THE FAT LADY RARELY SINGS IN PAKISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 000617

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER
SUBJECT: THE FAT LADY RARELY SINGS IN PAKISTAN

REF: A. ISLAMABAD 605

B. LAHORE 53

C. ISLAMABAD 604

D. ISLAMABAD 560

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (C) Summary. In a country which has amended its
constitution 17 times in its 62 year history and where most
leading politicians have spent time in jail at the hands of
rivals, there is rarely a definitive end to political
disputes that are dragged into the courts. President Zardari
and Prime Minster Gilani pulled Pakistan from the brink March
16, but the political drama surrounding reinstatement of the
deposed judiciary, resolution of governor's rule in Punjab,
and the political fate of the Sharif brothers is far from
over.


2. (C) The Secretary and SRAP Holbrooke are widely and
positively credited here with pressuring both Zardari and
Nawaz Sharif to compromise and avoid further street violence.
However, the local perception also is that Washington is
warming to Nawaz as the most popular leader in Pakistan.
Zardari made it clear to Ambassador that he feels the U.S.
and the UK did not adequately support him in this crisis, and
we are unclear if he will follow through with all of the
promises that PM Gilani made on behalf of the government. We
do not expect Zardari or his governor in Punjab to give up on
efforts to marginalize the Sharifs at the local and national
level or restrict the powers of a restored Chief Justice
Chaudhry. End Summary.


3. (C) Prime Minister Gilani's March 16 announcement that
the judges deposed by former President Musharraf would be
restored and that the government would file a petition
appealing the disqualification of the Sharif brothers created
public euphoria over how civil society pressure produced
genuine prospects for an independent judiciary and political
reconciliation. Based on Ambassador's conversation with
Zardari March 18 (Ref A) and PO Lahore's meeting with Punjab
Governor Taseer (Ref B),however, we are not at all sure that
Zardari plans to follow through on reconciliation.


4. (C) The GOP finally has submitted several petitions
requesting a Supreme Court review of the decision to
disqualify the Sharifs, asking for an expanded bench to hear
the cases, and requesting a stay order that would return the
political situation in Punjab to the status quo (i.e.,
restoring Shahbaz Sharif as Chief Minister). The initial
legal work was sloppy, with the court initially complaining
the government did not follow proper procures. There is no
certainty that the Court will reinstate the qualifications of
either or both Sharif brothers. Despite previous assertions
that Iftikhar Chaudhry will be reinstated without conditions,
Zardari hinted to Ambassador that he may try to somehow
restrict Chaudhry's powers. Governor Taseer appears to be
exploring ways, legal and otherwise, to prevent the
restoration of Shahbaz Sharif as Chief Minister.


5. (C) The Pakistan Muslim League (PML) continues its
negotiations with the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) about
forming a government in Punjab, but PML leader Chaudhry
Shujaat told Ambassador March 18 that he still does not trust
Zardari and believes the only way forward is a three-party
unity government in Punjab. That assessment most likely is
based on the reality that PML cannot convince its pro-Nawaz
forward block to join a PPP government. Nawaz publicly
rejected a supposedly scheduled meeting with PML leaders on
March 21; the press has announced that PM Gilani will meet
with Nawaz in Lahore on March 22.


6. (C) Ifitkhar Chaudhry has remained silent on his future
plans, although his acolytes--including Aitzaz Ahsan--are
reassuring the public that he will not go after Zardari or
Musharraf; we are not yet convinced. Meanwhile, Nawaz is
pressing Gilani to repeal the 17th amendment and thus restore
parliamentary government in Pakistan. Gilani, in public at
least, appears eager to enact the Charter of Democracy, which
calls for a constitutional amendment to shift powers from the
President to the Prime Minister. Privately, Zardari told
Ambassador flatly that he had no interest in repealing the
17th amendment, so Gilani may be setting himself up, at a
minimum for disagreement with Zardari, and at a maximum, for

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a fall. Fissures in the PPP continue; an announced PPP
Executive Committee meeting on March 19 became a simple
meeting when Zardari excluded CEC members Sherry Rehman and
others. The announced outcome was that the PPP would proceed
with trying to form an alliance with the PML in Punjab.


7. (C) Kayani, who won kudos for avoiding overt Army
intervention in the crisis, detailed to Ambassador March 19
the full range of his involvement behind the scenes in this
crisis (septel).


8. (C) Comment: In both press coverage and our meetings
with a broad range of Pakistani political actors, the
Secretary and SRAP Holbrooke are receiving praise for U.S.
interventions to pull Zardari and Nawaz back from the brink
of political crisis. There also is a sense that Washington
is warming to Nawaz, the most popular politician in Pakistan,
after the impression that former President Bush snubbed him.
Zardari senses that too; we will need to reassure him of
support for the elected government without promising carte
blanche to over-reach again, or to lash out further. He
punished Information Minister Sherry Rehman for resigning by
replacing her March 19 as Information Secretary to the PPP.
His dislike of Nawaz is palpable and his concern about
Chaudhry based on personal survival, so we need to be
prepared for Zardari to throw additional roadblocks in front
of reconciliation efforts.
PATTERSON