ISLAMABAD EAC MEETING 06/06/09

S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 001258


NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2014

TAGS: ASEC PTER PREL AMGT CACS PK

SUBJECT: ISLAMABAD EAC MEETING 06/06/09

REF: A. ISLAMABAD 1044

B. ISLAMABAD 0776

C. ISLAMABAD 0766


To: SECSTATE WASHDC - PRIORITY

Action: DS

From: AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD (ISLAMABAD 1258 - PRIORITY)

TAGS: ASEC PTER PREL AMGT CACS PK

Captions: NOFORN

Subject: ISLAMABAD EAC MEETING 06/06/09

Ref: A. ISLAMABAD 1044 B. ISLAMABAD 0776 C. ISLAMABAD 0766
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Classified By: DCM Gerald M. Feierstein; Reason 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (SBU) The DCM chaired an EAC meeting on 06 June 2009 to
discuss the steady rise in terrorist threat reporting in the
aftermath of the PAKMIL operations in Swat and review the
personnel security measures currently in place to lessen
vulnerability in our heightened threat climate. All
sections/agencies were represented.


2. (S/NF) RSO and GRPO reviewed the current state of
terrorist threat reporting and host country countermeasures
to deter a terrorist attack in Islamabad. There is a growing
body of intelligence to indicate Baitullah Mehsud and the
Tehrik-e Taliban are desperately seeking to target urban
areas in retaliation for PAKMIL operations in Swat. Likely
targets in the Islamabad area include Pakistani government
buildings, Inter-service Intelligence (ISI) facilities,
police installations, Federal Investigative Agency (FIA)
buildings and large public markets located in the F/6 and F/7
areas of the city. Separate reporting suggests Pakistani
Taliban militants ordered suicide attack cells in
Islamabad/Rawalpindi to target unspecified five-star hotels,
government buildings, military and police installations, as
well as unspecified diplomatic areas.


3. (C) Pakistani security forces have implemented
extraordinary security measures in Islamabad and Rawalpindi
in the wake of the 5/27 attack in Lahore that targeted the
Rescue-15 and ISI compounds. The newly-appointed Inspector
General Police (IGP) for Islamabad implemented a multi-tiered
system of police checkpoints, to include many random,
"rolling" checks to interdict terrorist movements. According
to the IGP, a number of terrorists in the final stages of
planning have been detained over the course of the last two
weeks and intelligence gained from interrogation has led to
further arrests. The IGP believes the threat is real and the
terrorists determined, but the flexible security plan for the
capital is paying dividends. Despite the heightened security
plan for the capital, a suicide bomber attempted to penetrate
the Rescue-15 center in Islamabad's G/8 sector on 6/6,
killing two policemen and injuring six after detonating an
IED after being confronted at the facility checkpoint. The
action of the police mitigated further casualties.


4. (S/NF) The DCM led a discussion on the serious threat of
terrorist attack in Islamabad (and throughout Pakistan) and
the Mission security policies in place to lessen the
vulnerability of Mission personnel while we continue to carry
out vital foreign policy objectives in Pakistan. The EAC
discussed the seriousness and long term significance of
targeted terrorist reporting in Islamabad and the Mission
response. While our footprint within Islamabad will shrink
upon the opening of the TDY lodging facility on the Embassy
compound at the end of June, there is still a significant
number of employees living outside the compound that must
traverse the city on a daily basis. Upon review of Embassy
personnel security guidance, the EAC was unanimous in belief
that these measures continue to provide the greatest chance
of lessening our vulnerability to targeted attacks and
mitigate the potential for being a victim of collateral
damage. Current security policies are geared to keeping
Embassy personnel out of the high risk situations while
allowing some freedom to conduct essential personal business
outside the Enclave.


5. (C) In discussing Embassy personnel's perceptions of the
security climate, EAC members noted that access to terrorist
reporting differs based on office/agency, job, physical
location, etc. While significant terrorist threats are
discussed at each Country Team, the crush of business often
precludes many employees from focusing on the immediate
threat climate. The EAC reemphasized the need to keep all
employees briefed and focused on the serious threat
conditions we face in Pakistan - the reason we operate in a
restricted personal security environment. Section/Agency
heads will refocus their efforts to keep respective sections
up to date on terrorist threat reporting. RSO will continue
to reinforce the real danger from terrorism in both the
new-arrival and monthly refresher briefings.


6. (SBU) The EAC recommended that the Pakistan Travel
Warning be revised to further highlight the significant
terrorist threat facing Pakistan. Non-essential travel is
not recommended and security measures consistent with those
followed by official Americans are provided. CONS is
clearing the recommended update. DCM closed the meeting
after reminding all EAC members on the "No Double Standard"
issues the USG operates under, for both official/non-offical
Americans and also internal to the Embassy. Section/agency
heads cannot impose restrictions more stringent than those
followed by the general population. The EAC remains the one
forum to discuss security implications associated with
terrorist threat and appropriate Embassy response. The EAC
unanimously concurred that current security guidance is
appropriate and no further restrictions will be implemented
at this time.
PATTERSON


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