BABIL'S POLITICS HEADING TOWARD ELECTIONS: CHANGE AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L HILLAH 000002


E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: BABIL'S POLITICS HEADING TOWARD ELECTIONS: CHANGE AND
UNCERTAINTY

REF: BAGHDAD 0028


CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth Hillas, Team Leader, Babil PRT, Dept of
State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)


1. Summary. (C) Babil's political landscape is sure to change
after the elections, but the scope may be less than some
opposition politicians seek. ISCI's dominant position is sure
to be weakened, but it may not be broken altogether. Dawa may
assume a greater political role in the province, if only through
superior alliance building with other parties. The previous
ISCI/Da'wa partnership is defunct and not likely to continue in
the next Provincial Council (PC). The reasons extend beyond the
current electoral contest -- Dawa seeking to supplant ISCI as
the dominant political force and both parties competing for the
Shia religious vote - and are based in competing visions of
Iraq's future. Da'wa is aiming to convert growing ties with OMS
into a partnership in the new PC. Although ISCI still believes
it can win the election, it clearly stands the most to lose.
Whether ISCI is prepared to accept an electoral loss or
diminution of its political power in the province will influence
the risk of violence and intimidation after the election. With
one or two exceptions, threats or acts of violence against
candidates have so far not been a feature of the election
campaign, but the period of greatest risk could be after the
election. Most candidate express confidence in the Iraq High
Election Commissions (IHEC) local Governorate Elections Office
(GEO) Director, who is viewed as relatively fair and impartial,
notwithstanding apparent links to Dawa. End Summary.


Da'wa


2. (C) Dawa's goals in the PC election are ambitious.
Provincial party chair Abu Ahmed al-Basri sees Da'wa winning 10
of 30 PC seats, while Deputy Party Chair Dr. Neama jassim says
severn to eight. Under either scenario Dawa would probably be
the largest party in the PC and in a position to play a leading
role in electing a new Governor and PC Chair. Al-Basri has
spent most of the last year distancing Dawa from ISCI and the
current Governor, while reaching out to other political
entities. The previous Dawa/ISCI partnership that ran the
province after 2005 had effectively lapsed by the start of the
current election campaign. The reasons for this, however,
transcend electoral politics, and there is little Dawa interest
in replicating the previous power-sharing arrangement with ISCI.
The electoral rivalry is real, as Dawa seeks to supplant ISCI
as the provincial power-broker and both parties compete for the
support of the same constituency -- the Shia religious voter.
But Dawa has a different vision for Iraq (rejecting regionalism)
and is far more prepared to build partnerships with secular
parties, such as the communists, independents and even the
Sadrist Trend. Abu Ahmed Al-Basri, who has close ties to PM
Maliki, rejects the possibility that the Marja'iyah could force
ISCI and Dawa to work together to run the province.


3. (C) The current Governor, Salim Salah Al-Muslimawi, does not
meet the educational requirements under the new provincial
powers law. An open Governorship just adds to the scope of
political change that may flow from the January 31 election.
The current Governor is widely viewed as corrupt, uneducated and
incompetent. His photos are largely absent from the many
posters festooning Hillah and other Babil towns, even though he
tops the ISCI ticket. Leading candidates to be elected Governor
include Al-Basri and former Governor Iskandr Witwit. Al Basri
himself says he would prefer to have a Dawa-friendly technocrat
fill the position, and then removing him after two years if the
incumbent is not successful. Al-Basri's ambivalence about
becoming Governor is no doubt influenced by the perceived
political drag the current incumbent has had on ISCI.


ISCI/Badr


4. (C) ISCI and its Badr militia still believe they will win the
election. In a December 15 meeting, Deputy Badr Chief Hassan
Hamza Al-Tayi'e virtually identified Badr as an arm of the
state. For many ISCI/Badr officials, it is hard to imagine
losing power. By contrast, there is a broad expectation among
other political parties that ISCI will be weakened by the PC
election, if it does not find itself replaced altogether by a
Dawa-led coalition. Many of ISCI's rivals fear, however, that
it will not freely give up power if it loses. For this reason,
the risk of violence may actually be greater after the January
31, if ISCI/Badr decides to coerce or kill newly elected PC
members in an effort to extend its hold on provincial power.
ISCI's electoral strategy has been to effectively run against
itself, fielding at least six slates of independents with no
formal ties to ISCI, even as ISCI nests itself inside a
seven-party coalition, Shaheed al-Mirab. ISCI campaign seeks to
tap into the Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim's aura of leadership, but his
illness does not reinforce an image of strength.


5. (C) How ISCI responds to the prospective loss of power will
shape the risk of political violence after the election. Given
its influence over the Governor and the IP, Iran could influence
ISCI behavior in such a scenario. It is not clear to many Babil
politicians, especially Da'wa's leadership, whether Iran will
constrain or encourage ISCI/Badr to engage in violence in an
effort to remedy an electoral defeat. Al-Basri's hope -- and it
may not be much more than that -- is that Iran would accommodate
itself to a Da'wa-dominated provincial government. Potentially
the risk of political violence could be greater right after the
election, if ISCI believes intimidation could help it retain its
power.

Sadrist Trend


6. (C) The elections will occur at a time of ferment within OMS
in Babil. Voices of moderation appear to be ascendant and many
Sadrists are engaging in the political process. Like the other
major parties, the Sadrist Trend is fielding several (at least
five) separate candidate slates. Many of them are not "fronts,"
in the true sense of the word, but rather like-minded political
entities, such as Al-Halnah and Risalion. Relations between
Da'wa and OMS have strengthened over the last year and a
coalition between Da'wa and the Sadrists in the new PC is a
propsect welcomed by both parties, but one dependent on the
election results. The OMS parliamentary group's endorsement of
the Free People Trend (Tayar Al-Ahrar) is likely to focus the
Sadrist vote on January 31. Another pro-Sadrist slate (Ahalnah)
had hoped it would also be endorsed by OMS. No Sadrist
candidates have yet alleged threats or intimidation against
them. Like Dawa, the Sadrist-affiliated parties all staunchly
oppose "federalism," specifically the creation of a region of
the south. Unlike Da'wa, these Sadrist entities have not shown
an ability - or inclination - to reach across the sectarian
divide. Interestingly, Ahalnah candidates believe that the
Security Agreement is the way to return Iraq to full sovereignty
and that the USG wants to see a stable, peaceful and democratic
Iraq. Not exactly a view ascribed to Moqtada Al-Sadr.

Independents


7. (C) The independents may end up holding the balance of power
in a new PC. Babil's elites anticipate that political power
will be more diffused in the next PC -- unless Da'wa does
spectacularly well. Non-sectarian but not uniformly democratic,
the leaders of the major independent slates will not, however,
be a coherent force in the new PC. Former Governor Witwit, a
leading independent and very secular candidate, aspires to
recapture the governorship, but he would be hard for Da'wa to
control. As many as three or four independent slates could find
themselves represented on the PC, and one of these could provide
a compromise candidate for Governor acceptable to a wide array
of non-ISCI parties. These range from one headed by the brother
of the assassinated head of provincial police and communists to
secular businessmen and Sunni slates. Change is assured -- with
a new Governor and half the PC replaced -- but there is little
certainty at this point on what it will exactly look like.


HEATH