MACAU SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION AT 10: DESPITE

C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 002262

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/CM; ALSO FOR DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MC CH
SUBJECT: MACAU SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION AT 10: DESPITE
CRACKS, ESTABLISHMENT REMAINS SOLID

REF: (A) HONG KONG 2171 (B) HONG KONG 1807 (C) HONG
KONG 354 (D) 08 HONG KONG 2094

Classified By: Acting Consul General Christopher Marut for reasons 1.4(
b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment: Ten years after reversion, Macau
remains politically conservative and largely under the sway
of the same entrenched, "patriotic" business and political
elite that has essentially run Macau since the late 1960s.
While Beijing has shown a low tolerance for public
corruption, it appears to prefer an imperfect political
status quo to dynamic change. Macau people remain generally
content and largely politically apathetic. While interest in
politics has increased, there is no clear movement towards
political reform. End summary and comment.


2. (C) This is the first of two analytical cables examining
Macau's development on the occasion of the tenth anniversary
of its December 20, 1999 return to Chinese rule; the other
will examine economic issues.

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Change Flags, Change Names, Change Nothing
--------------


3. (C) The Macau that Beijing took back in name on December
20, 1999 was much the same as the one it had ruled in fact
since the late 1960s. At that time, a tottering Portuguese
regime under siege by Cultural Revolution-inspired protests
turned to three senior Macau "patriotic" business clans --
the Ho's (whence came future Chief Executive Edmund Ho
Hau-wah),the Ma's, and the Chui's (whence came CE-designate
Fernando Chui Sai-on) -- to mediate. The three families
restored the peace, but the capitulation of the Portuguese to
protester demands, followed by the rapid decolonization
effort after the fall of Salazar in Portugal, meant that the
Portuguese were marking time until a mutually acceptable exit
could be negotiated with Beijing.


4. (C) It was during this twilight period that traditional
associations -- "patriotic" organizations representing key
business and social sectors -- came to dominate civil
society, running patriotic schools, trade unions, and social
welfare organizations. In the SAR era, these associations
have dominated elections for both directly- and
indirectly-elected legislative seats, ensuring comfortable
majorities for the government to pass its legislative
program. The Catholic Church, the only institution that can
rival the traditional associations in providing education and
social services, has no real political profile (although it
remains a key constituency). While the government does not
actively restrict the media, it also doesn't have to -- most
outlets would fold without government subsidies. Most civil
society organizations similarly subsist on the dole.


5. (C) On the positive side, Macau followed post-Salazar
Portugal in taking the first steps towards social reform,
including directly-elected legislators starting from the
mid-1980s. The Portuguese administration actively recruited
Macau-born students to return from overseas to help develop
the territory. Results lagged behind aspirations, however,
leaving institutional capacity in most areas extremely low at
the time of the handover. Macau since 1999 has remained
critically short of trained local civil servants and legal
professionals. Many policy bureaux still include Portuguese
nationals, and Portuguese lawyers still dominate the legal
field.


6. (C) Edmund Ho Hau-wah seems to have been almost the only
choice for Macau's first Chief Executive (CE),and he still
possesses a stature none of his would-be successors can
match. Born into one of Macau's leading political clans, Ho
managed to keep the establishment and the casino magnates
(the other Ho clan, the Foks and the Chows) on board when
Macau opened the gaming market to competition in 2002. If
not for the 2007 fall of Secretary for Transportation and
Public Works Ao Man-long on corruption charges in a scandal
that threatened to engulf Ho himself, Ho would have left
office as the fair-haired CE whom Beijing held up to Hong
Kong as a model. As it turned out, many observers regarded
Ho as on life-support through his last months, with
successful passage of Article 23 national security
legislation among the penance Beijing set for him.


7. (C) Beijing's concerns about public corruption in Macau
fed rumors that Macau Prosecutor General Ho Chio-meng might
be tapped to succeed Edmund Ho as a warning to wrong-doers.
In the end, a flawed but familiar status quo apparently

looked better than change by fiat. Macau people assumed any
contender for the CE-ship would only declare himself with
Beijing's approval, which in turn meant that Beijing
consciously chose to allow Fernando Chui Sai-on to run
unopposed. The decision to retain Edmund Ho's cabinet
largely intact under the Chui administration supports the
idea that Beijing wants more of the same.

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Guarding a Dying Flame
--------------


8. (C) Portuguese language and culture never achieved the
penetration into Macau society that English did in Hong Kong,
and the Portuguese and Chinese communities lived almost
separate existences. The bridge between the two was provided
by the Macanese -- people either of mixed heritage or whom
consciously chose to acculturate with the Portuguese. While
many Macanese are still active in public life (Secretary for
Administration and Justice Florinda Chan being a prominent
example),Macau's commitment to preserving its Portuguese
heritage seems largely pro forma. Many senior officials
speak Portuguese poorly if at all, and educated Macau people
are more likely to speak English. While Portuguese dominates
the legal field (for now),and the Portuguese press is
largely held to be the most probing and critical in Macau,
the community tending the Portuguese flame is small, and its
influence is marginal at best.

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Majority Silence
--------------


9. (C) One essential ingredient in a political system which
perpetuates an established elite is a population that is
sufficiently content to remain disinterested. Macau's
economy is healthy enough to maintain almost full (if not
always high-quality) employment and to generate revenue
surpluses sufficient to fund repeated cash handouts. Macau
people may not all be rich, but they can get by, and the
booming economy means that many are doing better than ever.
Demographically, political-age Macau residents are largely
Mainland-born or of the first generation born in Macau,
leaving them far more "patriotic" and favorably disposed
toward Beijing. They are also less immediately interested in
politics, although they turn out in respectable numbers for
elections.


10. (C) With the last days of Portuguese rule marred by
corruption and triad-related violence, many saw the coming of
the PRC as heralding a return to law and order, and it
generally has been. Macau's weak governing capacity has
meant Beijing can be more open about its role in Macau, which
is commonly held to extend to day-to-day guidance of the SAR
Administration. We doubt Beijing actually gets down that far
into the weeds, but we expect the process of consultation is
more direct than may occur in Hong Kong, where there are more
"one country, two systems" hawks keeping tabs on the
government.


11. (C) Perhaps the best illustration of this trend was the
public's reaction to Article 23 national security legislation
passed in February 2009. One poll, conducted in late 2008 by
influential "traditional association" the Macau General Union
of Neighborhood Associations, showed support for the law
running at 92 percent. Sixty-five percent, however, admitted
to not knowing the details of the text.

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First Buds of Spring?
--------------


12. (C) Macau society's contented apathy showed the first
signs of change in the runup to the September Legislative
Assembly (LA) elections. With only twelve of the LA's
twenty-nine seats up for direct election, and the ten
indirectly-elected seats decided before the election, nothing
that happened September 20 was ever likely to bring
substantive change to Macau politics. That said, there was a
palpable buzz that many took as the first sign that the Macau
people might stand up.


13. (C) Political debate increased in the months leading up
to both the CE and LA elections, but much of it took place in
the comfortable anonymity of cyberspace or talk radio. A new
organization, Civic Power, tried to position itself as the
voice of a modern middle class, independent of both the
government-business collusion of the establishment and the
"confrontational" tactics of Macau's established

pro-democracy movement, the New Macau Association (NMA).
Three of the political movements able to contest seriously
the direct elections for the LA made a transition to
universal suffrage a core element of their platform.


14. (C) In the end, however, only NMA gained an additional
seat. Its principal pan-democratic competitor, representing
Macau civil servants, managed only to return its single
incumbent, while Civic Power failed to take a seat. Analysts
judge that, while there are more individuals interested in
politics than in past, they represent no single group or
political tendency. Moreover, democracy trails behind anger
over corruption and concern that increasing numbers of
foreign workers are taking jobs from Macau people as a spur
to political participation. That said, turnout for the 2009
LA elections approached 60 percent, a Macau record and
perhaps the most hopeful sign Macau people are becoming more
interested in how they are governed.
MARUT