Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09HONGKONG1078
2009-06-12 10:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Hong Kong
Cable title:  

MACAU CHIEF EXECUTIVE RACE -- NO CONTEST

Tags:  PGOV CH MC 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7455
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHHK #1078 1631012
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121012Z JUN 09
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7837
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 001078 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/CM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2024
TAGS: PGOV CH MC
SUBJECT: MACAU CHIEF EXECUTIVE RACE -- NO CONTEST

REF: HONG KONG 983

Classified By: DPO Christopher Marut for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 001078

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/CM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2024
TAGS: PGOV CH MC
SUBJECT: MACAU CHIEF EXECUTIVE RACE -- NO CONTEST

REF: HONG KONG 983

Classified By: DPO Christopher Marut for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) With Prosecutor General Ho Chio-meng's decision not to
enter the race, former Secretary for Social Affairs and
Culture Fernando Chui Sai-on is almost certain to be Macau's
next Chief Executive (CE). The June 11 deadline for any
senior Macau official to resign his or her position in order
to stand for CE passed without another serious candidate
declaring interest, thus ceding the field to Chui. Prospects
for any of the other, largely unknown, declared candidates
even getting the fifty nominations required to appear on the
ballot are almost nil (reftel). Chui's campaign reports he
has already secured the minimum fifty nominations, but Chui
can be expected to seek as many of the remaining 250
nominations as possible to demonstrate the strength and
breadth of his support. Assuming the process proceeds as
expected, Chui will be "elected" July 26, approved by Beijing
thereafter, and take office December 20.


2. (C) Macau Inter-University Institute (IIUM) scholar Eric
Sautede sees social harmony trumping even corruption in
Beijing's calculus. Thus, having Ho Chio-meng, who
prosecuted Macau's biggest official corruption case to date,
run for CE would serve only to highlight the corruption fault
line in Macau society. The point of having any other
candidate, he argues further, is to offer an alternative, and
other than on corruption, there aren't really any issues
which would show contrast between Chui and another contender.
University of Macau Professor Eilo Yu believes Beijing is
now trying to smooth Chui's path into power by reaching out
to those who oppose Chui. Yu also thinks the (largely tame
and pro-government) Macau media will protect Chui in their
coverage. Even with such "united front" efforts, however, Yu
sees little chance for Chui to have much of a honeymoon
period once elected. Even Beijing may be laying down
markers, as Yu thinks the recent crackdown on corrupt
Shenzhen officials by Mainland authorities are meant in part
as a warning to Macau.


3. (C) Comment: No one ever expected the Macau CE race would
be a real contest; the only question was which candidate
would have Beijing's nod. Chui may now be the heir apparent,
but his march to the throne may not be a pleasant stroll. As
reported reftel, a vocal, if still quite small and largely
powerless, sector of society has now mobilized to express its
opposition to corruption and the historically cozy
relationship between government and a few powerful
"patriotic" business clans like the Chui family. Chui is
saying the right things about opposing corruption and
supporting "one country, two systems," but to avoid being
seen as merely a well-connected princeling, he will need to
deliver clean and effective governance along with economic
prosperity. Moreover, the opposition now finding its voice
in Macau's cyberspace may yet become a force, or at least a
factor, in the September Legislative Assembly elections. End
comment.
DONOVAN