Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ISLAMABAD926
2009-04-30 13:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

GROPING FOR NATIONAL UNITY

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PK 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0198
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0214
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 4817
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 1546
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 7151
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 6086
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 000926 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PK
SUBJECT: GROPING FOR NATIONAL UNITY

Classified By: CDA Gerald Feierstein, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 000926

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PK
SUBJECT: GROPING FOR NATIONAL UNITY

Classified By: CDA Gerald Feierstein, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (C) Summary. Pitching the need for national unity to
tackle the extremist challenge has become the flavor of the
day, but Pakistan's politicians still are focused first and
foremost on their own survival. PM Gilani increasingly is
aligning himself with Nawaz Sharif through negotiations to
restore the Pakistan Muslim League-N/Pakistan People's Party
coalition in Punjab, promises to form an all-parties
committee, and efforts to repeal the 17th amendment. This is
alienating Gilani from President Zardari, who has made
half-hearted and reportedly clumsy gestures at outreach to
Nawaz. Mutual Zardari-Nawaz suspicion is blocking serious
discussion of efforts to form a national unity government.
Out in the cold in Punjab, the Pakistan Muslim League
reportedly is negotiating to join the national coalition but
opposing plans to help Nawaz by repealing the 17th amendment.



2. (C) Gilani asked Charge for assistance in strengthening
law enforcement's ability to hold areas once the
Army/Frontier Corps leaves, as they must; it was also
critical to help the growing IDP population. Charge outlined
ongoing USG plans to respond to GOP military and police
support requests and help with IDPs (septel). Gilani tried
to sell a bit of revisionist history by claiming that the
decision to sign the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation was all part of a
grand plan to let Sufi Mohammed and the taliban overreach, as
the Pakistani government and military knew he would. Now the
nation was united behind the fight, according to Gilani.


3. (C) But Zardari and Gilani failed even to introduce
their planned National Assembly resolution in support of
military action in the Northwest Frontier Province before
Zardari left Pakistan for a two week tour to include
bilateral/trilateral meetings in Washington. The Pakistan
Muslim League-N (PML-N) privately supports military action
against the militants but will not say so publicly, according
to Opposition Leader Chaudhry Nisar; gaining PML-N support
would require Zardari to take the opposition into greater
confidence. But PML-N continues to reach out to the U.S.;
Nisar wants to visit Washington in June/July to lay the

groundwork for a later Nawaz visit. End Summary.


4. (C) Charge and A/DCM met April 29 with PM Gilani for an
hour and a half; A/DCM met separately with Pakistan Muslim
League-N (PML-N) Opposition leader Chaudhry Nisar. A/DCM met
April 23 with Pakistan Muslim League President Chaudhry
Shujaat Hussain.

All Parties Committee
--------------


5. (C) There is a growing chorus of statements on the need
to create political unity in the face of a serious insurgent
challenge. President Zardari April 29 (the day before
leaving Pakistan for two weeks) publicly called on citizens
to put political differences aside and back the troops
fighting the taliban in the Northwest Frontier Province. An
unusually assertive Gilani told Charge that "I'm a statesman,
not a politician," and the time had come to put petty
political disagreements aside and unite to win the war
against militants. Nawaz Sharif wrote to PM Gilani urging
him to form an all-parties committee to address security and
other national challenges.


6. (C) PML President Chaudhry Shujaat told A/DCM that, for
the first time in 30 years, he was truly worried; the upper
classes, he said, now were concerned about pro-taliban
sentiments in their servants and their guards. Now was the
time to put aside political infighting and focus on the dire
threat to the nation. The religious parties, Jamaat Islami
and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam are both under attack by Sufi
Mohammed, who declared Islam and democracy were incompatible;
Shujaat believed these parties would have no choice but to
embrace an all-parties committee. Muttahida Quami Movement
leader Sattar previously told Charge that his party would
support formation of a unity government.


7. (C) Gilani felt this unification effort should begin in
Punjab. "I convinced President Zardari to take a U-turn and
agree that the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) would rejoin
PML-N in the Punjab. When the Supreme Court reinstated the

ISLAMABAD 00000926 002 OF 004


status quo in Punjab, they reinstated the PML-N/PPP coalition
government. I negotiated the timing of this so that Shahbaz
Sharif could resume his post as Chief Minister without
additional challenges. I also have ordered that the National
Assembly seat that Nawaz Sharif planned to contest (before
his disqualification) be left open so that if he wins his
court challenge he can become a parliamentarian." He noted
that he had discussed this idea with Shahbaz Sharif in recent
meetings in Lahore. Asked if that meant PML-N would rejoin
the national coalition, Gilani said this was a different
issue. Having the PPP resume its role in Punjab was a
positive decision, but having PML-N reverse its decision to
quit the cabinet was more complicated.


8. (C) Gilani has asked National Assembly Speaker Mirza,
currently on a visit to China, to form an all-parties
committee when she returned to consider repeal of the 17th
amendment, following up on a request from PML-N. However,
Gilani said he was going further; he had promised Nawaz he
would work on implementing the PPP/PML-N Charter of
Democracy, which included a commitment to repeal the 17th
amendment. He has begun quiet meetings with opposition
leaders, including PML-N's Chaudhry Nisar, and then will move
on to discussions with coalition partners. Gilani admitted
there was concern within the PPP (read Zardari) that
repealing the 17th amendment would benefit Nawaz, who then
would be empowered to destabilize the government. Gilani
replied that Benazir had committed to repealing the 17th
amendment and, given the challenges Pakistan faces, this is
no time to think about "one's own seat." On April 29, the
Senate adopted a resolution calling on Senate leader Naek to
form a committee to implement the Charter of Democracy; PML,
which is not a signatory to the Charter, opposed this move.


9. (C) Chaudhry Nisar confirmed to A/DCM that PML-N would
welcome the PPP back into the Punjab but indicated this was a
gesture to Gilani; 56 members of the Pakistan Muslim League
(PML) had defected to the PML-N in Punjab, so the party did
not need PPP's votes to rule. Nisar confided that PML
President Chaudhry Shujaat had been in secret negotiations
with Zardari to join the coalition in the center. This
follows Shujaat's apparently failed efforts to press for a
national unity government as a way to get his party back into
power at the national level.

Clumsy Outreach
--------------


10. (C) Nisar explained in some detail what he described as
Zardari's clumsy attempt to reach out to Nawaz, who agreed at
once to the concept of a joint meeting and even postponed a
trip to Europe to be available. Nisar said that Nawaz had
appreciated Ambassador Holbrooke's call on this issue.
Zardari sent a friend (nfi) to Nawaz's Lahore home to
negotiate the details; negotiations lasted for more than
eight hours of phone calls every five minutes in which the
presidency offered different ideas (Zardari could not come to
Raiwind, could he send a helicopter for Nawaz? Could Nawaz
call Zardari's chief of staff to extend an invitation?) that
were never acceptable to both sides. This was indicative of
the problems dealing with Zardari, said Nisar, so the idea of
PML-N rejoining a national coalition with the PPP simply was
not tenable.

Strengthening COIN Capacity
--------------


11. (C) Gilani repeated his mantra that Pakistan had the
will and the capability to fight extremism but lacked the
capacity. He ticked off a list of items on which he needed
assistance, beginning with a strengthening of law enforcement
and including assistance on internally displaced persons
(septel) and development. Gilani said that IMF restrictions
were forcing him to shift resources from development to the
police, which meant that of the government's "3 D" strategy
(dialogue, deterrence and development),he was now only
implementing the deterrence pillar.


12. (C) Insisting that there be an exit strategy for the
Army after it clears out militants, Gilani said that he
needed to strengthen law enforcement so that when the Army
left, the vacuum would not be filled by the extremists. This
is what happened after we won the jihad against the Soviets,

ISLAMABAD 00000926 003 OF 004


he said; neither Pakistan nor the U.S. could afford to make
this mistake again. He cited the need to help the police
with: bomb-proof police stations, armored troop carriers,
protective vests, explosive detection devices, training, life
insurance and widow/orphan benefits. He also mentioned his
concern about the 3.5 million Afghan refugees still present
in Pakistan and the need to increase cross-border controls to
reduce opportunities for these refuges to cause trouble.


13. (C) Charge reviewed in general terms how the U.S.
military was responding to Pakistani military requests for
helicopters, ammunition and intelligence in support of
current operations. He provided a more detailed explanation
of our current efforts and plans to assist law enforcement
across Pakistan, beginning with the NWFP's Elite Police unit.
This included training, vests, hardened police stations, and
armored vehicles. There were legal hurdles to funding
salaries or death benefits, but we could perhaps help the
NWFP government in other ways that could compensate for their
need to shift funding from development to the police.
However, Charge noted our frustration at having the money to
assist but lacking GOP approval for access to areas like
Swat. He hoped that once military operations were completed
in Dir and Buner, we could begin strengthening the police
there.

Swat/Nizam-e-Adl
--------------


14. (C) Without ever mentioning TNSM leader Sufi Mohammed
by name, Gilani gave the GOP's defense of the Swat agreement
and claimed that when it became clear the taliban had not
implemented the agreement as promised, "I ordered Army
action." The civilian government and the Army, he suggested,
signed the deal knowing that Sufi would not be able to
deliver and the Taliban would renege. In this culture where
signing an agreement binds all parties, the fact the taliban
were not complying while government has implemented
Nizam-e-Adl gave the government the moral advantage required
to resume military operations. Gilani admitted that "I took
refuge in the parliament" to strengthen proof of the
government's commitment to peace.


15. (C) Gilani noted that neither the GOP nor the U.S. can
afford instability in the NWFP; if Zardari had refused to
sign Nizam-e-Adl, the Awami National Party (ANP) would have
been forced to quit the coalition and the NWFP provincial
government, leaving a vacuum for Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam leader
Fazlur Rehman to fill. Returning to the failed religious
party control of the NWFP was not in our interests, asserted
Gilani. Now, said Gilani, the release of the video showing a
woman being flogged (whenever it was filmed) and Sufi's
intemperate statements have galvanized popular opinion
against the taliban.


16. (C) Nisar said flatly that PML-N supported military
action against extremists but would not say so publicly.
This was because the PPP had failed to take PML-N or even its
own coalition partners into confidence about what was going
on. Asked if Zardari's April 28 meeting with the joint
parliamentary committee on security was evidence of this kind
of outreach, Nisar said no--Zardari offered no new
information at the meeting, which he called only so he could
assure Washington he had consulted broadly across political
parties.


17. (C) Continuing PML-N's new outreach to Washington,
Nisar said he would like to visit Washington in late
June/early July and would appreciate help in arranging
meetings. The visit was to lay the groundwork for a
Washington visit by Nawaz, hopefully some time this year.
Nisar also urged the creation of more institutional links
between the U.S. Congress and Pakistan's parliament.


18. (C) Comment: We should continue to encourage Zardari
and Gilani to consult widely across the political spectrum
before the current popular momentum in favor of military
action against extremists fades. We should tell Nawaz it is
no longer in his interest to be politically coy--he needs to
come out publicly in support of military action.




ISLAMABAD 00000926 004 OF 004


FEIERSTEIN