: CDA Gerald Feierstein, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (C) Summary. Awami National Party President Asfundyar
Wali Khan told Charge May 3 that he was pleased (for the
first time) with vigorous Army/Frontier Corps action against
militants in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). GOP
forces were moving into Shangla, completing the encirclement
of Swat in preparation to move against militants within the
Swat Valley. The NWFP provincial government had met for the
last time with TNSM leader Sufi Mohammed; they were
proceeding with implementing the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation so
the government--not Sufi--would get the credit for responding
to popular concern for "swift justice." He claimed his
strategy of separating the populace from the militants had
worked, and there was now widespread support for military
action. Wali Khan said to control extremism in NWFP required
that the GOP go after militants in the Waziristans. He
warned that the consequences of current GOP military action
would be increased militant attacks in the settled areas of
Pakistan and more cross-border attacks on U.S./NATO forces in
Afghanistan because Waziri militants allied with Mullah Omar
were preparing for a summer campaign. While disagreeing on
modalities, Wali Khan shared USG concern for the need to
control ethnic/political violence in Karachi and to replace
the current NWFP governor. End Summary.

Military Action/Nizam-e-Adl
--------------


2. (C) Awami National Party (ANP) leader Asfundyar Wali
Khan met May 3 with Charge and A/DCM for and hour an half.
Wali Khan said that for the first time, Pakistani security
forces were doing their job in eliminating extremism in the
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). When locals pointed out
militant locations the security forces were going after them
instead of alerting them to flee, as they had done in the
past. He reported that GOP forces had moved to Shangla and
were closing the noose on Swat, where Wali Khan expected Army
action to begin shortly. Once the Army cleaned up the area,
however, they could not become an occupying force. Wali Khan
expressed great concern about what force would hold the area;
Charge outlined USG offers to repair/harden police stations
and train and equip the NWFP Elite Police Force and said we
had been frustrated at the inability of the national or
provincial governments to provide us a needs assessment or
access. Wali Khan said he was meeting with NWFP Chief
Minister Hoti later in the day and would get us a response.


3. (C) Wali Khan confirmed that the NWFP government would
proceed with implementing the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation (NAR) so
the government, not TNSM leader Sufi Mohammed, would get the
credit. This was about responding to decades-old popular
requests for "swift justice." The press reported that the
NWFP government unilaterally established the Darul Qaza
(appeals) courts May 2 and had nominated two Peshawar High
Court justices to serve in these appeals courts in Malakand
Division. Sufi is reported to have opposed this unilateral
NAR implementation. Wali Khan said that the NWFP's May 2
meeting with Sufi Mohammed (which has been widely criticized
in the local media) was their last meeting.
Washington Visit
--------------


4. (C) Wali Khan reported that President Zardari had
invited him to go to Washington for the bilateral/trilateral
meetings next week, but the GOP also had committed that the
leader of the National Assembly's Foreign Policy Committee
would attend a counterparts meeting in Turkey the same week.
"If I do not go," said Wali Khan, "that would mean Jamiat
Ulema-e-Islam leader Fazlur Rehman would represent Pakistan";
Zardari had agreed that this was not in their interest. Wali
Khan said he would be happy to visit Washington if invited in
the coming weeks or months.

Karachi Violence
--------------


5. (C) Charge raised U.S. concern about escalating
Pashtun/ANP-Muhajir/Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) violence
in Karachi. Wali Khan relayed his recent conversation with
MQM leader Altaf Hussain in which Wali Khan said bluntly that
MQM was going to have to become accustomed to greater numbers
and powers of Pashtuns in Karachi. It was in both MQM and

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ANP interests to prevent conflict and avoid the blame game.
He suggested that some of the violence was started by other
parties (e.g., Jamaat Islami or the Balochis) that benefited
from MQM-ANP conflict. Charge pressed again on the need for
peaceful resolution of ANP-MQM differences, especially given
the upcoming May 12 anniversary of a bloody inter-party clash.

NWFP Governor
--------------


6. (C) Wali Khan agreed there was an urgent need to replace
NWFP Governor Ghani and said that GOP negotiations had been
ongoing for some months with Azam Khan, a former NWFP Chief
Secretary. Wali Khan felt that he was the best candidate
precisely because he was non-political and had extensive
experience as a bureaucrat in the Federally Administered
Tribal Area (FATA). Anwar Saifullah, an alternate candidate
being considered by President Zardari, was rich and
well-connected but as a PPP politician could upset the
delicate PPP-ANP relations within the NWFP government.
Making clear that past difference still rankled, Wali
discounted Saifullah's pledge to respect the Hoti
government's electoral mandate, recalling that Saifullah had
tried to maneuver into the Chief Minister's chair after last
year's election even though the ANP enjoyed a clear
parliamentary edge. If neither could be appointed, Wali Khan
suggested that perhaps retired Lt General Imran Ullah Khan, a
Pashtun appointed by Benazir Bhutto as Balochistan governor
in 1994, could be a compromise candidate.

Consequences & Drones
--------------


7. (C) The Army/Frontier Corps had to finish operations in
Swat, Buner and Dir and then move on to the FATA, said Wali
Khan. It was clear that the heart of the problem was in the
Waziristans, which had openly declared allegiance to Mullah
Omar. The GOP could not protect the NWFP from militancy
without clearing the Waziristans. Wali Khan said there would
be two consequences to these military operations--increased
militant attacks inside the settled areas of Pakistan and
increased cross-border attacks on U.S./NATO forces. The
militants in Waziristan were gearing up for a summer
offensive, and the U.S. should be prepared, warned Wali Khan,
that the price of encouraging the GOP to shut down militancy
in Pakistan would spill over into Afghanistan.


8. (C) Claiming his strategy of separating the population
from the militants in Swat had worked, Wali Khan said that
the key to counter-insurgency strategy was winning the hearts
and minds of the people. The people in the Waziristans, he
noted, have never protested U.S. drone attacks because they
know the GOP has no way to stop extremism there without
drones. The only ones protesting drones were intellectual
liberals sitting in Lahore and Islamabad.


9. (C) Comment: Wali Khan consistently has been critical
of the lack of Army will/capability to carry out operations
against militants, so his new-found praise is welcome news.
It indicates that, despite a lack of training and equipment,
the Pakistani Army/Frontier Corps can conduct
counter-insurgency operations when it truly wants to.
Whether they succeed in holding cleared areas, however,
remains to be seen. We suspect Wali Khan's decision to
decline Zardari's invitation to Washington had more to do
with avoiding USG criticism of ANP's deal with Sufi Mohammad
than his desire to represent Pakistan in Ankara.

FEIERSTEIN