Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ISLAMABAD832
2009-04-21 11:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

SPENDING STRATEGICALLY IN PAKISTAN

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER MARR EAID PK 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0135
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0104
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 4747
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 1470
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 7070
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 6005
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 ISLAMABAD 000832 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR EAID PK
SUBJECT: SPENDING STRATEGICALLY IN PAKISTAN

Classified By: CDA Gerald M. Feierstein, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 ISLAMABAD 000832

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR EAID PK
SUBJECT: SPENDING STRATEGICALLY IN PAKISTAN

Classified By: CDA Gerald M. Feierstein, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (C) Summary. This cable conveys a shorter version of the
strategy we laid out in the Mission Strategic Plan and how we
will implement the President's strategic review. We welcome
the additional resources but we are very mindful of the
constraints: our own, the GoP's and the international donor
community's. We are working with CENTCOM on a combined
civil/military strategy for the tribal areas. And there are
serious holes in the strategy, most notably Balochistan,
which lies across the border from new American troops in
Helmand and Kandahar. We are also adjusting our approach to
how we target assistance, moving to a more geographic
approach rather than a sectoral one. Separately,
international donor coordination is extremely poor: the UN
has been surprisingly passive in addressing humanitarian
concerns and the IBRD and other banks have not played a
traditional leadership role.


2. (C) The strategy consists of:

-- Accelerated training of the Frontier Corps and the
various law enforcement elements in the FATA and Balochistan,
as well as enhancing the COIN capabilities of the Pakistani
military. This will use new authorities and funds provided
by the PCCF, as well as current law enforcement authorities;

-- Redesign the payment of Coalition Support Funds to
incentivize Pakistani action against militants;

-- Continuation and enhancement of USAID employment
generation, capacity building and small community projects
(OTI) in the FATA;

-- A USD 100 million police development program, some parts
of which will be modeled on the successful Afghan National
Civil Order Police (ANCOP) program, starting with the NWFP
police. This is a high priority for the Pakistani government
and will include building up police capacity to return to
Swat;

-- Geographically focusing the billion dollars in additional
economic assistance, initially in 25 districts throughout
Pakistan which are at highest risk for extremism, with a
particular emphasis on agriculture and employment generation.

This will also address the traditional incubators of
Deobandi/Wahhabi extremism in the southern Punjab;

-- A meaningful strategic communications plan. We need to
turn around the tacit support for the Taliban and
anti-Americanism in Pakistani society;

-- A significant, but currently underdeveloped, part of the
strategy must be a sharply enhanced role for the United
Nations, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the
other donors, several of whom, like the Japanese, will put
significant amounts of money into Pakistan. This needs to be
addressed as a top international priority with allies, but
the UN and other agencies need to have the infrastructure
here, on the ground, to carry it out. End Summary.

KEY FOCUS AREAS
- - - - - - - -


3. (C) Mission Pakistan welcomes the prospect of significant
increases in economic and military assistance from the
Congress. This cable outlines the Mission's plans to spend
new resources, and to reprogram existing funds, in support of
our strategic objective: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat
al-Qaida and its extremist allies and prevent their return to
safehavens in Pakistan.


4. (C) We will continue short-term unilateral intelligence
activities and bilateral cooperation to disrupt al-Qaida and
its allies, but the longer-term answer is building Pakistani
counter-insurgency (COIN) capability to fight extremism and
addressing underlying conditions that breed extremism and
militancy. This requires strengthening Pakistani military,
law enforcement, governance, economic development, and
strategic communications capacity. Keeping in mind the
President's commitment to end the "blank check" for Pakistan,
our goal is to introduce new conditionality and leverage
equipment and assistance to build COIN capabilities and

ISLAMABAD 00000832 002 OF 007


reduce poverty and poor governance that help breed extremism.


5. (SBU) We will propose a revision of the USD 1.2 billion
Coalition Support Fund program to reward measurable combat
operations instead of mere troop sustainment and presence.
Congressional approval is pending for efforts to restructure
DOD assistance into a Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities
Fund (PCCF) that will allow the USG to determine the type and
amount of COIN equipment Pakistan procures, condition that
procurement on training/performance, and allow us to shift
funds to reward success and exploit opportunities. PCCF will
complement USD 300 million in longer-term FMF COIN programs
for the regular armed forces and the Frontier Corps and
augment USD 40 million in State/INL assistance already
provided to the Frontier Corps.


6. (C) To build the "hold" element of COIN, we are
initiating a USD 100 million program focused first on a
robust train and equip program for the police in NWFP and
related training for local forces with jurisdiction in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). We will shift
the current emphasis from individual to unit training and
supplement this with continued ATA and ICITAP programs. In
addition, we will continue to support civil/military
cooperation to assure that "hold" operations are successfully
transitioned into "build" opportunities.


7. (SBU) We will shift our management of foreign assistance
funds to a geographic approach, rather than the current
sectoral approach. There are five major geographic areas in
which the nexus of poverty and despair and the presence of
radical and militant elements are breeding extremism --
FATA/NWFP, southern Punjab, northern Sindh, Karachi, and
Baluchistan. We will focus initially on 25 districts in
these areas, where we will create synergies among governance
and development projects to provide jobs, improve delivery of
local services like education and healthcare, increase the
efficiency of the energy and agricultural sectors, and combat
corruption. In the FATA, we will continue small-scale
development, education, health and livelihood programs and
build the capacity of the FATA Secretariat to implement them.



8. (SBU) Although our main focus will be on the geographic
areas, there are several programs that must proceed on the
national level, in order to support and sustain progress at
the local level. We will continue to strengthen Pakistan's
parliamentary democracy, help build national policies that
improve energy efficiency and management of water resources,
assist the Government of Pakistan with strategic
communications, and continue humanitarian programs in support
of internally displaced persons (IDPs) affected by combat
operations. On a macro-economic level, to help address
budget support needs as estimated by the IMF, we will pledge
USD 400 million (as part of a USD 1 billion commitment) at
the Tokyo Donors' Conference. We will ensure this support's
consistency with the IMF/World Bank/Asian Development Bank
economic policy framework by conditioning its disbursement on
the GOP's taking measurable steps to expand democratic
political institutions and government transparency and
accountability; promote education and health services; and
reform policies that are holding back, in particular, the
energy and agriculture sectors, such as reform of the tax
code. We will also press the GOP to make continued progress
fulfilling its IMF commitments, to improve the investment
climate, and to advance stalled efforts to improve the
protection of intellectual property rights. International
donor coordination has been extremely weak; we must work to
ensure that the newly-proposed World Bank Trust Fund and
Friends of a Democratic Pakistan initiatives will improve
coordination of longer-term assistance programs.


9. (SBU) We cannot deliver and adequately monitor
significant new assistance funding without expanding
resources for good program management -- staff, vehicles, and
office space. Given the significant worsening of security
conditions, we will need additional security support,
especially in Peshawar, Karachi and Quetta, to implement and
oversee projects. We will also consider developing small
PRT-like teams to help focus our programs at the district
level.

Ground Realities

ISLAMABAD 00000832 003 OF 007


- - - - - - - - -


10. (SBU) The security situation is deteriorating rapidly;
the GOP has lost control over much of FATA and, most
recently, of Swat in the NWFP. Extremism is spreading beyond
the border to areas (southern Punjab, northern Sindh, Pashtun
neighborhoods of Karachi, and Balochistan) where poverty,
unemployment, and lack of education provide a breeding ground
for terrorists who are fighting U.S./NATO troops in
Afghanistan and challenging the GOP. The USG troop surge in
Afghanistan this spring will open up a new front along the
Balochistan border, an area where Pakistani troops are thinly
deployed and already engaged in combating an ethnic
nationalist insurgency and where the GOP and the
international donor community have delivered few benefits to
one of Pakistan's most underdeveloped regions.


11. (C) Although Pakistan's needs are extensive, local
capacity to absorb assistance is limited. Democratic
institutions are weak; the current civilian government
remains distracted by domestic political disputes. While
President Zardari and PM Gilani appear determined to fight
extremism, they have yet to craft or implement an effective
COIN strategy. Equally, the GOP lacks a strategic
communications program to convince its public of the critical
nature of this battle. The economy is stabilizing under an
IMF Standby Program, but financial constraints continue to
limit the GOP's ability to fund development programs in
support of COIN, and another spike in world energy or food
prices could easily derail the progress to date. The
military remains the ultimate domestic power broker, but it
will take 5-10 years to modernize 1940's era Army/Frontier
Corps forces for effective counterinsurgency operations.


12. (C) International donor coordination has been extremely
weak. We are encouraged the UN has appointed an advisor to
the Friends of a Democratic Pakistan initiative and welcome
the potential of a newly-proposed Border Trust Fund to
improve donor coordination. But UN leadership, especially on
humanitarian relief efforts, is desperately needed and we are
not convinced there is a clear UN commitment to assign a
much-needed high level coordinator for humanitarian
assistance to Pakistan.

Military Aid: Creating War-Fighting Flexibility
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


13. (C) In the short term, we are using unilateral
intelligence activities and bilateral cooperation to disrupt
the activities of al-Qaida and its allies. The longer-term
answer to eliminating terrorist safehavens in Pakistan is to
build indigenous COIN capacity. The tribal Frontier Corps
(FC) is the best potential COIN force Pakistan has for its
western border, but it cannot be effective without Pakistani
military support, so we need to balance our military aid
programs among these forces. We are challenged in helping
the Pakistanis because we do not "own" the combat space in
country; the Pakistani military prefers equipment to training
and remains wary of too large a USG military footprint; and
both regular and FC forces lack COIN doctrine, equipment and
training. Our strategy is to exploit the success of ongoing
FC training and new intelligence cooperation to expand COIN
capabilities within Pakistan and expand cooperation among
U.S., NATO and Pakistani forces to reduce cross-border
attacks on coalition forces in Afghanistan.


14. (C) The largest single source of USG support for COIN is
the USD 1.2 billion annual Coalition Support Funds (CSF)
program created after 9/11 to reimburse Pakistan for expenses
in support of USG objectives in the war on terror. After
careful vetting of Pakistani claims, funds are distributed
into the GOP's treasury account; to date, we estimate that
less than 60% of these funds are transferred to reimburse the
Pakistani military. We are proposing to restructure the CSF
Pakistan program to reimburse the GOP for measurable combat
operations instead of troop sustainment activities and
presence costs (septel). This should improve CSF
accountability and provide Pakistanis with incentives to
fight.


15. (C) The traditional military aid mixture of FMF
assistance plus support from multiple pots (1206, 1207, CN,
etc) of DOD funding is no longer adequate to meet the urgent

ISLAMABAD 00000832 004 OF 007


war-fighting needs in Pakistan. We are asking for USD 400
million in FY09 and USD 700 million in FY10 funds through a
new Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund (PCCF)
proposal that will provide flexibility to respond to changing
combat conditions. PCCF will allow the USG to determine the
type and amount of equipment Pakistan procures, will
condition that procurement on training/performance, and will
allow us to shift funds to reward success and exploit
opportunities.


16. (C) PCCF will fund short-term, quick-impact COIN needs,
including training for the Frontier Corps in NWFP and
Balochistan and for Army Special Forces, upgrading and
maintenance of existing combat helicopters, targeting pods
and training to build Close Air Support and night
capabilities, individual soldier equipment (protective vests,
night vision goggles, communications gear) and vehicles for
the Frontier Corps, construction of two new Border
Coordination Centers, aerial platforms to deliver coordinated
intelligence in support of ground combat operations, and
humanitarian aid (now provided by the Combatant Commanders
Initiative Fund) distributed as we train Pakistani military
forces to conduct civilian-military operations. The aid is
distributed to civilians who suffered collateral damage from
combat operations. Training for the Balochistan Frontier
Corps will be done in cooperation with the UK.


17. (C) Complementing PCCF will be USD 300 million in FY09
and FY10 FMF programs in support of longer-term COIN needs.
Because host country requests drive the FMF process, we are
re-shaping GOP requests to support COIN. The top priority
will be long lead time procurement of such items as new
combat helicopters, followed by armored personnel carrier
refurbishment to improve IED survivability, P-3 surveillance
aircraft and frigates to expand coastal interdiction
programs, and mid-life upgrades for F-16s in support of
ongoing combat operations in FATA. Since 2001, State-INL has
provided over USD 40 million for Frontier Corps equipment and
border post construction.

Law Enforcement: The "Hold" Component
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


18. (SBU) Law enforcement capability across Pakistan is
weak, and the most urgent need is to stem the tide of
extremist expansion into the settled areas. Demoralized law
enforcement personnel -- underpaid, under-trained,
under-equipped -- are no match for the superior forces
supporting the extremists. To build capacity, we will focus
first on the newly-created Elite Force of the NWFP Police.
With USD 65 million in FY09 and USD 155 million in FY10
funds, we are initiating an expanded train-the-trainer
program to build a heavy police force capable of engaging and
defeating well-armed militant groups and criminals. We also
plan infrastructure improvements to expand the number and
harden police stations and checkpoints throughout FATA and
NWFP. To build organizational capacity, we will shift the
current program of individual ATA and ICITAP police training
to unit training, concentrating on small unit tactics and
command and control. In the FATA, where there are no
traditional police forces, we will use USD 6 million in FY09
and USD 13 million in FY10 INL monies to continue training
and equipping tribal Levies that are being tasked with
maintaining security once the Frontier Corps has cleared the
territory. COIN success depends on close coordination
between civilian government and security forces. The Embassy
will continue to support civil/military cooperation among
Pakistani security forces and civilian administrations in the
FATA and NWFP, and expand efforts into other areas of kinetic
operation to make sure that "hold" operations are successful
and lead to "build" opportunities.


19. (SBU) With USD 8 million in FY09 and USD 37 million in
FY10 funds, USAID will support improvements to the
administration of justice to reduce backlogs in court dockets
and to train judges. The first focus will be on courts in
NWFP and southern Punjab, where the desire for swift justice
is fueling popular demand for Shari'a law.


20. (SBU) There also is ample scope for other donor efforts
to supplement police salaries, provide life insurance/death
benefits for the police and build forensic/investigatory
capability at the local and provincial level across Pakistan.

ISLAMABAD 00000832 005 OF 007



Governance: Targeting Aid
- - - - - - - - - - - - -


21. (SBU) We plan to spend USD 887 million in FY09 and USD
1.1 billion in FY10 on USAID programs. We are revising our
development strategy to narrow its geographic focus and
concentrate on areas of most urgent concern, especially those
in which a combination of poverty, unemployment, lack of
education and the presence of extremist elements makes the
population especially susceptible to exploitation. We will
concentrate on stabilizing vulnerable districts through quick
impact activities to meet basic needs of the population,
programs to generate jobs, providing vocational job training
and expanding agricultural and industrial production.


22. (SBU) There are five main geographic areas in which we
will be focusing: FATA/NWFP, southern Punjab, northern
Sindh, Karachi, and Balochistan. We have identified 25
districts across those areas where poverty, unemployment,
isolation, weak governance, and limited prospects provide
fertile recruiting ground for extremist groups. The criteria
for choosing the districts include political factors (the
presence of terrorist training camps and/or extremist
madrassahs; recruitment activities; proximity to Taliban
strongholds; incidents of Talibanization; services being
provided by "charitable" groups associated with extremists;
and ineffective Pakistani government institutions) and
economic indicators (lack of government services like clean
water and education; percentage of people living below the
poverty line; access to markets, and unemployment).


23. (SBU) The 25 districts that will be our initial areas of
focus include eleven in NWFP (Peshawar, Swat, Tank, Hangu,
Bannu, Buner, Upper Dir, Lower Dir, Charsadda, Kohat, Lakki
Marwat, and D.I. Khan); five in Punjab (DG Khan, Bahawalpur,
Rajanpur, Khanewal, and Multan); six in Sindh (Thatta,
Shikar Pur, Larkana, Sukkur, Ghotki, and Jacobabad); two in
Baluchistan (Quetta and Qila Abdullah); and Karachi.


24. (SBU) Our strategy is to build synergy among programs
in a concentrated area: governance programs (USD 8 million in
FY09 and USD 46 million in FY10) will improve local delivery
of services; education programs (USD 143 million in FY09 and
USD 352 million in FY10) will build/renovate schools,
focusing on primary and secondary schools; health programs
(USD 75 million in FY09 and USD 171 million in FY10) will
focus on reducing maternal and infant death rates; and
vocational training and jobs creation programs will provide
young men and women an attractive alternative to what is
being offered by the militants. At a minimum, we will move
more of the management of these programs to our consulates in
Peshawar, Lahore and Karachi to improve the effective
implementation of the programs. In addition, we propose to
establish small PRT-like missions in each affected district
capital to establish close working relationships with the
district governments and track on a real-time basis the
progress of the programs.

PROGRAMS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


25. (SBU) A limited number of programs need to go forward at
the national level in order to support and sustain more
localized efforts. We will continue to strengthen the
parliament, with the goal of increasing civilian control of
the military and improving government accountability to all
of Pakistan's citizens. By supporting national teacher
training, we will create teachers for our targeted districts.
We will continue to provide limited higher education
scholarships, especially for FATA students, which will give
disadvantaged young people exposure to other parts of
Pakistan and elsewhere. We will work to address the
country's chronic energy shortages by improving the
efficiency of existing power grids, which will in turn help
reduce load shedding that is undermining industrial
production, especially in textiles, and limiting agriculture
production that depends on power-driven irrigation.
Expanding rural electrification will improve GOP credibility
with a portion of the population that otherwise receives
little in the way of government services. Last, we will
continue our effective polio eradication campaign.


ISLAMABAD 00000832 006 OF 007



26. (SBU) As part of a Presidential commitment following the
earthquake of 2005 ($50 million per year for four years,
beginning in 2006),we will spend USD 51 million in FY09 for
earthquake reconstruction in the northern areas. This
program should phase out at the end of the commitment period.
We will also provide an estimated USD 8 million in FY09 and
USD 15 million in FY10 to assist internally displaced persons
(IDPs) fleeing military operations or victims of what are
annual flood and earthquake disasters in country. In
addition, through DOD, PRM, OFDA and ERMA, we will provide an
estimated USD 80 million in FY09 to assist IDPs whose homes
and livelihoods have been destroyed by fighting in FATA and
NWFP.


27. (SBU) To help fill budget support needs as estimated by
the IMF, we will pledge USD 400 million in FY '09 at the
Tokyo Donors' Conference as one element of our overall
two-year, USD 1 billion commitment. We will ensure this
support's consistency with the IMF-World Bank macro-economic
policy framework by conditioning its disbursement on the
GOP's taking measurable steps to expand democratic political
institutions and government accountability, promote education
and health services, and reform policies that are holding
back the energy and agriculture sectors. Without continued
adherence to Pakistan's IMF commitments, in particular
elimination of unsustainable subsidies and limited borrowing
from the Central Bank, budget support will not have the
desired effect. Improving revenue collection (in part by
revision of the tax code) and the social safety net, and
genuine GOP steps to begin tackling endemic corruption will
be other important measures.

Economic Development: Creating Jobs and Opportunity
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


28. (SBU) On a policy level, we will continue to encourage
GOP action to tackle the difficult structural reform
decisions that will lead to long-term economic growth and
stability that complements our security efforts. A more
equitable and efficient tax code will enhance and stabilize
GOP revenue streams, as will dismantling outdated and
inefficient state-controlled pricing and distribution regimes
- particularly in energy and agriculture. Ensuring that
intellectual property and patent rights are protected and
addressing the decrepit electricity transmission and
distribution system (that fails to deliver even the
electricity that Pakistan currently produces) will help
bolster the confidence business needs to expand production
and grow the economy. Addressing endemic corruption and
nepotism will boost public confidence in Pakistan's
leadership. Because all these structural issues require time
to show results, it is essential to begin addressing them
now.

Strategic Communications: Effective Messaging
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


29. (C) Our goal is to assist the GOP in developing and
implementing its own strategic communications plan. This
requires overcoming GOP wariness about being seen as working
too closely with the U.S., closing a "trust deficit" built on
past USG withdrawals from the region, countering public
perceptions that the USG presence in Afghanistan is the
source of militancy in Pakistan, and convincing the Pakistani
public that they need to make winning an existential battle
against extremism a matter of national urgency. The
Government of Pakistan will not be able to take on a strong
counter-insurgency campaign in the absence of a unified
population supporting the effort.


30. (C) Our strategy is to leverage indigenous voices that
are acceptable to our Pakistani target audiences to build
support for governmental leaders--especially police and
security forces, expand the writ of the government in FATA,
and reduce anti-Americanism. Working with the DOD Military
Information Support Team (MIST) and USAID, we are using local
public relations firms to establish quick-reaction mechanisms
to deliver COIN-focused messages after suicide bombings and
will better publicize USG assistance outside the FATA.
Within the FATA, USAID has created a Media Cell to publicize
how the GOP is delivering (USG funded) services to the
population. This includes publicity for CCIF-funded
humanitarian assistance (see para xx) we are helping the

ISLAMABAD 00000832 007 OF 007


Frontier Corps deliver to IDPs and those who have suffered
from fighting in the tribal regions. We are refocusing
traditional International Visitor Programs on COIN-related
objectives including law enforcement, counter-terrorism,
energy management, health and food safety, and girls'
education.


31. (C) The MIST is creating a Frontier Corps Media Cell
that will counter militant propaganda, coordinate
anti-extremist messaging, manage FC public affairs in the
area, and eventually manage radio stations supporting GOP
counter-extremist messaging. MIST products include a Tribal
Voices Pashtun radio program, a national Urdu soap opera, a
comic book series aimed at youth, and a "Heroes of the
Frontier Corps" campaign.


32. (C) However, this initiative has been severely
under-funded. To date, we have received from DOD
approximately $7.3 million in support of a $120 million plan
drafted by the Mission and coordinated with the NCTC in 2008.
An additional $1 million has been set aside by State/R for
programming associated with a media campaign in support of
the strategic communications plan and USAID has made $50
million available in FY10 to build the government's capacity
to communicate effectively with the public. We continue
working with them to spend the funding appropriately. This
has not been and will not be enough.

USG Implementation: Staffing/Support Needs
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


33. (SBU) Effective program management in a critical threat
environment is a major challenge, but with proper resources
it can be done. We recommend that the Kerry-Lugar
legislation include authority to spend up to ten percent in
new funding for program management. Implementing this
ambitious new assistance program will require increased
personnel (both U.S. and LES program officers and
administrative support officers),housing, office space,
armored vehicles, driver/bodyguard training, and perhaps
helicopters to effectively monitor programs in dangerous
areas. With a geographic focus to our AID programs, we will
need to deploy more staff in the consulates in Peshawar,
Lahore, and Karachi to more closely administer our programs
in those areas.


34. (SUB) The Mission's DOD and USAID offices alone are
projected to double in size over the next year. To support
this expanded profile, SCA and Mission Pakistan are currently
in the process of filling 31 Supplemental, mid-level Foreign
Service positions. SCA and Mission Pakistan are also
creating and filling 136 LES ICASS positions to support the
rapid and continued growth of program staff. In FY 2011,
Post requests Department support for additional general
services, facilities, financial management and medical staff
to ensure that we can support what will be one of the largest
U.S. Embassies in the world. Accordingly, Post has asked for
the following increases in the 2011 MSP: for U.S. Direct
Hire positions - 9 Program, 9 ICASS, 1 Public Diplomacy, and
a total of 13 fee-funded positions (2 OBO, 8 Consular and 3
RSO); and a total of 49 LES - 12 Program and 37 ICASS
positions.
FEIERSTEIN